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ABSTRACT 
Necessity; Logic and God is an investigation into the ground and nature 
of necessary truths and their relation to God. The basic aim of the thesis is to 
establish the case for "Divine Conceptualism" which explains necessary truths 
in reference to a realist ontology of abstract objects as grounded in the nature 
and mind of God. 
In so doing, the thesis first critically examines the major theories of 
necessary truths such as naturalism, linguistic conventionalism, the 
Wittgensteinian conventionalism and various conceptualist theories in 
relation to the human-mind-dependency. The basic questions raised in 
chapters 1 to 4 are: Can necessary truths be naturalised? Are necessary truths 
analytic? Do necessary truths owe their necessity to the contingent rules of 
linguistic conventions? Are necessary truths the rules of our language-game? 
Can necessary truths depend upon the human mind? 
Having eliminated the theories hitherto examined in favour of realism, 
at the end of chapter 4, Divine Conceptualism is proposed to solve the problems 
of realism. Before developing Divine Conceptualism, however, the thesis 
studies two other accounts which also relate necessary truths to God. Thus, 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 examine the contention that God is responsible for the 
existence of necessary truths in terms of creation, the Cartesian Voluntarism 
and Theistic Activism are then examined in this connection. The principle 
questions asked are: Can the notion of creation be applied to the framework of 
necessary truths and objects? Can God change the truth value of a necessary 
proposition? Or could God have refrained from creating necessary truths? 
With the creationist accounts examined and rejected, chapter 7 develops 
and defends Divine Conceptualism and tries to show how it avoids the problems 
facing the creationist views. Thus, in a tentative manner, Divine 
Conceptualism is argued to offer a powerful explanation for the phenomenon 
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INTRODUCTION: NECESSITY MATTERS 
Michael Dummett pointed out that the philosophical problem of 
necessity is twofold: what is the source of necessity and how do we recognise 
it? How can there be certain things which are not just true, but necessarily 
true, namely, which are not true only in the actual world, but true in every 
possible world? Or, how can certain things be such that even God, if true 
cannot make them false, and if false, cannot make them true? 1 
. Necessity, thus understood, is a property of certain propositions which 
are such that if 'true', could not thinkably have been false, that is, they could 
not have failed to be true, hence, are necessarily true. To make a distinction 
between propositions with respect to their modal properties, therefore, does 
seem to be somehow inevitable, because there are some propositions whose 
truth is a matter of contingent happenings such as 
(1) Plato is the tutor of Aristotle. 
But also there are some propositions whose truth is of necessity, hence are 
doomed to be true like the proposition that 
(2)2+2=4. 
Clearly, (1) could have been false; instead, it could have been true that Plato did 
not teach Aristotle. However, by contrast with (1), it is hard to think how (2) 
could possibly have been false; namely, there seems to be no possible state of 
affairs in which one might conceive either the truth of "2 +2= 3", or of 
"2 +2= 5". Accordingly, although it is hard to conceive any circumstances in 
which "2 +2= 4" is other than it is, one can easily think of a counterfactual 
situation where Plato is not the tutor of Aristotle. 
1 Dummen (1959b), p. 169. 
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It is exactly at this point that the celebrated distinction between 
contingent and necessary truth2 presents itself. The difference between the 
two types of propositions in question can be clarified in various ways. 3 For 
instance, it has been argued that a necessary truth is one whose negation is 
impossible, and thus implies a contradiction, whereas the denial of a 
contingent truth is possible, and does not imply a contradiction. 
Again, given a modal realist account of de re modalities, according to 
which propositions are some kind of abstract objects together with essential 
and contingent properties, one might say that contingent truths have their 
truth value, thus, the property of being "true", accidentally while necessary 
truths have this property essentially. 4 If a proposition, accordingly, has the 
property of being true or false accidentally, there seems to be no reason why it 
could not have been otherwise; i. e., there is no fact in virtue of which it must 
2 The distinction between necessary and contingent truth holds a perennial interest in the 
philosophical tradition, therefore it has long been noted by philosophers in varieties of 
ways. Thus, for example, Leibniz characterised necessary truths as "truths of reason" and 
contingent truths as "truths of facts". Our reasoning, on this account, is underpinned by 
two basic principles: 
the principle of contradiction by virtue of which we judge to be false that 
which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory 
to the false; ... and the principle of sufficient reason by virtue of which we 
consider that no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true 
unless there is a sufficient reason, why it should be thus and not otherwise. 
(1973a, §§ 31-32). 
The same distinction is referred to by Hume in his division between "the relations of 
ideas" and "matters of fact"; according to which, the former set of truths, as necessary, are 
either intuitively or demonstratively certain, and hence can be recognised by the mere 
operation of thought, independently of an existential ground in the world. So for instance, 
"the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of two sides" is a relation of thought 
concerning triangles, while "three times five is equal to half of thirty" expresses a 
relation between these numbers. (1975, p. 25). 
3 For the traditional characterisations of necessary propositions, see Pollock (1967), p. 
308. 
4 Plantanga (1987), pp. 189-191. 
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have been as it has been; hence, it could have been true or false and its being 
so is not a matter of necessity. Yet, on the contrary, if a proposition has the 
property of being true essentially, it could not possibly have been false. Such a 
proposition would have been "true no matter what". On the other hand, if a 
proposition has the property of being false essentially it would be an 
impossible proposition, and such a proposition could not possibly have been 
trues. In terms of possible world semantics, therefore, 
(i) A proposition p is necessarily true if and only if p is true in every 
possible world, 
(ii) A proposition p is contingently true if and only if p is true in at least 
one possible world, 
(iii) A proposition p is impossible (necessarily false) if and only if p is 
false in every possible world. 
Among necessary truths significantly are also such propositions as: 
(3) If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is 
mortal, 
whose necessity, one might say, proceeds from being a proper instance of the 
syllogistic form of 
(4) All S are P, M is S, therefore M is P. 
To be sure, all truths of logic including valid argument forms such as 
(4), modus ponens etc., and their proper instances constitute a subset of 
necessary truths. By the same token, some necessary propositions, it might be 
said, owe their properties of being necessarily true to the laws of thought6, so 
for example, 
(5) Socrates is Socrates 
S See Hughes and Cresswell (1968), p. 22. 
6 The law of identity and the law of contradiction together with the law of excluded 
middle, that is, that x is either F or not F, are usually known as "the laws of the thought" 
which are generally taken to be essential to any possible ratiocination. 
9 
is necessarily true in terms of the law of identit3, i. e., x= x, while, 
(6) This table cannot be rectangular at a and non-rectangular at tl, 
and 
(7) A proposition p cannot be both true and false (at the same time) 
is necessarily true in terms of the law of contradiction, that is, 
(8) x cannot be F and not-F (at the same time). 
Although by "necessity" or "necessarily true" one usually has in mind 
"what is logically necessary", nevertheless, one might legitimately make a 
distinction7 between truths that are logically necessary in the narrow sense - 
such as the truths of first order logic, and truths that are logically necessary 
in the broad sense - which may include truths of set theory, arithmetic and 
mathematics and also truths such as 
(9) No one is taller than himself 
(10) If a thing is red then it is coloured. 
The necessity of some propositions, however, is a matter for debate; consider 
for instance: 
(11) There never was a time when there was space but no material 
objects 
and 
(12) There exists a being than which it is not possible that there be a 
greater8. 
The notion of necessity is also needed for a proper understanding of 
entailment or necessary implication statements9 which have a central place in 
logic. Or indeed, given the fundamental role of the notion of logical 
consequence in logic, one might agree with the view that logic itself "is the 
7 See Plantinga (1974), pp. 1-2. 
8 Ibid, p. 2. 
9 See Konyndyk (1986), p. 11. 
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systematic presentation of certain relations of deducibility or implication 
which hold among propositions". 10 Thus, for example, that 
(13) xis a mother 
en tails 
(14) xis female. 
That is to say, one can deduce the truth of (14) from the truth of (13). However, 
it seems that one can hardly make satisfactory sense of the notion of 
entailment or necessary implication, which is essential to one's understanding 
of the very notion of logical consequence or valid deduction, without the 
intuition of necessity. Thus without the notion of necessity preserved in the 
first place, one might wonder what it would be like to employ the expressions 
such as "... is a logical consequence of.... ", "it logically follows that... " and "P 
logically implies Q" etc. In claiming that one proposition entails another, or 
indeed that the proposition p entails q or q (logically) follows from p, 
therefore, one does not seem to be committed just to the belief that two 
propositions p and q are somehow interconnected, but also to the fact that one 
cannot be true while the other is false. There seems to be a necessary relation 
obtaining between (13) and (14); that is, it is impossible for x to be a mother 
but fail to be female. If so, to put it another wayll, to say that p entails q is to 
say that the contradictory of p and not-q, that is, not-(p and not-q), is logically 
necessary. Then, it must be evident that the truth p, the antecedent of a 
conditional such as pzq, is sufficient to secure the truth of the consequent q, 
that is, it is impossible for p to be true and q to be false. 12 
10 Strawson (1967a), p. 1. 
11 See Strawson (1952), p. 23. 
12 Indeed, that is what C. I. Lewis calls "strict Implication", which has been one of the 
basic motivations behind the development of modal logic for overcoming the paradoxes of 
"material implication". But this has been rather controversial. For a debate on this issue, 
see Duncan-Jones (1935); Kneale (1945-46); Hughes and Cresswell (1968), pp. 335-339. 
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Nevertheless, to say that logic is the systematic presentation of 
deducibility should not mean that logical laws (such as the laws of thought and 
the rules of inference) are themselves just rules, and therefore cannot be said 
to be true or false. For a logical rule such as modus ponens, 
(15) If p, and if p implies q, then q, 
itself is a necessary truth. 13 
Consequently, in order to understand the notion of logical consequence 
or entailment one needs to presuppose the notion of necessity, if by pnq we 
mean that it is necessarily the case that not-(p and not-q). But then, the notion 
of entailment would be explained on the grounds of the notion of necessity. 
Similar considerations apply to the rest of logical truths; thus, for 
example in claiming that a contradiction is false, we mean that it is impossible 
that (p & not-p) be true, that is to say, p cannot be true together with not-p; 
hence it is necessarily false. 
If a proposition pis true in terms of logic alone, we usually take this to 
say p cannot possibly be false, and no matter of fact can refute p, then p is 
necessarily true. Thus for instance, let us consider logical truths such as (3) 
which instantiates a valid logical form. From the premises All men are mortal 
and Socrates is a man, we draw the conclusion that Socrates is mortal. But in 
saying this we are not prepared to concede that the premises can be true and 
the consequence can be false. On the contrary, as it seems, what (3) reveals is 
that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. 
Indeed this is presumably what makes a logical form valid in the sense that a 
valid logical form is not simply truth-preserving but necessarily truth- 
13 Here, one should note that whether logic is a body of truths or a body of rules of 
inference is a matter of current debate on the nature of logic. (See Harman, 1984, pp. 107- 
112). Thus, those who think that logic is a body of truths explain logical laws in axiomatic 
terms whereas the advocates of the view that logic is just the science of inferences account 
for logical laws in proof-theoretic (syntactic) terms. And this conflict, in turn, seems to 
have brought to the fore the realist and anti-realist views of logic. 
12 
preserving14; it must yield only a true conclusion out of true premises for all 
its substitutions. That is to say, it is necessarily the case that if the premises are 
agreed upon to be true, then the consequence, which logically follows from 
them, must be true. 
Now, it should be clear that the notion of necessity is therefore a 
common property underlying all logical relations; and thus essential to any 
exposition of those relations as well as making sense of what it is to be true in 
terms of logic. But on the other hand, one can also see that logical necessities 
have a compulsory character in that once certain things are agreed upon 
beforehand to be true, there seems to be no way to avoid what logically follows 
from them; and this is what makes the notion of logical consequence objective. 
For, it is somehow impossible, or unintelligible for us, for example, to agree 
upon the truth of the premises of an argument such as All men are mortal and 
Socrates is a man, but disagree with the conclusion that logically follows from 
the premises, that is, Socrates is mortal. 15 Logical rules, therefore, are 
14 See Konyndyk (1986), pp. 11-12. 
15 There Is however a well-known objection to be cited here. The objection is raised by the 
sceptical character, the Tortoise (in Lewis Carroll's "What the Tortoise said to Achilles"), 
who even though he agrees with Achilles on the premises that (A) Things are equal to the 
same are equal to each other, (B) The two sides of this Triangle are things equal to the 
same, still refuses to accept what logically follows from them, that is, (Z) The two sides of 
this Triangle are equal to each other, as he thinks that an additional premise, that is, (C) 
if A and B then Z is required for the proposed conclusion to be drawn. Again, the Tortoise 
accepts (C) but does not accept Z as he insists that still another premise is needed, that is, 
(D) If (if A and B then Z). Thus, the Tortoise argues that since the desired conclusion 
involves an infinite number of premises such C, D, E, F, and so on, one can agree on what 
logic says (that is, C, D, E, F... ) but still refuse to draw the conclusion, Z. (Carroll, 1972, 
pp. 118-119). However, we might rightly wonder what 'agreeing' or 'accepting' (C) means to 
the Tortoise. Does he really agree with Achilles on (C)1 The Tortoise's agreement on the 
premises might astonish as would the case of a friend who makes a promise but does not 
fulfil her promise. Of course, one might say, she still makes a promise, that is, it is one 
thing to make a promise, yet another thing to keep such a promise. In fact, this might be 
true; but does giving a promise also mean that one is free to break that premise? I do not 
13 
essential to certain human intellectual activities such as thinking, inferring, 
calculating; they set limits to human understanding, conceivabilities and 
hence determine the boundaries of what is intelligible and unintelligible for 
us. It is hard to imagine how can one think or make sensible remarks without 
presupposing the rules of logic. This fact has been clearly underlined by Kant: 
Logic is a science of the necessary laws of thought, without which no 
employment of the understanding and the reason takes place, which 
consequently are the conditions under which alone the understanding can 
and should be consistent with itself-the necessary laws and the conditions 
of its right use-Logic is therefore a Canon. 16 
Similarly Frege argued that "laws of thought" (or "laws of truth") are 
objective as well as prescriptive; they do not describe how we actually think, 
rather, they show how we must think: 
think so. That one is free not to fulfil her promise does not mean that she is justified in 
doing so, therefore, there are good reasons to suppose that our friend does not really 
promise if, in so doing, she also means that she can break her promise. Correspondingly, 
one wants to say, the Tortoise does not really accept (C) and therefore does not agree with 
Achilles on (C). 
However, it ' might be argued that such an analogy is irrelevant, because the 
Tortoise does not break his promise; he keeps his promise at any stage in that he never 
denies that he agreed that (C). This seems to be correct, but then again what does it mean 
to agree that (C)? It has been argued that there can be lessons to be learned from the 
Tortoisian objection such that logic is not a body of truths but also involves a set of rules 
of inference. Hence, on this account, what the Tortoise does not really accept is that (C) is 
a rule. (See Harman, 1984, p. 111). However, it seems to me that such a view is mistaken, 
because the Tortoise clearly accepts (C) but does not fulfil what it says. Therefore, I would 
agree with the view that whether the Tortoise accepts or does not accept what follows from 
(A) and (B), that is, (Z) is logically necessary, therefore the Tortoise is already under a 
logical necessity as the first formulation of the argument is valid. Therefore the procedure 
followed by Achilles is wrong in that he seems to have agreed with the Tortoise as if the 
first formulation of the argument were not semantically valid. See Thomson (1963) pp. 95- 
105. 
16 (1972), p. 38. 
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... the laws of logic ought to be guiding principles for thought in attainment of 
truth... [and] the laws of logic [can] be called 'laws of thought': so far as they 
stipulate the way in which one ought to think. ... [therefore] "laws of thought" 
prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at 
all. 17 
Once it is stated that logic is the unique criterion for any possible way of 
thinking, it is inevitable to ask what is the relation of thinking to the laws of 
logic? Given that thinking is a mental activity it is hard to see there being 
'laws of thought' without there being at least one thinking subject, namely, a 
mind. Then the question is: are the laws of logic somehow embedded in our 
minds or are they mind-independent? In any case, how do we know them? 
Here is the epistemological problem of necessity. The distinction 
between necessary and contingent truths, to be sure, is a metaphysical one, 
but it has closely related epistemological and semantical counterparts; a priori 
-a posteriori and analytic - synthetic respectively. Since I shall consider the 
question of analyticity and necessity and thus whether there is an extensional 
coincidence between necessary and analytic truths later (see 2.2,19n), here I 
shall clarify only the relation between necessity and apriority. 
There has been a traditional assumption that necessary truths are a 
priori in nature. According to this view, what is necessary can be known a 
priori and what can be known a priori is necessary; thus for example, Kant 
argues, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that "any knowledge that professes to 
hold a priori lays claim to be regarded as absolutely necessary". i$ 
The reason behind the traditional identification of the metaphysical and 
epistemic modalities is evident: if something is - in a broad sense - logically 
necessary, it does not depend, for its truth or validity, on the empirically 
17 (1964), p. 12. 
18 Kant (1929), p. 11. 
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observable, discoverable features of any possible world; rather it is a state of 
affairs which obtains in every possible world. Hence, it is knowable 
independently of any experience of particular aspects of contingent states of 
affairs. On the other hand, contingency is identified with the a posteriori since 
one needs a particular empirical investigation in order to establish the truth 
value of a proposition descriptive of a contingent state of affairs which might 
or might not obtain. 19 
Nevertheless, that what is necessary can be known a priori and what 
can be known a priori is necessary has recently been called into question 
especially by Kripke who has maintained that there can be contingent a priori 
truths and also necessary a posteriori truths. With regard to contingent a 
priori truths he suggests20 we consider the case of someone who fixes the 
reference of the term "one meter" as "the length of stick S at to". For Kripke, 
"one meter" is a rigid designator, that is, it designates the same unit of length 
-the length of Sat to in every possible world, whereas "the length of stick Sat 
to" is not since, in some counterfactual situations the length of the stick S could 
have been other than it has been at to, that is, it could have been longer or 
shorter under different physical circumstances. If so, what about the 
epistemological situation of the person who determines "a meter" by reference 
to "the length of stick S at to"? Kripke argues that this case provides us with 
the possibility of contingent a priori truths on the basis of the fact that the 
person who determines the term "one meter" as "the length of stick S at to" 
19 See Salmon (1982), p. 76. Another motivation behind such an equation might be that, on 
the traditional metaphysical view, the truths of reason (logico-mathematical truths) stand 
for the relations obtained among certain abstract and eternal objects or essences such as 
properties, propositions, state of affairs, etc., whose existence is necessary and which 
would exist (timelessly) even though there were no physical objects. (See Chisholm, 1977, 
p. 34). 
20 Kripke (1980), pp. 54-56. 
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knows the length of the stick S at to is one meter without any empirical 
investigation. 21 
What about necessary a posteriori truths? Even if we may not know 
them a priori, Kripke says, we might discover certain necessary truths via 
empirical investigation. Thus, for example, identity statements between names 
such as 
(14) Cicero is Tully, 
and 
(15) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
are necessarily true, even though not a priori knowable. 
In the case of (14), we might have two names -i. e., 'Cicero' and 'Tully'- 
for the same person, and clearly as a proposition expressing identity between 
names, it is a necessary truth. But given that one can use the name 'Cicero' and 
also 'Tully' to refer to the same person without knowing that Cicero is Tully, 
that is, it can be matter empirical discovery that he comes to know that 'Cicero' 
and 'Tully' are identical, then it follows that he does not know a priori that 
Cicero is Tully. Similarly, in (15), one can refer to the same planet, i. e., Venus, 
by using the terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' without beforehand knowing 
that they denote the same planet, and again it would be a matter of empirical 
discovery to decide that Hesperus and Phosporus are identical22. Then, it 
follows that there are necessary truths which are knowable a posteriori. 
In fact, there seem to be some further reasons for thinking that this 
conviction -that not all necessary truths are a priori- must be true; thus, for 
example, there are necessary truths which, let alone knowable a priori, are 
21 P. Kitcher also argued for the existence of contingent a prior! truths in a similar 
fashion, see his (1980). The arguments for the possibility of contingent a priori truths, 
nonetheless, have been a matter of controversy, but it is beyond the scope of our interest 
now to go into further details; but for a defence of traditional identification of contingent 
and a posteriori truths against Kripke's argument, see Casullo (1977). 
22 Kripke (1980), pp. 100-101. 
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not yet knowable to us. Thus, for example23, if Goldbach's conjecture - every 
even number greater than number 2 is the sum of two prime numbers- is true, 
it is necessarily true; if false, necessarily false. But no one knows now if it is 
true or false at all. 
There is prima facie a difficulty with apriority in general as an 
epistemological notion in that it automatically raises the question: knowable a 
priori by whom? There seems to be no reason to exclude certain propositions 
being knowable a priori by some but a posteriori by others. 24 After all, if it is 
not necessarily the case that human a priori knowledge should exhaust all 
knowable set of necessary truths, it must remain true that there cannot be an 
extensional coincidence between necessary and a priori truths. Consequently, 
there might be many truths which are necessary yet not knowable to us. 
In conclusion, as Dummett's formulation reveals, the problem of 
necessity has two components; the first relates to the metaphysical and the 
second to the epistemological aspect of the question. 25 The metaphysical 
aspect, among other things, generates an explanation aimed at providing us 
with the ground as well as the nature of necessity and necessary truths; 
therefore, of the nature of logical truths and falsehoods, of entailment and 
validity; and it also incorporates the questions linked to the justification of 
logical consequence or deductive reasoning. Therefore, the principal 
questions are: in which terms can one provide sufficient justificatory ground 
for the existence of these laws and their modal properties, and thus for the 
modal expressions standing for them such as "cannot", "must", "can only", 
"have to", and so on? On what grounds exactly are we to insist that if a 
proposition pis true, the negation of that proposition, not-p, must be false and 
therefore cannot be true, and likewise the rest of logical necessities? There 
23 Ibid, pp. 34-35. 
24 See ibid., p. 35, and Plantinga (1974), p. 7. 
25 See Forbes (1985), p. 216. 
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also seem to be some further questions crying out for an explanation: is there 
really such a thing as necessary truth? Why there should be logic at all? Or 
rather, how is logic possible at all? 
The epistemological component of the problem, on the other hand, 
relates to the very possibility and nature of our knowledge of necessary truths: 
what is the ground and character of our knowledge of logical necessities? Are 
logical truths a priori? If the answer is yes, how is it possible at all that we can 
have a priori knowledge or the epistemic certainty of such truths? 
In what follows, I shall be concerned primarily with the metaphysical 
problem of necessity. 
19 
CHAPTER ONE 
NATURALISM, REALISM AND NECESSITY 
20 
1. NATURALISM, REALISM AND NECESSITY 
We have seen that there are certain propositions which do not just 
happen to be true but could not possibly be false, hence that they are 
necessarily true; among these necessary truths notably are truths of logic and 
mathematics. All these truths, it has been said, have the common property of 
being necessarily true; and therefore, one can hardly do justice to them, 
without, at the same time, taking into account their modal properties; that is to 
say, the notion of necessity is indispensable for one's grasping the idea of 
truth in logic or mathematics. If so, the locus of the problem of necessity is 
then in virtue of what are such propositions necessary? 
In this chapter, I shall examine the naturalistic response to this 
problem. Therefore, the question is: can necessity -which we seem to 
inevitably attach to every logico-mathematical proposition- be naturalised? By 
naturalising necessity, I understand any attempt to explain the nature of 
logico-mathematical necessity on physicalist grounds. At the heart of any 
naturalistic account of necessity, therefore, would be the identification of 
necessity with certain physical facts; and thus the attempt to make no 
substantial distinction between necessary and contingent truths in an ultimate 
classification among propositions. We might also call this approach the 
extensionalist view of necessary truths. 
1.1 Empiricism and Necessary Truths 
Explaining the ground of necessary truths has been all in all a difficult 
task for the empiricists who espouse the view that all our knowledge comes 
from experience alone. Needless to say, there is an intimate, if not a necessary, 
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connection between the nominalist ontology and the empiricist epistemology. 
Essential to the empiricist theory of knowledge is the requirement of a causal 
theory of knowledge, that is, any possible object of knowledge, one way or 
another, must be accessible to sensory experience and thus fall within the 
range of physical objects. 1 The empiricist must thus explain how within the 
boundaries of the empiricist epistemology and the nominalist ontology we 
might come to know that some propositions are not only true, but necessarily 
true. The difficulty was clearly pointed out by Ayer. 
Where the empiricist does encounter difficulty is in connexion with the truths 
of formal logic and mathematics. For whereas a scientific generalisation is 
readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of mathematics and logic appear to 
everyone to be necessary and certain. But if empiricism is correct no 
proposition which has a factual content can be necessary or certain. 
Accordingly, the empiricist must deal with the truths of logic and mathematics 
in one of the following ways: he must say either that they are not necessary 
truths, in which case he must account for the universal conviction that they 
are; or he must say that they have no factual content, and he must explain how a 
proposition which is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and 
surprising. 2 
J. S. Mill seems to have taken, in Ayer's formulation, the first line of 
thought to show that so-called necessary truths are not necessary but 
contingent truths, inductive generalisations, of some special kind. Mill's 
understanding of mathematical necessity is strongly wedded to his views 
concerning the ontological character of mathematical entities such as 
numbers. Therefore one should first consider his theory of numbers. Numbers, 
in Mill's view, are to be considered to be the properties of physical objects; 
they are supervenient upon them for their existence: 
1Here we must exclude the idealist types of empiricism such as Berkeley's. 
2 (1936), p. 97. 
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The fact asserted in the definition of a number is a physical fact. Each of the 
numbers two, three, four, &c., denotes physical phenomena, and connotes a 
physical property of those phenomena. Two, for instance, denotes all pairs of 
things, and twelve all dozens of things, connoting what makes them pairs or 
dozens; and that which makes them so is something physical... 3 
What, then, is that which is connoted by a name of number? Of course, some 
property belonging to the agglomeration of things which we call by the name; 
and that property is the characteristic manner in which the agglomeration of 
things is made up of, and may be separated, into parts .4 
Evidently, Mill favours a physicalist (or nominalists) ontology, which 
restricts the realm of "what there is" merely to concrete, physical individuals; 
therefore, it rejects the possibility of there being abstract objects. Thus, in 
attributing numbers to the collection of things, on this view, one must refer 
only to aggregates of physical objects and not to the numbers "in the 
abstract" 6. 
However, Mill seems to have been well aware7 of one of the principal 
difficulties concerning logico-mathematical truths, that is: how a finite set of 
general principles can be applied to infinitely many logico-mathematical 
instances. Thus, for example, in arithmetic, one must demarcate a numerical 
3 (1967), III, § S. 
4 Ibid., III, § S. 
S In calling Mill's view of numbers "nominalistic", as Skorupski (1989, pp. 136-137) 
notes, one ought to distinguish this from the nominalism which holds that syllogistic 
reasoning and the propositions of arithmetic express purely verbal facts, which Mill 
criticizes. 
6 Mill op. cit., III, § S. 
7 Thus Mill says: "There is something which seems to require explanation, in the fact that 
the immense multitude of truths (a multitude still as far from being exhausted as ever) 
comprised in the mathematical sciences can be elicited from so small a number of 
elementary laws" (ibid., III, § 5). 
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formula such as 2+3=5, from the general laws which apply to all numbers8. 
But faced with this question, that is, what is the nature of these general laws, 
the explanation Mill offers is also naturalistic. Since, according to Mill, the 
very general law of arithmetic, "[t]he sum of equals are equals"9 (and every 
arithmetical operation is either an application of this law or can be deduced 
from it), to which arithmetic owes its deductive character, is co-extensive with 
natural phenomena; therefore, any arithmetical truth "must be considered an 
inductive truth or law of nature of the highest order"10. For Mill, accordingly, 
one believes on the grounds of this inductive law and the definitions of the 
numbers that, for example, five and two equal to seven, and "... arrive[s] at the 
conclusion (as all know who remember how they first learned it) by adding a 
single unit at a time: 5+1+1=7; and again 2=1+1, therefore 5+2=5+1+1= 
71111. 
It is worth noting that there is said to be a significant connection 
between the idea that truths of arithmetic are empirically-based and that their 
certainty is grasped on inductive grounds; the only way to explain the ground 
of necessary propositions therefore would involve inductive evidence of some 
sort. Then, it must follow that, on this account, there is no substantial 
distinction between empirical and non-empirical truths save the fact that the 
inductive evidence provided is variable. Some propositions are supplied with 
strong and some with weak observational evidence; in a word, what 
distinguishes a so-called necessary truth from a contingent one is a matter of 
degree. 
Mill's idea that numbers are to be identified with the properties (or of 
aggregates) of physical objects has been radically challenged by Frege whose 
8 Frege (1950), § 5. 
9 Op. cit., III, § 5. 
10 Ibid., III, § S. 
11 Ibid., III, § 5. 
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principal counterargument rests on the idea that numbers differ from the 
other properties exemplified by physical objects. Thus, even though it is 
determinable whether a physical object x exemplifies an ordinary property F 
(such as red or blue) independently of our choice; one cannot in the same way 
determine whether x has or exemplifies a number n regardless of a particular 
consideration in mind. So, for example, if we ask someone whether this or that 
physical object is green, he would have an answer simply by looking whether 
the object in question is green or not, whereas if he is given a pile of playing 
cards and asked to find their number, he would wonder whether we wish to 
know the number of cards or the number of the packs of the cards, etc. But 
then it would be seen that the pile of playing cards exemplifies more than one 
number, thus whether it exemplifies the number 1, or 100 cannot be true 
independently of our choice to describe the pile of cards in a particular way. 
Similarly, Frege argues, even though there is no physical property 
corresponding to the difference between one pair of boots and two boots, 
nevertheless one pair and two are different concepts. 12 All this is meant to 
show that numbers cannot possibly be the properties of physical objects and 
their aggregates. 
Suppose we agree with Frege on the propounded disanalogy between 
numbers and the properties of physical objects, and thus that physical objects 
cannot be said to exemplify a number without a description, cannot we, 
nevertheless, think that in ascribing a number to physical objects and their 
aggregates on each description there is still a physical phenomenon as a 
counterpart to numerical predications? 
Such a line of argument seems to be taken by Armstrong as he suggests 
we do identify numbers with the structural properties of physical objects. 
Given that on each numerical attribution there would be counterpart 
structural properties of physical objects, then, all numbers would be the 
12 Frege, op. cit., §S 21-25. 
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properties of physical objects. Thus, for example, if a page can be composed of 
distinct parts such as x, y, 7, ...; then the page's being two parted, three parted, 
four-parted and thus conceivably being infinitely parted, on this view, would 
be considered as the structural properties of the particular (physical) page. 
Given this, one can agree with Frege that physical objects, unlike the rest of 
properties exemplified by them, exemplify indefinitely many numbers. 
Nevertheless, all of these numbers would be considered as the structural 
properties of physical objects. 13 
However, there are a few difficulties with this argument. First of all, 
essential to it is the supposition that physical objects can be divided infinitely, 
but, as Armstrong himself acknowledges, it is likely that "there is an upper 
limit to the complexity of the universe" 14, whereas, this is not so in the case of 
numbers. It is logically possible that there is a terminus for the complexity of 
the physical world where physical individuation comes to an end, however, it 
is logically impossible that numbers are subject to such a limitation; they have 
no terminus. 
In response to this difficulty, Armstrong proposes that the above 
argument can be amended such that numbers are not to be "identical with the 
properties, being two parted, three-parted, etc. ... [But] with the 
logically 
possible set of properties, being two parted, being three-parted, etc. ... To talk 
about the "existence" of numbers would be simply to talk about the logical 
13 See Armstrong (1978), p. 72. It might be a question to what extent Armstrong's 
argument can be taken as a defence of the Millian position as he is in general more 
sympathetic to the Aristotelian ontological intuitions than the Millian empiricism, but 
given his overall position concerning universals (abstract objects) that they exist if and 
only If physical objects exist, It seems to me that he shares the same naturalistic 
comprehension with Mill. A similar defence of the Millian account of arithmetic -though a 
modified one- has been taken by G. Kessler who argues that a number is to be identified 
with "a special relation which holds between aggregates and properties that pick out parts 
of those aggregates". See his (1980), p. 69. 
14 (1978), p. 72. 
26 
possibility of corresponding formal properties. " 15 This answer, it seems to me, 
is clearly unsatisfactory for the purposes of naturalism. For the task the 
naturalist set for himself was to demonstrate that numbers are the properties 
of physical particulars or the structural properties of these particulars. It can 
hardly be claimed that numbers are to be identified with the logically possible 
set of formal properties corresponding to the structural properties of physical 
objects without begging the question. In other words, the kind of possibility 
involved, from a naturalist viewpoint, must be explained by reference to 
physical possibility rather than logical possibility unless the very ground of 
the latter is satisfactorily argued to be grounded in the former. 16 But there is a 
prima facie difference between what is physically (naturally) possible and 
what is logically possible, as there are many things which are 'conceivable but 
not physically possible. Thus, even though it is physically impossible for 
human beings to run faster than the speed of light, nevertheless this is 
logically possible; there is no contradiction in thinking that human beings 
could have such an ability. The same cleavage is obvious in the case of 
numbers too. We do not have any difficulty in envisaging in extending 
numbers infinitely which, it might be said, involves logical necessity, whereas 
we do not have the same assurance in the physical domain. 
There is another Fregean objection to the Millian empiricist. 17 The 
Millian can presumably show the physical counterpart of number 3 in natural 
phenomena simply by displaying the collection of three objects which could 
betaken to be causally and thus empirically responsible for one's having the 
idea of the number 3, but if that is true, how are the naturalists to account for 
number 0 on the so-described natural phenomena basis? Is there any 0 
15 Ibid., p. 73. 
16 Armstrong (Ibid., pp. 39-40) attempts to explain the ground of logical possibility in 
semantic or de dicto terms, however, it is not clear to me how even such a theory can be 
wedded to the naturalistic expectations. 
17 Frege op. cit, § 8. 
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physical object which might sensibly be observable? Or is there any physical 
fact which corresponds to the number 07 Perhaps it would be said that the 
number 0 corresponds to a negative fact, that is, to the state of affairs of which 
no number bigger than 0 is predicable. Thus, for example18, a room with no 
physical objects in it can be said to contain 0 chairs in it; the very physical 
phenomenon of the room's being empty is the physical fact corresponding the 
number 0. Suppose that this is indeed true, can we really extend such an 
empiricist account to an overall theory of mathematical truths and objects? 
It does not seem so. If that had been the case it would have been hard to 
account for larger numbers such as 678460456, or even larger numbers. By the 
same token there seems to be no reason why we should think that one cannot 
sensibly refer to the arithmetical equation of 9,000,000 = 8,999,999 +1 unless we 
observe a collection of physical objects exemplifying such a property? 19 
Consequently, it seems to me that Frege is right when he argued that 
there is a perplexity in the Millian account of arithmetical truths in that it 
confuses "the applications that can be made of an arithmetical proposition, 
which often are physical and do presuppose observed facts, with the pure 
arithmetical proposition itself'20. Thus, for example, by adding three apples to 
six apples we shall get nine apples, but this cannot in effect explain or is not 
the meaning of the arithmetical proposition that 3+6=9. Accordingly, if one 
follows the view that numbers are the properties of physical objects one must 
restrict the use and applicability of arithmetical propositions somehow to 
observable properties of physical objects or phenomena. But how? There is no 
doubt, in saying "there are one table and three chairs in the kitchen" one can 
observe the reference of number one, the table, and number three as there 
are three observable chairs, but how are to explain the numerical predications 
18 Armstrong op. cit., p. 74. 
19 Frege op. cit., § 7. 
20 Ibid., § 9. 
28 
in cases such as, "it is now eleven o'clock", "there is only one way to overcome 
that problem", "two dramatic events happened yesterday", etc.,? Thus, as Frege 
rightly pointed out, 
we can speak even here [i. e., on the level of events] of "parts"; but then we are 
using the word not in the physical or geometrical sense, but in its logical 
sense, as we do when we speak of tyrannicides as a part of murder as a whole. 
This is a matter of logical subordination. And in the same way addition too 
does not in general correspond to any physical relationship. 21 
Likewise, in order to see whether an arithmetical proposition such as 
2+2=4, or 2996 + 567 = 3563, is (necessarily) true we do not need to observe all 
possible instances of that formula. 
Given that numbers can hardly be properties of physical objects in the 
way the naturalist conceives, we can now return to the Millian contention that 
arithmetical truths are inductive truths or laws of nature of the highest order. 
One of the reasons Mill provides for this claim is that arithmetical truths 
are co-extensive with natural phenomena; that is perhaps to say that there is 
no conflict between arithmetical and physical reality. This, indeed, might be 
true, but I do not think that this is a good reason for concluding that 
arithmetical truths are inductive and presumably contingent, because there 
does not seem to be a necessary connection between the fact that an 
arithmetical truth such as 2+2=4 is coextensive with natural phenomena and 
its being an inductive truth. In other words, it is perfectly conceivable that 
necessary truths should be coextensive with physical reality and still be 
necessary and thus non-inductive; there is no reason why these two things 
should not be compatible and hence no reason for taking necessary truths, on 
these grounds, to be inductive or empirical truths. 
21 Ibid., § 9. 
29 
Furthermore, the idea that arithmetical truths can be considered in the 
same boat as empirical and thus inductively valid propositions is not 
persuasive. So, for example, the proposition that "all swans are white", if true 
at all, is an inductive truth depending on the empirical evidence obtained: it 
can never exclude the possibility of there being somewhere unobserved "black 
swans". Hence, no matter that the observational evidence is highly supportive 
of the proposition that "all swans are white", this does not suffice to consider it 
as a necessary proposition. So, while it is possible that, for instance, there 
should be scientific hypotheses based on exceptionless inductive 
generalisations, nevertheless such hypotheses still would be at best highly 
probable, not certain. 22 On the other hand, unlike propositions stating 
empirical generalisations, the certainty of an arithmetical truth such as 
2+2=4, as Russell pointed out, 23 can be drawn from one single instance 
without further enumeration of other instances. 
Consequently, there is a strong disanalogy between empirical-inductive 
truths and the truths of arithmetic. The same conviction is equally true for the 
truths of logic or the validity of logical forms; thus it can rightly be argued 
that it is a matter of necessity rather than probability that the law of 
contradiction is true, namely, that a proposition cannot be true together with 
its negation, . -(p&, p). 24 Or, again, the necessity involved in an argument such 
22 Ayer op. cit., p. 100. 
23 (1967), p. 47. Moreover, the very idea of "induction" In the present context can hardly 
escape the charge of circularity in that it depends on probability and given that one 
cannot explain probability without presupposing numbers and arithmetical truths (Frege, 
op. cit., § 10); again, the principle of induction itself cannot in turn depend on induction 
for its validity (Russell, op. cit, p. 47). 
24 Similarly, it is unclear how such a physicalist picture can account for the law of 
contradiction as in saying that p one also thinks about the negation of p, i. e., not-p, but in 
the natural phenomena only one of these conditions, either p or not-p, obtains; no state of 
affairs p and the state of affairs not -p together take place in the world. Hence, there is not 
a physical fact (in the world) in virtue of which one might think why we consider both p 
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as from the premises that All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, it 
necessarily follows that Socrates is mortal can hardly be a matter of 
probability, therefore, cannot be an inductive truth even though the truth of 
the premises is clearly inductive. Thus, unlike inductive truths, the truths of 
logic and mathematics offer a certainty which makes us think that they 
cannot be otherwise; therefore, necessarily true. So, it seems correct to think 
that the idea of induction cannot accommodate our necessity intuition about 
logico-mathematical truths. There is no reason why a highly probable 
empirical (contingent) proposition cannot be thought to be otherwise, 
whereas it is of the character of necessary truths that one cannot conceive 
them to be otherwise; and this difference seems to be in itself sufficient reason 
for rejecting Mill's view that necessary truths are inductive truths and thus, 
that they have the same truth-conditions as empirical hypotheses. 
1.2 Can we dispense with necessity? 
The Millian idea that necessary truths are inductive or that they are 
laws of nature of the highest order can be seen as one endeavour to secure the 
naturalistic intuition. Another naturalistic attempt, which has been 
originated by Quine, is to account for the existence of necessary truths in 
"holistic" terms. The principal target of the Quinean argument is to show that 
given a global-holistic empiricist picture of reality there would be good 
reasons to think that one should dispense with necessary truths if the 
empirical evidence obtained obliges us to do so. 
In Quine's words, the fabric of all our knowledge is like a field whose 
boundaries are underdetermined by experience where some statements are 
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central to the field while some are peripheral. 25 On this view, therefore, the 
distinctive character of necessary truths is that they are more theoretical in 
that they "may be thought of as relatively centrally located within the total 
network"26. But, since all our knowledge is underdetermined by experience 
and thus "[t]he edge of system must be kept squared with experience"27, no 
statement is ultimately immune from revision as 
... it becomes folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which 
hold contingently on experience, and the analytic statements which hold come 
what may. Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic 
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to 
the periphery can be held to be true in the face of recalcitrant experience by 
pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called 
logical laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to 
revision. Revision even of the logical law of excluded middle has been 
proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; what difference is 
there in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler 
superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle? 28 
Quine too does not see a substantial difference between necessary 
(logical) and contingent (empirical) statements. Indeed he seems to have made 
this point even clearer when he raised the question, "... is this [logical] 
necessity somehow different in kind from what can be attributed to the 
ordinary truths of physical theory or other natural sciences? "29 To this Qliine 
is inclined to say "no": 
and the negation of p, (two states of affairs) when thinking about one (natural) fact (one 
state of affairs). See Hahn (1980a), pp. 40-41. 
25 (1953b), p. 42. 
26 Ibid., p. 44. 
27 Ibid., p. 45. 
28 Ibid., p. 43. 
29 (1963), P. 75. 
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In principle... I see no higher or more austere necessity than natural necessity, 
or our attribution of it, I see only Hume's regularities, culminating here and 
there in what passes for an explanatory trait or the promise of it. 30 
In the face of the empiricist dilemma mentioned above, logical 
positivists such as Ayer and Carnap tried to account for the existence of 
necessary truths in terms of analyticity, that is, for any proposition to be 
necessary it must be so in terms of being analytic, i. e., in virtue of the 
meaning of the words involved. Quine, however, sees an empiricism of this 
type as involving non-empirical tenets such as the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions, and yet no one has given a non- 
questionbegging definition of analyticity. However, Quine too seems to have 
thought that if there is anything such as necessity it must be accountable for 
in terms of analyticity31 and consequently there must be an exhaustive 
coincidence between necessary and analytic propositions. 
In general, Opine's opposition to the theory of necessity in terms of 
analyticity, one might say, has two motivations: (i) he has some radical doubts 
about intensional entities such as objective meanings independent of natural 
languages (the thesis of indeterminacy of translation32) and therefore, (ii) he 
thinks that there cannot be an account of necessity solely in terms of the 
meanings of the words involved. If one cannot therefore make a legitimate 
cleavage between analytic and synthetic propositions, Quine seems to have 
thought, one should altogether dispense with idea of logical necessity, namely, 
with the idea that there is a definite type of proposition to be held to be true no 
matter what. 
30 Ibid., p. 76. 
31 Realer (1982), pp. 204-205. 
32 For the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, see Quine (1960), ch. 2, pp. 26-73; 
and for a general criticism of this thesis, see Katz, (1990), ch. 6, pp. 203-233. 
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What seems to be problematic, however, is whether one can legitimately 
move from the fact that there are no analytic propositions to the claim that 
there are no necessary propositions. Why should one think that the only way 
to explain the ground of necessary propositions is their analyticity? Obviously, 
it is one thing to say that one cannot make sense of the notion of analyticity 
-and indeed in this sense one might agree with Quine that one cannot give a 
non-troublesome definition of the notion-, but still it is an altogether 
different thing to say that there are no necessary truths. As a matter of fact, 
as we shall examine in the next chapter, since both the idea that necessity can 
be defined on the basis of analyticity and the equation between analytical and 
necessary truths can be shown to be erroneous, Q line seems to have based his 
motivation for rejecting necessary truths on insecure grounds. 
Another problem with Qpine's argument is the notion of revisability. 
Again why should it follow from the claim that p is revisable that p is not 
necessary, or vice versa? Clearly the question of "giveupability" or 
"ungiveupability" can be considered as a matter of epistemic rationality in the 
sense that there might be right epistemic circumstances C under which S is 
justified in giving up a necessary proposition, but this can hardly make any 
difference to its necessity; that is to say, there does not seem to be a necessary 
connection between the necessity of a proposition and its being revisable 
under certain circumstances; hence an equation between "unrevisability" and 
"necessity" seems to involve a confusion. 33 The "revisability" or 
"giveupability" of a proposition p, therefore, would mean to withhold p only in 
the face of certain contingent circumstances under which S is not clear how p 
is true of certain facts. However, given that p is necessary does not mean that S 
has to be clear how p applies all its contingent instances (states of affairs), it 
can hardly be concluded on this ground that p itself is not necessary. As a 
33 plantinga (1974), p. 3. 
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result, even though necessary truths might be revised, they are still 
necessary. 
More importantly, however, is it really the case that no statement is 
immune from revision? It is true that the law of bivalence (p v non-p) has 
been proposed for abandonment when applied to vague statements we are not 
sure about their truth-values, 34 but is it really thinkable that just any 
statement can be subjected to revision? Can we, as a matter of fact, conceive a 
possible world in which it would be rational to give up the most basic law of 
logic, that is, the law of contradiction, -(p & -p)? 
If the answer is "yes", then, on the face of it, it would be conceivable 
that just any proposition p is true, but the negation of that proposition, non-p, 
would also be true. Thus, the proposition that no statement is immune from 
revision would be true together with its negation that every statement is 
immune from revision. But could it have been the case that every statement is 
both true and at the same time false? If not, then there seems to be at least one 
a priori (necessary) truth which is a version of the law of contradiction, that 
is, the principle that: not every statement is both true and false. Had this 
minimal principle of the law of contradiction been false, on the other hand, it 
would have been true that every statement is both true and false, 
consequently, there would not be such a thing as rationality inasmuch as the 
34 As for the question of revisionism, the realist, as a defender of the classical logic, 
might follow different strategies. Thus, for example, with Kripke (see Putnam 1983b, p. 
136) he might ask, if nothing is really taken to be a priori why should we not revise the 
vague statements in question instead of the principle of bivalence? On the face of it, there 
seems to be no reason why one should revise logical (conceptual) truths rather than non- 
logical (factual) truths. Or, a more promising procedure for the realist, it seems to me, is 
to consider the problem of vagueness in epistemological context, that is, to deal with the 
problem of vague statements, therefore the question of revision of the law of bivalence, in 
reference to our epistemic inaccessibility, i. e., to consider it as a consequence of our 
ignorance. For such an argument, see Williamson (1994), especially chs. 7 and 8. 
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consistency requirement would obviously have been infringed. 35 
Accordingly, granted that rationality cannot be established in terms of 
inconsistency, we might say the revisionist claim that no statement is immune 
from revision is false, as there is no conceivable circumstance in which the 
minimal principle of the law of contradiction is untrue, or perhaps 
necessarily false. 
But can it coherently be argued that just any statement is revisable? The 
answer must be "no" as it seems to me that such a thesis is self-referentially 
incoherent in that when the revisionist says that no statement is immune from 
revision, nevertheless, he presupposes that there is at least one statement 
which is not revisable, that is, that no statement is immune from revision. 
Hence, the revisionist position itself seems to hold one a priori (necessary) 
truth in repudiating the idea of apriority. 
Yet Putnam has characterised charging the revisionist position with 
self-refutation as a "cheap shot" in the sense that the revisionist principle that 
no statement is unrevisable is itself not argued on a priori grounds, rather on 
the basis of inductive generalisations from the history of science. 36 But this 
seems to be false, simply because of the fact that the certainty of the statement 
that no statement is immune from revision cannot be established on inductive 
grounds. Certainly Putnam would have been right had the revisionist 
contention been that the law of bivalence is revisable in the face of the 
consideration that it remains unable to explain certain scientific cases. As 
seen, however, the revisionist assertion is indeed more than that; for, to 
maintain that in principle no statement is unrevisable entails that any logical 
principle including the law of contradiction is revisable. But the trouble is 
that it is difficult to see how the revisionist principle -including the 
revisability of the law of contradiction- can satisfactorily be explained on 
35 Putnam (1983a), pp. 100-101. 
36 Ibid, p. 98. 
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inductive grounds. Since the very idea of inductiveness implies probability 
rather than certainty; therefore, to say that no statement is immune from 
revision on this ground would mean that the revisionist principle itself is not 
immune from revision; but this does not seem to be what the revisionist has in 
mind. Therefore, inductive grounds from the history of science do not suffice 
to establish the certainty of the revisionist principle that no statement is 
immune from revision, consequently, there remains no reason why the 
naturalist claim that no statement is immune from revision should not be 
vulnerable to the charge of self-referential incoherence. 37 
Finally, let us consider the basic Quinean argument to the effect that, 
given the holistic empiricist picture of human knowledge, we can dispense 
with necessary truths (therefore, logical laws, the rules of inference). In 
other words, in order to simplify the employed theory in the face of 
recalcitrant experience, the Qpinean global empiricist seems to allow that one 
can modify or indeed give up the logical laws underlying the theory as in 
principle no statement is immune from revision. But can one really dispense 
with the whole idea of logical necessity? 
It does not seem so. As Wright vividly argued, there seems to be some 
kind of logical necessity involved even on the proposed Quinean picture, 
which cannot in turn be explained by reference to the global empiricism. To 
depict the Quinean proposal, let The some theory and L be the logic underlying 
T, and I . -b- Pa conditional where I stands for certain initial conditions for T, 
37 Apart from such a charge, in fact, the whole project of global empiricism, or rather of 
"epistemology naturalised" has recently come under severe criticisms to the effect that it 
is self-refuting or incoherent. Thus, for example, Bealer has argued that the three basic 
tenets of naturalism (namely, that (i) all our knowledge is empirical, (ii) the holistic 
principle, and that (iii) only natural sciences can justifiably provide us with the simplest 
comprehensive theory of experience or observation) themselves do not satisfy the 
epistemic criteria they require, that is, they are not justified on the very naturalistic 
grounds they propose, hence naturalism is self-defeating. See Bealer (1992), pp. 99-143; 
and also Bonjour, (1994), pp. 283-300. 
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while P describes possible predictions to be made relative to the these initial 
conditions. To designate this claim as W, we seem to end up with a formula 
such as W: T1-,, 1-+ P. Given this scheme, an experience E would be recalcitrant 
if it assents to I together with the negation of P. Evidently, even though we 
might think that L is revisable as a response to g W, on the face of it, has 
nothing to do with L, and furthermore, Ewould be thought to be a recalcitrant 
experience if and only if W is presupposed. That is, W is both independent of L 
and necessary to make sense of the proposal in question. But if so, what is the 
status of VW Or, in which terms can the global empiricist account for the 
certainty of 14? Given that W itself cannot in turn be explained on the Quinean 
holistic empiricism, then there seems to be at least one statement whose 
existence is a matter of formal proof and therefore establishable 
independently of the proposed empiricist scheme38. By the same token, our 
belief in the certainty that 'if T, then if A, then B' cannot be grounded in 
empirical terms as we have no experience of the truth of the conditional, 'if A, 
then B', yet, on the other hand, for any predictive theorising it seems 
inevitable to appeal to that kind of coherent conditional pattern to test the 
theory. And the very idea of coherence and conditionals articulating how B 
can be derived from A, cannot be explained on the (holistic) global empiricist 
account as they involve the idea of logical consequence or entailment -i. e., 
given A, therefore B; or if A, then necessarily B- and hence the idea of logical 
necessity39. Instead, we might rightly be inclined to think that the idea of 
necessity involved in "logical consequence" and "entailment" should be 
associated with traditional idea of validity of argument forms or the principles 
of inference. They are what has traditionally been taken to be the elements of 
proof and thus irrespectively true of what is considered to be the case in the 
38 Wright (1986), pp. 187-194. 
39 Ibid., p. 194; and Wright (1980), pp. 318-341. 
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factual realm. 40 Accordingly, given that the notion of logical necessity, in 
this sense, is prior to any theorising activity, once again, logical necessity 
seems to be indispensable; and if so, the contention that necessary truths can 
be naturalised on the revisionist grounds and thus that logical necessity is 
dispensable loses its credibility. 
1.3 Intensionalism versus Extensionalism 
Ontological and modal intuitions, as shown, are intimately related. The 
naturalist view of necessary truths, basing itself on a nominalistic ontology 
which denies there being any objects other than physical ones, takes certain 
physical facts as responsible for the presence of necessary truths. But we have 
seen that such a position is mistaken as it is hard both to understand the reality 
of numbers solely on the grounds of physical objects and to ground the 
distinctive properties of necessary truths on contingent propositions. In this 
section, I shall try to make the relation between ontology and modality clearer 
and also to give some further reasons why nominalistic (naturalistic) ontology 
cannot explicate necessary truths. 
Presumably the crucial difference between naturalistic and non- 
naturalistic accounts, as Katz pointed out, "is that naturalistic accounts of the 
formal sciences must sacrifice the necessity of their truths, whereas the non- 
naturalistic account can preserve it"41. Thus, it seems that non-naturalists 
(realists) can account for the necessity of necessary truths along with their 
admission of abstract entities whose existence, unlike physical objects, is 
necessary and eternal. Thus, realists 
40 See McFetridge (1990a) pp. 148-154. 
41 (1990), p. 155. 
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... can explain the uniqueness of mathematics and 
logic in terms of their 
position that mathematical and logical truths are absolutely necessary ... 
on the basis of their view that mathematics and logic are about abstract 
objects. Abstract objects exist necessarily and have their intrinsic 
properties and relations necessarily, and hence true statements about the 
intrinsic properties and relations of an abstract object in this world cannot 
be false of that object in any other. 42 
In other words, naturalists are ontological extensionalists whereas 
realists are ontological intensionalists in the sense that on the former view 
there are only concrete objects and sets, whereas on the latter view there are 
abstract as well as physical objects. Thus, for example, Frege clearly held the 
view that one must be committed to the existence of numbers as abstract 
objects as they stand for (are the references of) singular terms43 which are 
used in arithmetical statements of identity such as "the number of Fs is (the 
same as) the number of Gs", and predication44. Thus, consider 'there are 
42 Ibid., p. 156. 
43 The definition of a "singular term" in this context can be controversial; it can both be 
given a syntactic (see Wright 1983, pp. 53-64) as well as semantic definition. (For a 
general discussion of singular terms, see Hale 1987, ch. 2, pp. 15-44). However, having a 
semantic definition of singular termhood in mind, Hale formulates Frege's argument for 
the existence of numbers as follows: 
(1) If a range of expressions function as singular terms in true statements, then there are 
objects denoted by expressions belonging to that range. 
(2) Numerals, and many others numerical expressions besides, do so function in many true 
statements (of both pure and applied mathematics). 
Hence 
(3) There exist objects denoted by those numerical expressions (i. e. there are numbers). 
(Ibid., p. 11) 
44 See Frege, op. cit., §§ 55-76; and also Wright (1983), pp. 105-129. Even though the 
history of intensionalism can rightly be traced back to Plato's theory of forms (ideas), 
modern intensionalism is usually taken to be rooted in Frege's celebrated distinction 
between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) according to which, two expressions might 
have the same reference (extension) even though they express different senses 
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twelve apostles' and 'the apostles are twelve'; here, we have the singular term 
'twelve' which is common to both sentences and hence corresponds to a 
property (an abstract object) whose instances include all and only properties 
having 'twelve' instances. And this property is what the intensionalist takes to 
be the definition of number 'twelve'. 45 
Intensionalism thus maintains that there are intensional (abstract) 
objects such as properties, propositions etc., over and above extensional 
objects; intensional entities are no less real than physical objects and they 
cannot be identified with their extensions. So, to analyse, for example 
(1)3+5=8, 
numbers such as 3,5,8 are to be identified with properties, '+` with the addition 
relation as well as (1), as a proposition, is an intensional object. All these 
objects, in the intensionalist view, have the properties they have essentially; 
their properties are purely logical and thus fixed prior to the existence of any 
extensional object exemplifying them; therefore, intensional objects are 
considered to be independent of their extensions. By the same token, the 
concept of logical consequence would be seen as a matter of the properties of 
intensional objects and relations obtaining among them. This is why, on this 
understanding, entailment statements have a predeterminate relation; once 
certain things are allowed in the first place, one must accept what necessarily 
(intensions). Thus, although "the morning star" and "the evening star" have two different 
senses, they have the same reference, that is, they designate the same object, i. e., the 
planet Venus. Now of course, given that "the morning star is the evening star", (a =b), has 
a different cognitive value than "the morning star is the morning star", (a - a), it should 
follow that the sense of an expression cannot be identified with its reference. Therefore, 
on the intensionalist account, expressions have senses over and above the fact that they 
might have references; hence, the sense of an expression must be distinguished from its 
reference; the sense of an expression cannot be identified with its reference. (See Frege, 
1952). 
45 See Bealer (1982), p. 124. 
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follows from them, and this relation is necessary and objective in the strictest 
logical sense. 
On the other hand, extensionalism, as a view which restricts the reality 
-what there is- to no more than what is physical, identifies the meaning 
(intension) of an expression with its references (extensions). Thus, the 
meaning of the term "table" is to be identified with its extension, that is the set 
of all tables. Accordingly, it identifies necessary truths and objects with the 
extensional (physical) entities which exemplify these properties. Thus for 
example, let us consider the proposition (1). The extensionalist would identify 
number 3 as the set of physical objects with three members, the number 5 with 
the set of physical objects having 5 five members, and the proposition (1) 
itself would be identified with the set of physical objects exemplifying the 
property of being such that 3+5=8. 
But there seems to be good reasons for thinking that extensionalism 
cannot account for the modal properties of necessary truths. First of all, why, 
for instance, should the relations, obtaining within the mathematical 
proposition such as 2+2=4 be necessary? Given that the truth of such a 
proposition, on this account, is to be verified by reference to its set of physical 
instances, although one can see on the extensionalist grounds how these 
instances exemplify these properties and thus that they are to be classified as 
instances of such a proposition, nonetheless, there seems to be no reason why 
such a relation must hold and therefore such a proposition should be 
necessarily true. 
Secondly, the extensions of natural numbers, the set of physical objects, 
taken by extensionalists to be the meaning of numbers, are, to be sure, 
contingent. That is to say, they could have been different than they have 
actually happened to be, or they even could have failed to exist. But, then, the 
extensionalist is committed to the view that had the extensional instances of 
properties such as numbers been different, the numbers would also have been 
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different; and also had there been no extensional instances, there would be no 
numbers (properties in general). But it is perfectly conceivable that there 
should be different extensional instances of numbers, or no extensional 
instances at all, but it is hard to see how this could have been true in the case 
of the properties (objects) such as numbers and fundamental logico- 
mathematical relations obtaining among them. 46 Evidently, there is no reason 
why 2+2=4 should not have been true even though tangible-observable 
extensional instances, that is, the aggregates exemplifying the state of affairs 
such that 2+2=4, were different (in kind) than they are or failed to exist. 
Accordingly, we might think that intensional entities such as' properties 
cannot be identified either with the set of all their instances in the actual and 
possible worlds, 47 or with functions if that would mean, for example, 
identifying a property F (or a number) as a function from the set of objects 
exemplifying F in one possible world (the actual world) W to the other objects 
exemplifying F in other possible worlds W. For, we might say, the objects 
exemplifying F are contingent objects, hence, had they failed to exist, or had 
they have been different, their function would not come into existence, or 
would have been different48. However, properties (as intensional entities) 
cannot be other than they are even though their instances can be different, 
or even if there are/ were no particulars exemplifying them. 
Therefore, the intensionalist objection to extensionalism is that unless 
the existence of intensional objects is allowed, no justice can be done to our 
intuition of necessary propositions. In fact this intuition can be fortified. 
Thus, the intensionalist can argue that extensions are insufficient in order to 
catch the sense that one needs to attach to the proposition 
46 Indeed this is the neo-Fregean conception of natural numbers; see ibid., p. 123. 
47 D. Lewis (1986,. p. 50) seems to be have Identified a property G with the set of Gs 
instances in the actual and possible worlds. 
48 Pollock (1984), pp. 72-73. 
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(2) For any x, if x is trilateral, then xis necessarily a triangle. 
To be sure, it is necessarily true that whatever object has the property of being 
a triangle has also the property of being a trilateral, in other words, inasmuch 
as these two properties are necessarily co-extensive 
(3) There are no possible worlds in which x is trilateral but not 
triangular. 
On the face of this, the extensionalist must hold that the property of 
being a trilateral and the property of being triangular are synonymous or 
even identical as they are necessarily equivalent. But, the intensionalist would 
argue that these two properties are obviously not synonymous, or identical, as 
the property of being an angle is necessarily different from the property of 
being a side and their instances are necessarily different, 49 even though an 
instance of the one involves an instance of the other. 
Intensional objects in many cases seem indispensable; indeed, this is 
something which has been granted even by the empiricist philosophers. And 
the basic driving force behind such an acknowledgement is the apparent role 
that mathematical truths -therefore, intensional entities- play in the natural 
sciences for the predictions made by scientific theories, or the calculation of 
probabilities and so on, which provides one with sufficient evidence for truth 
of mathematical propositions. 5° However, some of them such as Carnap51 hold 
the view that, although they are indispensable, this should not be taken to 
conflict with the basic empiricist tenets. Accordingly, abstract objects are to be 
49 See Bealer (1982), p. 3; and Katz and Katz (1977), p. 88. It can similarly be argued that 
since the extensionalist does not allow there to be intensional objects, he is necessarily 
committed to the idea that certain meaningful expressions are meaningless such as 
"square circle" solely on the grounds of the fact that they (necessarily) fail to have 
extensions. See ibid., p. 88. 
50 Here, I shall not go into a detailed exposition of how mathematical truths are crucial to 
the scientific investigations; but, for a detailed account of this issue, see Sober (1993). 
51 (1956a), pp. 205-221. 
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considered within the linguistic conventionalist framework without a genuine 
ontological character to which the realist is committed. 
However, we might have doubts here. For, as Putnam pointed out, some 
abstract objects are crucial to one's understanding of certain logical truths; 
thus, for example, it would be conceded that it is a truth of logic that 
(4) If all S are M, and all M are P, then all S are P. 
But it is not clear that how one can make any sense of (4) without 
presupposing the notion of a set, which is an abstract object; since by (4), one 
simply means, 
(4*) For all sets S, M, P: if all S are M and M are P, then all S are P. 
However, even though (4*) is necessary for grasping the content of (4), the 
extensionalist (nominalist) ontology would not allow such a formulation as 
(4*). Again, more importantly, by claiming that a logical formula such as (4) is 
valid, the very notion of validity can hardly be defined (given that it must be a 
semantical definition in this context) in extensionalist terms. Because, in 
saying that a logical form is valid, we presumably mean that it is truth- 
preserving for all its possible substitution-instances. However, it is simply not 
possible to prove this by appealing to the (infinite) number of its contingent 
instances. 52 And this seems to be an additional reason why intensional objects 
52 Putnam (1971), pp. 3-13. Similarly, the fundamental character of intensional 
definition of mathematical truths can be emphasised in some other contexts. Thus for 
example, the extensional view depends on enumeration of the members of the sets, but it is 
hard to enumerate all members, If possible at all. It is hard to see how one can enumerate 
the sets of all extensional instances in the world in order to verify their truth-values. 
Indeed one can easily see that in view of the fact that human beings are finite it is not 
possible to enumerate Infinite structures, but all this can be expressed in intensional 
terms simply by affirming the existence of properties -intensional objects- such as the 
sense expressed by the property of number or mathematical propositions. Thus, as Russell 
pointed out, "our knowledge in regard to all such collections can only be derived from a 
definition by intension" that is, "by a property common to all its members and peculiar to 
them" (1964, p. 168). 
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are indispensable and modal (logical) and ontological structures are to some 
extent inseparable. 
Yet the naturalist might take a more radical step to challenge the 
conclusion which has just been drawn. Indeed such a line of thought has been 
taken by Papineau along with Field's fictionalist (nominalist) view of 
mathematics. On the fictionalist account, the belief in the mathematical 
proposition that 2+2=4 is as much true as the belief that 'Oliver Twist lived in 
London ; "the latter is true only in the sense that it is true according to a 
certain well-known story, and the former is true in that it is true according to 
standard mathematics- 53. But the fictionalist admits that mathematics is 
somehow a good story, nevertheless, the goodness of mathematics does not 
necessitate (or is not sufficient for) its (or necessary) truth. Hence 
mathematical truths are not conceptually necessary; they are neither 
necessarily true nor necessarily false; that is, they are either contingently 
true or contingently false. Accordingly, the contention that mathematical 
objects are indispensable is not true. 54 
There are many (particularly ontological) important issues to be raised 
in this connection. It is a question, moreover, whether such a position can be 
consistently maintained, however I shall not get into that discussion here. 
Rather, I shall confine the discussion to the question of whether one can do 
justice to our modal intuitions without at the same time presupposing some 
kind of intensional objects. 
The fictionalist takes a rather conservative attitude towards mathematics 
(a conclusion that can be drawn from the fictionalist affirmation that 
mathematics is consistent55) which arguably involves certain modal or 
53 Field (1989), p. 3. 
54 For such an interesting discussion see Hale (1987), pp. 102-122; Hale and Wright, 
(1992); Field (1993); and also Hale and Wright (1994). 
55 Field (1989), p. 240. 
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metalogical notions of logical consistency and logical consequence. But to say 
that A logically implies B is to say that there are no models in which A is true 
and B is false, and such a semantical definition obviously presupposes abstract 
objects such as models (sets). Field grants this and similarly the fact that one 
cannot give syntactical -proof theoretical- definitions of the notion in 
question without presupposing abstract objects. Therefore he argues that the 
notion of logical "... implication ... is a primitive notion, just as negation and 
conjunction and universal quantification are primitive notions". 56 
One might agree with Field in taking the notion of logical implication as 
primitive, and thus as a logical operator 'LTrue', (for example, 'A -*. F to be 
defined 'Ltrue(A B))57. But how are we, then, to explain such a notion 
without presupposing logic? To be sure, to say that p is 'LTrue' is to say that p is 
true in terms of logic alone. But can we understand the idea of being true in 
terms of logic without immediately being committed to, so to speak, a logical 
ontology? Essential to Field's argument, it seems, is the idea that logic has no 
ontology; however, it seems to me that such a supposition is mistaken in that 
the intensionalist can rightly argue that logic has its own ontology. 
Accordingly, if there is no reason why " -+ " cannot be taken as a logical 
constant along with "and", and "or", that is, as an expression whose meaning is 
a logical object -indeed this seems to be what is essential to intensionalism- 
then there seems to be no "way out" for the extensionalist to get out of the 
circle of the intensional (abstract) objects. 
In a similar fashion, PapineauS8 has argued that modal judgements are a 
matter of non-doxastic attitudes, that is, unlike mathematics, our modal (and 
also moral) attitudes do not have any objects; or rather, they do not have 
distinctive objects as their references. For suppose that there might be such 
56 Ibid., p. 32. 
57 Ibid., p. 34. 
58 (1993), pp. 198-210. 
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references then, according to Papineau, these should be naturalistically 
discoverable: "The question whether moral and modal claims involve 
reference to distinctive objects is once more an empirical issue, a matter of the 
actual contents of the thoughts of actual individuals". S9 However, 
paradoxically, Papineau mentions several times that there is another way 
which might be available to the naturalist to side-step the question of modality, 
that is, simply by approving "an unqualified commitment to certain forms of 
argument"60. 
It seems to me that, first of all, the argument against Field is equally 
applicable to Papineau's argument that modal judgements are devoid of 
distinctive references. This view is clearly false if the view that logic has its 
own ontology is true, and given that such an ontology is intensional, then it is 
not empirically discoverable. Or else, if the distinctive references of modal 
judgements are empirically discoverable, then the naturalist owes us an 
explanation of how this can be carried through. But, as shown, the task to 
explain how certain things must be true solely on the basis of natural 
(physical) properties seems to be rather difficult, if not impossible. 
As for the second naturalist option, the intensionalist can rightly press 
the point that the notion of "unqualified forms of argument" needs to be 
characterised. Might that not be exactly what the intensionalist has in mind as 
a part of his "intensional" ontology? The answer to this, I think, must be in the 
affirmative as the very notion of (logical) form in this connection (and 
whatever it might be) has to be something other then an extensional object. 61 
591bid., p. 206. 
60 Ibid., p. 200. 
61At this point, as J. J. Katz (op. cit, p. 18) has rightly pointed out the naturalist still 
must face another "naturalistic fallacy", in addition to the one G. E. Moore pointed out 
(that naturalism is committed to defining moral concepts) by holding the view that logico- 
mathematical reality can be naturalised. 
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If these considerations are correct, therefore, once again, one cannot 
account for modal notions such as the notion of necessity (therefore, the 
notion of logical consequence, consistency) on the grounds of the 
extensionalist ontology alone. Furthermore, this shows that there are good 
reasons for thinking that modality and intensional ontology are closely 
connected, and even undetachable; and this is to say that naturalism fails to 
explain necessary truths. 62 
62 Yet, this should not be taken in any sense as a general defence of intensionalism, for 
intensionalism (realism of logico-mathematical objects) has its own problems. The 
foremost trouble for the intensionalist has been generally epistemological, that is, how one 
can have a causal theory of reference to abstract objects. I shall consider this question in 
4.4, where this point will be answered from the "Divine Conceptualist" perspective. 
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2. CONVENTIONALISM, ANALYTICITY AND NECESSITY 
It has been argued in the previous chapter that necessary truths cannot 
be adequately characterised on the naturalistic view which restricts its 
ontology merely to physical objects. If the extensionalist attempt to justify the 
ground of necessary truths in the proposed naturalistic terms results in 
failure, then the naturalist either must deny that there is such a thing as 
necessity and therefore necessary truths or leave the question unexplained. In 
contrast to naturalism, however, realism gives credence to abstract 
-intensional- objects such as properties, relations and propositions; to each of 
them, on this account, a distinct sense or meaning is attached timelessly and 
thus independently of their contingent instances; namely, of their extensions. 
Conventionalism1 unlike naturalism, it would seem, can agree with 
realism that the problem of necessary truths can be dealt with in terms of 
intensional objects, but cannot agree that (i) intensional objects are 
ontologically independent, and that (ii) they have their meanings essentially. 
Instead, the adherent of conventionalism would say that (i) intensional objects 
depend upon our language; they are basically linguistic entities; hence (ii), as 
linguistic entities they mean what they mean contingently. 
2.1 The Conventionalist Argument 
The conventionalist doctrine of necessity and necessary truths draws 
basically on the notion of analyticity2; what makes a proposition p necessary 
1 By this, I have "linguistic conventionalism" in mind. 
2 The notion of analyticity, however, is older than linguistic conventionalism. Leibniz 
seems to have implied that "analyticity" is what makes a proposition necessarily true. He 
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is the analyticity of p; in other words, if p is necessary, then p is analytic. 
Hence, 
(Cl) For any proposition p, p is necessary if and only if p is analytic. 
says "... [if] a truth is necessary, the reason for it can be found by analysis, that is, by 
resolving it into simpler ideas and truths until the primary ones are reached" 
(1973a, § 33). However, it is Kant who was the first to give an explicit account of 
"analyticity" or "analytic truth". According to Kant a proposition is analytic if "the 
predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this 
concept A"; and synthetic If "B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand 
in connection with it" (1929, p. 48). Thus, for example, the proposition "all bodies are 
extended" is analytic because of the fact that "extension" is tied up with the concept of 
"body", whereas, this is not the case with the proposition "all bodies are heavy", since 
"being heavy" is not covertly contained in the concept of "body" and, therefore, it is a 
synthetic judgement. (Ibid, pp. 48-49). Kant thus seems to have thought that a proposition 
is analytic if and only if its truth can be established only by the means of the principle of 
contradiction in the sense that "... no predicate contrary of a thing can belong to it"; thus, 
"the principle of contradiction must ... be recognised as being the universal and 
completely sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge". (Ibid, p. 190). 
Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to suppose that, according to Kant, all 
conceptual truths are analytic, for he clearly thought that mathematical propositions, 
though necessary, are not analytic. So for example, although the mathematical proposition 
7+5 - 12 at first sight seems to be analytic and thus that it can be deduced solely by 
means of the principle of contradiction from the concept of a sum of 7 and 5, nonetheless 
the concept of 12 is by no means already thought of in the sum of 7 and S. Namely, since it 
is not necessarily the case that one can find 12 by analysis of the notion 7 and 5, this 
proposition Is not analytic, but synthetic. So, even if we sometimes ought to attach certain 
predicates to a given concept while this necessity is intrinsic to the very concept, 
nevertheless, this is not what makes a judgement analytic, for "the question is not what we 
ought to join in thought to the given concept, but what we actually think in it" (ibid., p. 
54). As a result, since mathematical propositions are synthetic (even though they are 
knowable a priori), on this view, there is not an exhaustive coincidence between the set of 
necessary truths and those of analytic; they have not the same extension. 
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But what is it to say that p is analytic? Although the notion of analyticity has 
been defined in varieties of ways, it would be agreed that the following 
definition is the most prevalent one3: 
(Al) A proposition p is analytic if and only if its truth can be established 
solely by virtue of the meanings of the words involved. 
On the criterion (Al), for example, it would be said that 
(1) All husbands are married men 
is analytic, therefore necessarily true, due to the fact that the meaning of 
"married man" follows from the accurate analysis of the meaning of 
"husband". So, to understand the meaning of "husband" is sufficient for 
grasping the meaning of "married man", and this, in turn, is sufficient for 
seeing that it is of necessity that (1) true. 
Nevertheless, the core of the conventionalist account of necessity can 
only be grasped when (Cl) and (Al) are taken in conjunction with (C2): 
(C2) Meanings are rooted in (linguistic) convention. 4 
Such an account of necessity and necessary truths found its clear 
exposition in the writings of logical positivists; thus for instance, Ayer argued 
that necessary propositions 
simply record our determination to use words in a certain fashion. We cannot 
deny them without infringing the conventions which are presupposed by our 
very denial, and so falling into self-contradiction. This is the sole ground of 
their necessity. ... It is perfectly conceivable that we should have employed 
different linguistic conventions...... that no observation can ever confute the 
3 See Ayer (1936), p. 105, and also Swinburne (1975), p. 173. 
4 Thus, in a conventionalist spirit, Quinton argued "that the relevant facts about meaning 
[a]re the outcome of conventions" (1973, p. 281). 
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proposition '7+5 a 12' depends simply on the fact that the symbolic expression 
'7+5' is synonymous with '12'5. 
The conventionalist accordingly maintains that logical truths are to be 
understood by reference to the conventionally determined meanings of logical 
words; that is, linguistic (logical) terms such as "and", "or", "if", and so on. 
Thus, for example6, one would see why a logical truth such as "p v -p" is valid, 
on the conventionalist view, as soon as she grasps the meaning, therefore, the 
function of the symbol "v", that is, the logical connective "or" in a language. 
Thus, taking logical laws as the syntactical of rules of a language, the 
conventionalist argues that logical necessity is not an external necessitation of 
pre-existing rules on our thinking but rather an arbitrary creation of our 
own intentions with respect to building our language as Carnap expressly 
maintained: 
In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to built up his own logic, 
i. e., his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, 
if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give 
syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments7. 
Now, given that syntactical rules are to be understood as the 
grammatical rules determining how one should combine the words of a 
language, logic is thus taken to be equivalent to the formal structure of a 
language, therefore, 
(C3) Linguistic rules - Logical rules. 
S (1936), p. 112. 
6 Ibid., p. 105. 
7 (1937), p. 52. 
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Logical rules are in that case necessary in the very same sense that 
linguistic rules are necessary, and given that the necessity of the latter is a 
matter of convention, so is the former. Hence, the contention that a 
proposition p is necessary is to be acknowledged, or makes sense if and only if 
in saying that p is necessary one implicitly refers to a given conventionally 
pre-agreed set of linguistic rules (conventions); p is necessary relative to L, 
where L can also designate an artificial language. Linguistic rules, in turn, 
can be characterised in terms of "the logical syntax of a language", that is, "the 
formal theory of the linguistic forms of that language- the systematic 
statement of the formal rules which govern it together with the development 
of the consequences which follow from these rules" 8. 
For (C3), therefore, "logic will become a part of syntax" as "the logical 
characteristics of sentences (... ) and the logical relations between them (... ) 
are solely dependent upon the syntactical structure of the sentences"9. Thus, 
according to Carnap's account, since it is possible to formulate both formation 
and transformation rules, -which are distinctive of a logical system-, in 
syntactical terms there remains no obstacle why (C3) cannot be true. 10 That 
logic is analytic, on the other hand, is to be understood in the same sense that 
pure syntax is analytic as it deals only with the possible arrangements and 
combinations of linguistic components. 11 
" To sum up, since linguistic rules are contingently as they are, and 
likewise it is a matter of conceptual necessity that whatever is true by 
convention must be contingently so -that is, if p is true on convention 71, p 
could have been otherwise on convention 72 -, it is a natural consequence of 
the conventionalist theory which identifies logical laws with linguistic rules 
8 Ibid, p. 1. 
9 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
10 Ibid., p. 2. 
11 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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that necessary truths are contingent. In other words, necessary truths owe 
their necessity to our contingent linguistic practices. 
2.2 Analyticity examined 
Conventionalism, it has been said, proposes "analyticity" as the ground 
of necessity and necessary truths, where to say p is necessary is to say p is 
analytic; and to say p is analytic is to say p is true by virtue of the words 
involved. 
One prima facie difficulty is, however, on what basis are we to 
understand the very notion of analyticity? The definability of "analyticity", as 
a different question from determining which propositions are analytic, has 
been seriously challenged12, and much of the difficulty seems to consist in the 
failure to give a precise and non-circular definition of the notion. Yet, the 
question whether the notion of "analyticity" can satisfactorily be defined 
would take us beyond the scope of this discussion, rather we shall focus on the 
issue of whether analyticity can explain the notion of necessity. 
To begin with, can we make sense of the notion of analyticity without 
presupposing "necessity" in the first place? Let us consider the definition of 
"analyticity" on (Al), according to which, it would be said, (1) is a necessary 
proposition due to the fact that "married man" necessarily follows from the 
analysis of the term "husband"; that is, the term "married man" is a part of the 
meaning of the term "husband", hence they are synonymous. 
First of all, it is clear that in order to explain the necessity of (1) in 
terms of analyticity one implicitly makes reference to the laws of logic, 
therefore, such a proposition would hold to be analytically true if and only if 
logical laws -i. e., the logical form underlying the proposition (1)- are valid. 
Thus, the fact that "husband" and "married man" are synonymous cannot 
12 See Quine (1953b), and for a defence of "analyticity", see Grice and Strawson (1956). 
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suffice to explain why (1) is necessarily true unless the law of identity (x = x) 
is already presupposed. 13 To be sure, if (1) is only one substitution of the 
underlying logical form of a proposition, then what reasons might the 
conventionalist have for the fact that the law of identity itself is necessarily 
true? 
Moreover, we need to presuppose the notion of necessity in explaining 
the very idea of "correct analysis". 14 Surely, it might be said that the ground 
for the analyticity of (1) is that "married man" is a correct analysis of 
"husband", but "correct analysis" cannot account for just for any proposition 
to be analytic. For instance, although by "God" is meant "the creator of the 
universe" the proposition 
(2) God is the creator of the universe 
is not an analytic proposition because God could have refrained from creating 
any universe. If so, there seems to be a difference between the correct 
analysis of "bachelor" and "unmarried man", on one hand, and "God" and "the 
creator of the universe", on the other. The difference seems to be that while 
there is a necessary equivalence between "bachelor" and "unmarried man", 
this fails in the case of "God" and "the creator of the universe". But, one cannot 
make sense of this difference, hence one cannot differentiate the two senses of 
correct analysis in question unless one presupposes the notion of necessity. 15 
That is to say, in order to explain the difference between these two 
propositions one has to say that it is necessarily the case that if x is a bachelor 
then x is unmarried man, while it is only contingently the case that if y is God 
then y is the creator of the universe. 
Needless to say, this is also the case in the following definition of 
analyticity which explains "analyticity" on the grounds of "logical truth": 
13 Hamlyn (1967), p. 106. 
14 Adams (1983 ), p. 45. 
15 Ibid., p. 45. 
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(A2) A proposition is analytic if and only if its truth can be determined in 
terms of logical truth. 16 
Similarly, without presupposing the notion of logical necessity, again it 
seems difficult how one can make sense of, 
(A3) A proposition is analytic if and only if its negation implies a 
contradiction. 17 
On definition (A3), it would be said, for instance, the proposition, 
(3) All fathers are male, 
is analytic, since its negation 
(4) No fathers are male, 
implies a contradiction. That is to say, (3) cannot be false (therefore, it is 
necessarily true). unless its contradictory is true; and since (4) is the negation 
of (3), it implies a contradiction, and hence it is necessarily false18. In more 
formal terms, this would mean that it cannot be the case that both p and not-p. 
If so, however, again it seems that we cannot understand this type of definition 
without presupposing the law of contradiction, and hence without reference to 
the logical laws. 
Furthermore, granted that implies a contradiction means is necessarily 
false, it seems that one cannot understand the key term in this definition, that 
is, the notion of "contradictoriness", without presupposing the notion of 
logical necessity. Therefore, I conclude that the notion of necessity is more 
16 Frege thought that a proposition p is analytic if the proof given for p merely depends 
upon logical laws or can be reduced to these laws by the help of definitions. See Frege 
(1950), p. 4, and Quine, (1953b), pp. 22-23. 
17 For such a definition of "analyticity", see Swinburne (1975), pp. 174-175. 
18 Similarly, see Adams, op. cit., p. 43. 
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fundamental than the notion of analyticity, and if so, the former cannot be 
understood in reference to the latter. 19 
19 Moreover, there has recently been a considerable discussion on whether 'necessary' and 
'analytic' truths have the same extensions. Kant already noted that mathematical 
propositions are necessary, even though not analytic. However, there seem to be certain 
non-mathematical propositions which are necessary, but not clearly analytic. Thus, for 
instance, 
(K) Nothing can be (simultaneously) red and green all over, 
is obviously necessary, but is it analytic? Given that (K) implies that, x's being red at t1, 
necessarily rules out x's being green at tl how are we to understand the nature of this 
entailment in analytic terms? Of course, in order to show that (K) is analytic one might 
need to show that being "not-green" is a result which naturally stems from the correct or 
partial analysis of the concept of red. But, given the fact that It is hard to specify the 
content of colours (which are in general taken to be unanalyzable qualities); and thus that 
the content of the concept of red cannot be specified in terms of being "not green, not 
white, not blue, etc.,...: ', therefore, "not-green" apparently does not seem to be a part of 
the concept of red. (Pap, 1949, pp. 307-310). 
Similarly, 
(L) Everything coloured is extended, 
though necessary, does not seem to be analytic. For, on one hand, it is difficult to see that 
how the property of being "extended" can be seen as a part of correct partial analysis of 
"coloured", as one can see in the case of "all mothers are female" where "female" is a 
correct analysis of "mother". On the other hand, It just Impossible to separate being 
extended from being coloured. (Adams, op. cit., pp. 46-47). 
The class of necessary truths thus seems to be broader than that of analytic truths. 
And in fact this point was already made by Kripke when he contended that 
(M) Nixon is a human being 
is a necessary truth. For Kripke, (M) is a necessary proposition just because we cannot 
imagine a possible world in which Nixon would designate an inanimate object, rather than 
a human being. Thus, since it is impossible to conceive a counterfactual situation in which 
Nixon is an inanimate object, say green cheese, "it will be a necessary fact about Nixon 
that in all possible worlds where he exists at all, he is human or anyway he is not an 
inanimate object" (1980, p. 46). In Kripke's terminology, the term "Nixon" is a rigid 
designator, because in every possible world it designates the same object. Then, if there 
are non-analytic necessary truths, the notion of necessity is broader than that of 
analyticity, the set of necessary truths cannot be equated to that of analytic truths. 
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2.3 Are Meanings Conventional? 
It has been noted that the real disagreement between the realist and the 
conventionalist account of necessary truths is not on the bare contention that 
their necessity stem from the meanings of the words involved, but on the very 
nature of meanings. 20 Thus, although the realist might readily endorse the 
fact that the meanings of the words involved in a proposition p are responsible 
for p's necessity, he can hardly -agree with the conventionalist claim that the 
ground of the meanings itself is conventional. 
In contrast to realism, however, conventionalism holds that had we 
chosen a different set of words involved in a necessary proposition p, it would 
have been false that p is necessary. There would remain no obstacle on this 
criterion why we should not end up with an entirely different class of 
necessary truths if we decide(d) to do so. But, is it right to claim that "meanings 
are conventional"? 
Of course, it is a matter of contingent use of the words that, for example, 
we call a "bachelor" an "unmarried man", but is it simply this which makes the 
proposition 
(9) All bachelors are unmarried men 
necessarily true? If that is so, then, necessity is obviously verbal. But it seems 
to me erroneous to think that the necessity of a proposition such as (9) is just 
verbal, as it stems from the way we use the words "bachelor" and "unmarried 
man" as synonymous, because it expresses more than what is verbally true of 
(9). Surely, it states certain facts about bachelorhood and being unmarried in 
that there are certain truth conditions required truly to be a bachelor and be 
an unmarried man. It is perfectly conceivable that we could have chosen a 
different set of words for the ones we actually have been using. We could have 
picked out different words for "bachelor" and "unmarried man", but still the 
20 See Quinton, op. cit, p. 268. 
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meaning of the necessary proposition (9) would have been there, though 
expressed in different words and thus remained unchanged. But if 
conventionalism is true, on the face of it, one cannot explain how different 
words in different languages can have common meanings, and also one cannot 
see any reason why the actual set of necessary truths does not as a matter of 
fact differ from one natural language to the other; thus, why cannot the same 
proposition be necessarily true in L1, but contingently true or even 
necessarily false on L2 and so on? 
Similarly, if one takes the thesis that what is responsible for the 
necessity of a proposition p are the meanings of the linguistic terms involved 
in p together with the fact that linguistic entities can change their meaning 
and thus express other than what they actually express, one seems to be 
committed to the idea that a sentence which is taken to be analytic can or could 
have been synthetic, or indeed false21. Thus if one supposes for a while that 
the conventionalist view is true, then it must be perfectly conceivable that just 
any proposition which we ordinarily take to be necessary could have been 
chosen as contingent or indeed as necessarily false, and also any contingently 
true proposition can or could have been taken as necessarily true. Such a 
possibility, on this view, would have been available to anyone who could have 
changed the meanings of the words taking place in expressing a proposition. 
But is this really possible? Can one really make a necessary proposition such as 
(9) false, or indeed necessarily false simply by changing the meaning of the 
words involved? The answer to this question can hardly be in the affirmative. 
For, suppose we have carried out such a task, the real achievement would be to 
supply a new expression for such a proposition; namely, such an attempt would 
result in an alteration in the sentence, not in the meaning (or rather, the 
proposition) of the sentence (9), hence (9) would continue to remain as a 
necessary truth. Similarly, 
21 See Haack (1978), p. 172, In. 
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(10) 7+ 5= 12 
could have been expressed in different symbols, and in fact, one can put (10) 
as follows 
(10*) VII +V= XII. 22 
But can we say that (10) ceases to be a necessary truth when expressed by 
(10*)? Of course not. For what has changed is the verbal expression (the 
symbols), not the meaning of the proposition. If that is the case, however, it 
must follow that what seem to be conventional and thus arbitrary are the 
symbols used in expressing a meaning not the meaning itself as the sense of 
the proposition is preserved in both (10) and (10*); therefore, common to both 
of them. 
However, Crispin Wright has argued that it is open to the defender of 
the conventionalist theory of necessity to maintain that, even though 
necessary truths are international (or rather interlinguistic), there is a sense 
in which necessary truths are still conventional: 
Let us suppose then, with the conventionalist, that it is conventions concerning 
'round', 'square', etc. which generate the necessity that there are no round 
squares. Since it is necessarily true, it will be a constraint upon the 
translation of the latter proposition into French, say, both that the result 
involve an articulation of ingredient vocabulary which appropriately 
corresponds to 'round', 'square', etc. and that it expresses a necessary truth. So 
- still assuming the correctness of the conventionalist view - the very 
22 For similar considerations see Carnap (1956, pp. 56-59). Carnap seems to have granted 
this point in his later work, Meaning and Necessity, where he takes two sentences of 
different linguistic expressions such as (10) and (10*) to be intensionally isomorphic. For 
Carnap, to say that two sentences are intensionally isomorphic is to say that they have the 
same intensional structure, and that is to say, they are L-equivalent. However, as 
aforementioned, even though Carnap seems to have inclined to intensional semantics, 
nevertheless, he tries to accommodate such an intuition within the boundaries of an 
extensionalist ontology considering that intensional (abstract) objects such as properties, 
numbers, propositions, relations etc., are just instrumental linguistic entities, not 
abstract objects in the way the realist conceives. (See Carnap, 1956a, pp. 205-221). 
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feasibility of an adequate translation will depend upon the existence of 
appropriate conventions governing the use of relevant French vocabulary: 
otherwise a suitable necessity-expressing French counterpart of the English 
formulation will not exist. Accordingly there is no need, in order to do justice 
to the 'international' character of necessary truth, to recognise any necessity 
which is not generated by convention23. 
Likewise, granted that even if there could have been alternative 
(possible) linguistic conventions other than the actual ones (that is, even if 
the present linguistic conventions are contingent), Wright thinks the 
conventionalist can argue that we are somehow forced to rely on the actual 
linguistic conventions as "all hypothetical states of affairs are to be described 
in accordance with our actual linguistic conventions,, 24. If so, Wright argues, 
the conventionalist can deny the idea that necessary truths are independent of 
our linguistic conventions and given that linguistic conventionalism can thus 
accommodate an international intuition of necessity it would leave out its well- 
known reductive character25. 
What Wright's argument can at best show is that meanings -therefore, 
necessary truths- depend upon linguistic conventions for their expression, 
but not for their existence nor for their modal properties. Yet the anti- 
conventionalist opposes the conventionalist idea that meanings are 
conventional, therefore, that they are contingent and arbitrary rather than 
their linguistic expressions as he thinks that meanings are properties with 
fixed contents which can be expressed in infinitely many different languages 
of different expressions and grammars. But then Wright's argument, it seems 
to me, misses the real conventionalist spirit. Of course, it is correct to think 
that one cannot convey the meaning of a property such as square without 
23 Wright (1985), pp. 194-195. 
24 Ibid., p. 192. 
25 Ibid., pp. 190-196. 
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being involved in certain linguistic conventions, that is, certain linguistic 
terms such as "four", "side", etc., but what reason might one have for 
concluding that the very meaning (intension) of such a property, being-four- 
equal-sided, which includes all and only objects which have four equal sides, 
also depends upon a linguistic convention? 
Now, Wright correctly says that an adequate translation of a 
(necessary) proposition, say, there are no round squares, from Li into L2 
would "involve an articulation of ingredient vocabulary which appropriately 
corresponds to 'round', 'square', etc. ", but he does not explain what seems to be 
crucially involved in "... appropriately corresponds to... ". If what accounts for 
such an "appropriate correspondence" between different words of two 
different languages is not the existence of the objective, linguistic- 
conventions-independent, meanings, what else can they be? Or else, why could 
not just any linguistic expression be in an "appropriate correspondence"? 
More importantly, given that the primary objective which the conventionalist 
has is to prove that necessary truths are grounded in our linguistic 
conventions, he needs to show exactly why a necessary proposition in L1 
cannot be translated into L2 as a contingent proposition. I cannot see what the 
conventionalist response to this could be. 
Therefore, even if it is true that the feasibility of the translation of a 
necessary proposition p from L1 into L2 rests upon the existence of certain 
linguistic conventions (relevant grammar and vocabulary) in Li and L2, this 
is trivial; what is more important is to see that without there being meanings 
independent of Li and L2, (i) the very idea of an adequate (or correct) 
translation does not make any sense and indeed (ii) translation is impossible. 
Moreover, it is perfectly conceivable that the French sentence (or the 
counterpart sentence in any natural language) expressing the necessary 
proposition there are no round squares should not have existed as it is a 
contingent state of affairs. Whereas, such a proposition would be necessarily 
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true even if there was no such a language as French, that is, it is hardly 
conceivable that the proposition in question should have ceased to exist or 
should have been false when it was not expressed in a language such as 
French or English. 
Again, if necessary propositions -or indeed propositions in general- can 
be expressed in more than one language and each language differs from the 
other in some important linguistic respects, it would follow that necessary 
propositions differ from one another with respect to their, so to speak, 
linguistic properties. 26 The necessary proposition p would thus have the 
linguistic property F when expressed in L1 and the linguistic property G in L2. 
(On the other hand, if a proposition p can be expressed in more than one L, it 
can have different linguistic properties such F, G, etc., in different Ls, and it 
must follow that it is contingent that p has F or G. But then it looks pretty odd to 
think that something should depend upon one of its contingent -or relational- 
properties for its existence as well as modal, and indeed, essential properties. ) 
But if the same necessary proposition p can have different linguistic 
properties, sentences such as Sl, S2, S3, etc., in different languages, how can 
one legitimately argue that p depends upon S1 (or on the grammar -the 
syntactical rules- of such a language) for its existence and modal properties 
rather than S2, or indeed any of them, or still all of them? 
Now if the conventionalist rejoinder is that necessary propositions 
depend upon one linguistic convention, then the question is why is the same 
set of propositions necessarily true in other languages? How can the 
conventionalist maintain that they are international? On the other hand, if 
26 By the linguistic properties of a proposition I mean the set of linguistic expressions 
(words, sentences), grammatical rules etc., of a natural language in which a proposition 
can be expressed. Thus, for example, the linguistic expressions which one uses in 
expressing the proposition that "all brothers are male" In English and the counterparts of 
this sentence conveying the same meaning (proposition) in other natural languages such as 
French and German would be considered as the linguistic properties of such a proposition. 
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the conventionalist thinks that they depend upon all languages he needs to 
show how this can be true; that is, how it can be the case that p remains true, 
indeed necessarily true, in different languages with different linguistic 
conventions (i. e., linguistic expressions, syntactical rules and so on). Still if 
none of these alternatives is available to Wright, is there another sense in 
which we might understand the conventionalist claim that necessary truths 
are conventional? 
I do not see any. Wright sees the difficulty and tries to avoid the 
reductive character of conventionalism by emphasizing the international 
character of necessary truths in terms of different languages, but, here, he 
seems to run into a contradiction as he, on the one hand, is inclined to deny 
that the necessity of necessary truths depend on a particular language and, on 
the other hand, maintains that the necessity involved is convention- 
generated. It is hard to see how these two claims can consistently be held 
together. However, it seems to me, all this shows that Wright's argument 
suffers from a basic fallacy, that is, jumping from the fact that we cannot 
express or convey the content of a necessary proposition without expressing it 
in a given natural language such as English or French to the conclusion that 
necessity of such a proposition must somehow be dependent upon a particular 
linguistic convention. 27 
In this connection, one might rightly argue that the difficulty 
confronting the conventionalist in essence emanates from a nominalistic 
ontology and therefore it has certain resemblances to what has been labelled 
the "naturalistic fallacy" in the previous chapter. The difficulty for the 
ontological extensionalist (naturalist) consists in his identifying intensional 
27 It is conspicuous that one of the motivations behind Wright's argument might be his 
anti-realist disposition and its (later) Wittgensteinian roots, which gives credit only to 
the manifestation, that is, the assertibility-conditions of a proposition which mediates 
some sort of linguistic activity rather than its truth-conditions. 
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objects such as properties (or rather the intensions of properties) with their 
contingent extensions. Further to this it has been argued that this cannot be 
the case. Thus, it has been argued, for example, that one cannot naturalize the 
meaning of a property such as "man" either by identifying with one of the 
actual instances of that property -an actual man- or with set of all its instances 
-the set of all men. The objection, in a word, therefore, was that such a 
property has its extension contingently but has its intension essentially. 
Similar considerations apply to conventionalism as it identifies the meaning of 
a property, so to speak, with its contingent linguistic extensions; that is, with 
the verbal expressions in a language, which stands for non-linguistic 
properties. It is interesting that there is a resemblance between Wright's 
international conventionalist and an extensionalist possible world. semanticist 
such as David Lewis who identifies intensional objects with their, so to say, 
inter-possible-worlds extensions. 
As a result, one thing seems to be importantly missing from the 
conventionalist picture of necessity and necessary truths: it overlooks the fact 
that the identity relation obtaining between a property or a proposition and 
the meaning which one attaches to such intensional entities is necessary, 
whereas the counterpart relation holding between linguistic entities and the 
meanings conveyed by them is contingent. What seems to be conventional is 
what we adopt in the linguistic realm such as words and sentences by which 
we express the meanings of the intensional entities such as properties and 
propositions; and what does not seem to be conventional is the domain of 
meanings which can be or could have been expressed by different linguistic 
expressions. Then, one's freedom to change comes in the linguistic realm (in 
the realm of words, sentences), not in the logical realm (the realm of 
properties and propositions). But such a change in itself is clearly trivial. 
There seems to be, however, a further difficulty with analytic accounts 
-even with non-reductive ones- of necessary truths in general: how can the 
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meaning of the words involved in a proposition p be so connected to each 
other that it makes p not only true, but necessarily true? One possible 
linguistic conventionalist explanation for this might be that a statement p's 
being necessary is not only a matter of the meanings of the words involved in 
p, it is also due to the fact that the words in p stand in such and such relations 
to one another. 28 But still, it seems to me that this too is far from being 
satisfactory in explaining why a proposition must be true. If what makes a 
proposition p necessary are the connections or interconnections of the 
meaning of the words involved in p, plus the syntactical relations obtaining 
among words in p, there seems to be no reason why just any statement cannot 
be considered necessary. Thus, let us consider, once again, a proposition such 
as (1), that is, "all bachelors are unmarried men" and compare it with (2); "God 
is the creator of the universe". Why do the meaning of words involved in (1) 
suffice to secure its necessary truth while this is not equally true in the case of 
(2)? Certainly, since we understand "the creator of the universe" as soon as we 
understand the term "God", what reason might the conventionalist have for 
denying the analyticity, hence the necessity of (2)? 
In reply, it might be said that the relation obtaining among words in 
(1), is not the same as in (2); that is to say, while the identity relation between 
the concept of "bachelor" and "unmarried men" is necessary, the same relation 
between the concept of "God" and "the creator of the universe" is contingent as 
God could have refrained from creating any universe at all. Indeed this is true, 
but I cannot see how this can be explained solely on the conventionalist 
grounds; on the grounds of the meanings of the words and their syntactical 
relations alone. 
28 See, for example, E. J. Craig (1975), p. 7. 
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2.4 Linguistic Rules and Logical Truths 
Now, if on the conventionalist view, the modal property of a proposition 
is a matter of convention and if also whatever is true by convention could 
have been otherwise, it is a natural consequence of such a view that necessity 
is a matter of contingency. There seems to be no reason why one cannot take 
just any proposition as necessary; why radically different conventions with 
entirely different sets of necessary propositions cannot or could not have been 
produced instead. For, on this account, logic itself is considered to be 
conventional; grounded in language in terms of syntactical characterisation 
of the basic terms. It is up to us to choose the linguistic convention in which 
the syntactical rules, hence logic, are embedded. Such a view surely 
presupposes that there do not exist beforehand any logical constraints either 
to force us to adopt one convention rather than the other, or to form the scope 
and the limits of our convention. Nor is there a common ground on which all 
possible conventions somehow must rest. Hence, logic is arbitrary in the sense 
that logical necessity is at best seen as an entailment internal to a convention 
and thus ultimately traceable to certain self-restrictions. In a word, therefore, 
logical necessity is not what the realist takes it to be: an objective source of 
compulsion upon us, but is rather our own intentional confinements on our 
own language. 
But is it really conceivable that we can or could have adopted just any 
proposition to be necessary or contingent? Is it conceivable that we can or 
could have chosen a radically different convention instead, in which, for 
instance, the very law of contradiction is, as a result of the adopted linguistic 
fashion, false, and instead, however, the negation of such a law is necessarily 
true? 
Certainly it is a part of the conventionalist view that there are 
alternatives to the actual set of necessary truths; however, the question is 
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whether the conventionalist can show us how this is indeed possible. To start 
with can one, for example, consistently maintain that the law of contradiction 
is false? To be sure, if to say that it is false is to say it is not true, then in 
denying, that is, in saying that the law of contradiction is false, one seems to 
be already committed to the very thing one is trying to deny. In this sense, the 
law of contradiction is often argued to be so central to our thinking that we 
cannot consistently deny it as our denial presupposes such a law and thus 
affirms its validity29. Precisely, this is what Aristotle30 tried to show when he 
said that the law of contradiction is the most fundamental of all principles, 
hence that it is impossible to think that an object can have the property F and 
not-F simultaneously and in the same respect. 
So, it looks unquestionably true that there is a minimal requirement for 
there being intelligible discourse in that such discourse must not breach the 
law of contradiction on pain of being inconsistent; for, it is not possible to 
make sense of a convention in which any proposition p is true together with 
its negation not-p. But can there not be a sense in which it might be thought 
that the law of contradiction is still conventional? What if we exchange the 
meaning of "not" for "either identical with or different from"? 31 Would not 
then the law of contradiction be violated, and yet the discourse involving a 
contradiction, p and not-p, be plainly intelligible? Of course not. For, in so 
doing, what is changed is not the logic, the law of contradiction, but the 
language in which it is expressed. Yes, not-p would not then be the 
contradictory of p, but the meaning of "not" as it occurs in "p and not-p" would 
be preserved; this remains unchanged even though it can be expressed in 
29 Blanshard (1962), p. 276. 
30 (1941a) 1005b18-20. 
31 Campbell (1958), p. 76. 
70 
different terms32. If so, once again, it seems that what can be changed is not 
the meaning of a necessary proposition but the linguistic expression of it. 
The defender of conventionalism might grant the fact that the law of 
contradiction is inevitable for there being an intelligible convention, yet, 
nonetheless maintain that such a principle is conventional in the sense that it 
is necessary only if we decide to use a language, "but to speak a language is 
still a choice and the law of contradiction still a convention". 33 But such a view 
is clearly erroneous, since it presupposes the fallacious linguistic 
conventionalist assumption that the law of contradiction can only be a 
linguistic rule, and nothing else. Surely one uses logic in formulating an 
intelligible language. However, the very idea of intelligibility presupposes 
logic, -e. g. the law of contradiction- and this is not a matter of language, but of 
thought. In this sense it is evident that thought precedes language. It is 
perfectly conceivable that we should think in accordance with the laws of 
thought but fail to express what we think, that is, we do not stop using logic 
when we keep silent. Consequently, what is conventional, -what we can make 
decisions about- then, is not the law of contradiction itself but whether we 
should speak a language or not; but this does not bear too much relevance to 
question of whether or not that the law of contradiction is true by convention. 
Provided that we cannot conceive how a contradiction (p & not-p) can 
be true or rather how the negation of such a law can function as the basic law 
of a convention, then there would be at least one necessary truth which is 
indispensable for there to be any intelligible convention, and therefore not 
true by convention. In this case, the linguistic conventionalist thesis that 
logic is freely and arbitrarily chosen would only be true for some necessary 
truths, not for all them; but then, such a thesis would be contradictory in the 
32 Ibid., p. 76. 
33 Quinton, op. cit., p. 273. 
71 
sense that it holds "all necessary truths are conventional" and also "some 
necessary truths are not conventional" 3`t. 
The conventionalist considers logical laws to be the consequences of 
purely syntactical terms which are defined implicitly35; namely, of the 
function of logical words such as "and", "if", "or", "not", and so on. That logical 
laws are true by convention, therefore analytic, is thus understood in the 
sense that the meaning of these terms, which are conventionally agreed, 
determines their truth. The arbitrariness or contingency of logical laws, on 
the conventionalist grounds, would thus be maintained to the extent that it is 
up to us to change the meanings that we attach to these terms. 
Thus, according to conventionalism, one can introduce some primitive 
logical terms, whose function is to produce the conventions, where the 
meaning to be attached to these purely formal (syntactical) entities is not 
determined beforehand; they are initially meaningless36. Indeed, this fact is 
supposed to provide the linguistic conventionalist with the freedom to do 
otherwise in the field of logic. But, it remains obscure on this picture how can 
one set out to adopt a convention which is supposed to account for the 
existence of logic without presupposing some logical truths in the first place 
(i. e., without the meanings of the proposed set of logical primitives already 
being present to him); therefore, it seems that we cannot introduce the 
primitives in question to explain the truth of the statements in which the 
primitives occur essentially unless we already presuppose or know the 
meanings of the very primitives which we are trying to explain37. Thus, in 
order to establish a linguistic convention obviously one needs to formulate the 
34 Blanshard (1962), p. 275. 
35 The notion of "implicit definition" itself is far from being clear, thus it is hard to 
distinguish on these grounds logical terms from non-logical ones. See Swinburne (1975), 
pp. 172-173. 
36 pine (1935), p. 90. 
37 Ibid., p. 104. 
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syntactical structure of a language, and in order to formulate this structure 
one needs to use a language, and it seems just impossible to envisage how one 
can use a language without presupposing logic. Accordingly, the 
conventionalist thesis which has been designed to account for the existence of 
logic is clearly circular in that it needs logic for its own invention. Clearly, 
since logic precedes any possible linguistic convention, to say that logic is true 
by convention would be equivalent to the circular thesis that logic is true by 
logic 38 Consequently, that logic is prior to inventing any possible convention 
makes it false that logic is true by convention and hence that one is free to 
built up one's own logic. 
Furthermore, if we follow the conventionalist criterion of analyticity of 
logical constanthood, that is, if the meaning of a logical constant can 
arbitrarily be fixed via certain conventional rules, then there is no reason for 
excluding just any connective. But can we really introduce just any 
connective? Thus, following Prior, suppose we introduce the contradictory 
connective "tonk" whose meaning is determined "by the rules that (i) from 
any statement P we can infer any statement Q [P-tonk-Q] by 'tonk' (... ) and that 
(ii) from any 'contonktive' statement P-tonk-Q we can infer the contained 
statement Q139. Following "tonk" rules, for example, one can infer '2 +2- 5', in 
an analytically valid way, from '2 +2= 4' as follows: 
2+2=4 
Therefore, 2+24 tonk 2+ 2= 5 
Therefore, 2 +2 = 5.40 
Consequently, given that a logical connective such as "tonk" leads us to 
absurd consequences, it should have been evident that the conventionalist 
contention that one can introduce any connective as a logical constant, and on 
38 See Putnam (1983c), pp. 172-173. 
39 Prior (1960), p. 218. 
40 Ibid., p. 218. 
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these grounds that logical truths are conventional in arbitrary terms of 
syntactical characterisation is false. 41 
There are some further problems with the conventionalist account of 
logic. Thus, as Quine argued, there is a circularity of the conventional theory 
of logical truth. Granted that the conventionalist thesis of "laying down 
convention "is to be considered in the same way that postulates are understood 
in an axiomatic system, -that is, the rules which are adopted by convention are 
generative rather than transformative-, Quine argued that one needs logic in 
order to infer an individual logical truth from a general convention 42 For a 
convention is general in the sense that it lays down the rules for infinitely 
many statements agreeing with the description fixed by convention, but the 
"derivation of the truth of any specific statement from the general convention 
thus requires a logical inference, and this involves us in an infinite 
regress"43. Thus for example, let us take "if" and "then" idioms as primitives 
and thus lay down the general convention, (if p then q, & p, then q) where 
any substitution for such a convention produces a truth. But then the very 
truth that the truth of the individual logical truth (the substitution of the 
general convention, that is, if p then q, & p, then q) follows from the general 
convention, if p then q, & p, then q, itself turns out to be a logical truth. Yet, 
41 The concept of logical constanthood is rather controversial, but what concerns us here 
is whether one can provide an arbitrary logical constant along conventionalist lines, which 
usually requires a merely syntactic definition of such a notion rather than a semantic 
definition. However, a semantic definition involves some unwelcome prerequisite 
considerations to the conventionalist such as the conservativeness towards "truth", 
"truth-preserving", "validity", etc. Yet it is difficult to see how one can, in giving a 
definition of a logical constant, dispense with these semantic requirements, and therefore 
be able to give a purely syntactic definition of a logical connective. For a recent debate on 
this issue, see Peacocke (1976); and Hacking (1979), pp. 299-300. 
42 Quine (1935), pp. 88-105. 
43 Ibid., p. 103. 
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such a truth itself, on the conventionalist account, remains unexplained44. 
Consequently, "if logic is to proceed mediately from conventions, logic is 
needed for inferring logic from the conventions"45. 
In addition, given that the conventionalist argument basically aims at 
explaining the ground of necessity in terms of linguistic rules and thus makes 
it a matter of contingency and intentional settlement, it faces a further 
difficulty. For, given that not all necessary statements are direct registers of 
the adopted conventions but rather that some of them are more or less remote 
consequences of these conventions, linguistic conventionalism seems unable 
to explain how certain conventions have certain consequences46. That is to 
say, provided that certain conventions are adopted by direct registration of the 
axioms together with rules of inference, the linguistic conventionalist cannot 
explain why one must adhere to the conventions embodied in the theorem, and 
"this necessity must be one imposed upon us, one that we meet with"47, not one 
we have arbitrarily adopted. 
To conclude then, one might rightly say that the conventionalist 
characterisation of logical truth and necessity in terms of linguistic rules can 
hardly do justice to our logical truth and necessity intuitions in that logic is 
clearly much more fundamental than any linguistic convention. Indeed, 
logical truths, far from being grounded in a linguistic convention, on the 
contrary, seem to set the limits of any possible linguistic convention, of any 
intelligible discourse; and in this sense, their truth is external to us and thus 
not a matter of an arbitrary linguistic invention. If anything can be truly said 
44 See ibid., pp. 103-104, and also Stroud (1981), p. 243. 
45 Quine (1935), p. 104. 
46 Dummett (1959b), p. 170. Thus, for instance, on the conventionalist view, "Nothing can 
be both green and red" is not a direct register of a convention, rather it is a necessary 
consequence which follows from the meanings of "green" and "red" displayed in the 
ostensive training. (Ibid., p. 169. ) 
47 Ibid., p. 170. 
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concerning the relation between a linguistic convention and logic at all, it is 
that logic is the essence of all possible conventions; therefore, a convention is 
possible as far as it obeys the rules of logic. 
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3. WITTGENSTEIN, RULES AND NECESSITY 
In this chapter, I shall conduct a critical examination of the 
Wittgensteinian argument that necessary truths -the truths of logic and 
mathematics- can be explained on the basis of the analogy of the rules of a 
language-game, bearing in mind the question whether such an account can 
help us to understand the contention that necessity is somehow conventional. 
3.1 Radical Conventionalism 
Wittgenstein's account of necessity, one might rightly argue, is 
conventionalist in spiritl. The necessity of logical principles, on this view, 
can be accounted for in terms of "rules of grammar" or "rules of the language- 
game": 
The rules of logical inference are the rules of the language game. 2 
Thus, 
Logical inference is part of a language-game3. 
1 Wittgenstein's views on the issue in hand have been subject to different textual exegeses 
and this has somehow raised the controversy of what is his real position. However, one 
thing is clear, that is, he favoured a non-realist view of logical necessity as he tried to 
explain the ground of necessity in terms of contingent natural (or cultural) facts. 
2 (1956), V, § 28. 
3 (1956), V, § 23. 
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However the rules of the language game are not essentially as they are, but 
arbitrary: 
The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It 
is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a 
proposition4. 
The notion of following a rule plays a central role in Wittgenstein's 
understanding of logical necessity; hence agreement to following the rules of 
a game is what makes something logically necessary for us. Still, this does not 
mean that one is necessitated to follow the rule. So, for instance, Wittgenstein 
suggests that we consider the case of a pupil who has been instructed to write 
down the series of numbers formed by adding according to the rule "+2". What 
if that person follows this instruction up to 1000, namely by writing ... 996,996,998, 
1000, and then when he has been asked to continue he writes down 1004, 
1008,.... 1 Faced with such case, according to Wittgenstein, we should say "it 
comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as 
we should understand the order. 'Add 2 up to 1000,4 up to 2000,6 up to 3000 and 
so on"'$. 
Similarly, Wittgenstein gives some other examples to convince us that 
our way of inferring, calculating and counting is not the only possible one. 
For instance, he argues that it is not logically impossible to come across a 
group of people who sell wood at a price proportionate to the area covered by 
the piles regardless of their height. Furthermore, it is even conceivable that 
they would say "Of course, if you buy more timber, you must pay more! "6. Faced 
with such a case, in Wittgenstein's view, "we should presumably say ... they 
4 (1953), § 372. 
5 Ibid., § 185. 
6 Wittgenstein (1956), I, § 194. 
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simply do not mean the same by "a lot of wood" and "a little wood" as we do; and 
they have a quite different system of payment from us"7. 
By these examples, what Wittgenstein is basically trying to do, one 
might say, is to undermine the very ground of the realist understanding of 
logical necessity, the must of logic, as he disputes the very grounds of logical 
compulsion: 
"But 'am I not compelled, then to go the way I do in a chain of 
inferences? " -Compelled? After all I can presumably go as I choose! "But if 
you want to remain in accord with the rules you must go this way. "-Not at all, I 
call this 'accord': -"Then you have changed the meaning of the word 'accord', or 
the meaning of the rule. "- No; -who says what 'change' and 'remaining the same' 
mean here? 
However many rules you give me -I give a rule which justifies my 
employment of your rules. 
'But you surely can't suddenly make a different application of the law 
now! '... But if I simply reply: 'Different? -But this surely isn't different! ' -what 
will you do? That is: somebody may reply like a rational person and yet not be 
playing our game. 8 
On linguistic conventionalism, it has been said, although logical laws 
are conventional and thus freely and arbitrarily adopted, nevertheless, one is 
not free not to accept what follows from the pre-agreed set of conventions via 
the pre-agreed rules of inference. In other words, once certain conventions 
are adopted in the first place, one must welcome the consequences which 
necessarily follow from them. In fact, this is a problem for linguistic 
conventionalism in that it cannot account for the necessary relations taking 
place among conventions in its own (linguistic conventionalist) terms; for 
this being the case, there would be non-conventional necessities that one 
faces in the conventionalist theory. Therefore, if the conventionalist picture 
7 Ibid., I, § 150. 
8 Ibid., I, §§ 113-115. 
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of necessity is to be complete, it must also explain how these very relations 
themselves are to be conceived as the results of the adopted conventions`. 
However, it is clear from what Wittgenstein argues above that one is 
free even within the rules of a game at any stage to make an arbitrary 
decision regardless of what we ordinarily consider to follow necessarily from 
what is granted in the first place. No matter what is admitted as a common 
agreement, this by no means necessitates someone to accept the consequences 
which follow. Clearly, this is not just to say that logical rules are ultimately 
grounded in the arbitrarily laid down rules of a language-game, hence that 
they are equally arbitrary, but also it means that there is not such a thing as, 
so to say, "internal necessitation" in a language-game. 
Given these considerations, however, Dummett seems to be right in 
designating the Wittgensteinian position as full-blooded (or radical) 
conventionalism, according to which, "the logical necessity of a statement is 
always the direct expression of a linguistic convention. That a given statement 
is necessary consists in our having expressly decided to treat that very 
statement as unassailable"10, which gives us at each step of a proof the 
possibility of a free choice "to accept or reject the proof; there is nothing in 
our formulation of the axioms and of the rules of inference, ... and hence 
nothing which forces us to accept the proof'll. Accordingly, since, on this 
view, unlike linguistic conventionalism, each necessary proposition is 
separately taken to be conventional, one is not bound to the logical relations, 
therefore necessities, taking place between conventions and their 
consequences. 
To strengthen such a radical position Wittgenstein puts forward two 
basic doctrines. Thus, first, according to Wittgenstein, logic is antecedent to 
9 See Dummett (1959b), p. 170; and also Wright, (1980), p. 392. 
10 Dummett ibid., p. 170. 
11 Ibid., p. 171. 
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truth12 in the sense that in an argument only logical inferences are not 
brought into question, but this does not show that they correspond to truth; 
"there is, so to speak, no 'independent reality' to which valid inference, 
correct calculation, etc. are subservient"13. Since there is not any further 
reality than logical inference itself providing the criterion for truth14, 
logical rules are, so to say, groundless. 
Secondly, Wittgenstein holds a radically sceptical attitude towards the 
idea that there is a determinate sense to be attached to an expression such that 
in understanding an expression one grasps a fixed meaning which is prima 
facie needed for the correct, application of an expression15. Thus, the 
Wittgensteinian theory of meaning seems to be truly anti-essentialist in that 
"the meaning of a word is its use in the language" 16 rather than an a priori 
property which extends itself according to its content; therefore, the meaning 
of an expression has, so to speak, an open-ended character. And in fact it has 
been argued17 that this is where Wittgenstein's radical conventionalism 
resides. Thus, at the heart of the Wittgensteinian critique of logical necessity 
is the idea that "there is in our understanding of a concept no rigid, advance 
determination of what is it to count as its correct application" 18, which is the 
denial of the realist conception of the pre-existence of the patterns with pre- 
determinate truth-conditions. And since there is not a fixed meaning of an 
expression, there cannot be such a thing as the correct or incorrect 
application of such an expression, thus one cannot make sense of what it is "to 
12 Wittgenstein (1956), I, § 56. 
13 Wright (1980), p. 74. 
14 ibid., pp. 73-74. 
15 This is at least true how both Wright (1980) and Kripke (1982) interpret 
Wittgenstein's work on this issue. 
16 Wittgenstein (1953), I, § 43. 
17 See Wright (1980), p. 392. 
18 Ibid., p. 21. 
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do the same thing again" or "to follow the same rule". But given that there is 
not an advance determination of what one means by an expression, by the 
same fact, there cannot be a determinate future use or application of an 
expression. 19 The problem, in a word, as Wittgenstein himself pointed out, is 
that in following a rule -or in fixing a meaning for an expression in general- 
nobody can determine what "change" and "remaining the same" mean with 
respect to following the rule in question. If so, however, there would be no 
difference between correct or incorrect application of an expression; in fact 
such a distinction would be irrelevant to this account. And this naturally 
leaves the door open to countless different uses or applications of an 
expression and thus following a rule. 20 
To apply these remarks to the Wittgensteinian deviant pupil of 
mathematics, since no one can possibly establish an objective sense of 
following the command "+2" - for "change" and "remaining the same" cannot 
be decided objectively; the rule needs the approval of, so to say, the follower of 
the rule at every single step; no matter whatever course of application is 
taken, this can be made both to accord and also conflict with the rule. 
Having this background in mind, it becomes easier to understand why 
Wittgenstein thinks that it cannot be a matter of compulsion that one accepts 
19 Ibid., p. 21. 
20 The roots of such a sceptical attitude, or the so-called Wittgensteinian paradox of rule- 
following, Kripke has pointed out (1982, p. 7), are to be viewed in the following passage of 
Philosophical Investigations, § 201: 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The 
answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it 
can also be made out to conflict with. And so there would be neither accord 
nor conflict here. 
The sceptical paradox, in Kripke's formulation, is that "there is no fact about me 
that distinguishes between my meaning a definite function by 'plus' (which determines my 
responses in new cases) and my meaning nothing at all" (1982, p. 21). 
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the proof. Inasmuch as "our concepts cannot remain unchanged at the end of 
the proof. ... we could have rejected the proof without doing any more violence 
to our concepts than is done by accepting it"21. In other words, then, a proof 
basically is a result of the change of our concepts, it "is a new paradigm", 22 
and in this sense, there is an element of decision23 in accepting or rejecting 
it. Thus, the locus of Wittgenstein's argument, in Wright's formulation, is that 
[the] conception of necessity involves thinking of necessary statements as 
comparable to the rules of... a game. They are, so to speak, among the rules for 
the game of language-use; they supply criteria for the description of 
circumstances and the correct implementation of procedures. (... ) In terms of 
our game analogy, allied to the rule-following considerations, we can now 
model three respects in which necessity may be described -... -as on 
Wittgenstein's view conventional. It is, to begin with, conventional what rules 
go into the rule-book; we are laying down an activity, and are subject to no 
external constraints. ... Secondly, it is an open question what is proper 
application of the rules in any particular case; It is a matter of successive 
judgements. 
... And finally, ..., it is an open question to what other conventions 
we are committed by the acceptance of certain rules, of certain statements as 
necessary. 24 
So much for the essentials of the Wittgensteinian argument. Obviously, 
what is distinctive about such an argument' is that it leaves no room for such a 
thing as "objectivity" in the realm of meanings and consequently in the 
logico-mathematical reality. And this being the case, the Wittgensteinian 
position stands in a sharp contrast to the realist view of both meaning and 
logical necessity. 
21 Dummett (1959b), p. 173. 
22 Wittgenstein (1956), II, § 41. 
23 See Wright (1980), p. 41. 
24 Ibid., pp. 231-232. 
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We have seen that the realist takes properties to have intensions as well 
as extensions; the intension of a property F is the meaning of F -the content of 
the concept of F- whereas the extension of F is those instances which fall 
under the description given by the intension of F. Thus, for example, suppose 
G is the property of being alive, the intension G would be being a living 
organism and the extension of G would be the set all actual objects which 
satisfy such a description, that is, any object which has a living organism. So, 
if one knows or understands the intension of G, thereupon he would be able to 
know which objects are to be taken as the extension of G, namely, he would 
have the ability to recognise which objects are to be called alive. To say that 
the intension of F determines the extension of F is then to say that the 
meaning -sense- of F determines what kind of actual objects can be classified 
under F. Given the intension of F, then, there are determinate ways for 
applying -predicating- F to each individual case; whether it is F or not-F. 
Applied to the realist view of logico-mathematical necessity, this picture 
would yield certain logico-mathematical patterns determined by the meanings 
of the logico-mathematical properties. Thus the grasp of the meaning 
-intension- of a property secures one's correct application of such an abstract 
object to the individual cases, and in this sense, necessary truths and the 
necessity obtaining among propositions -logical consequence- is objective as 
well as recognitional. Thus, to follow the right logical steps in an argument is 
to follow, so to speak, already existing patterns which provide pre-determinate 
truth-conditions of each step of the argument. There is an advance 
determination of what is a valid inference or a correct application of a logico- 
mathematical rule and thus under what circumstances a logical or 
mathematical statement is to be true or false. In fact this is usually considered 
to be what it is to know the meaning of a term or a proposition on the realist 
account. 25 
25 See Wright (1980), pp. 3-20; and also Frege (1956) passim; Dummett (1959b), p. 167. 
RS 
Wittgenstein, as seen, clearly repudiates such an account of meaning, 
but instead, extraordinarily enough, he leaves us with virtually no meaning. 
But is such a view really tenable? 
There seems to be, in the first place, some a priori problems with the 
Wittgensteinian argument in that if the foregoing sceptical considerations are 
right, it can be neither true nor false of any linguistic expression, any word 
w, or any statement S, that w or S has a determinate meaning; and this seems to 
entail some sort of global non-factualism (irrealism) of meaning. This being 
the case, however, if, for any sentence S in a language, S has no determinate 
meaning, the very S expressing the sceptical thesis cannot possibly have a 
determinate meaning. But, then, such a thesis is inevitably self-referentially 
incoherent26. 
Apart from this, let us suppose that terms lack intension, then how 
are we to know when such a term is correctly or incorrectly used? Or indeed, 
can we use it at all? After all, if there is not such a thing as the 
intension of a term, there remains an empty sign or symbol, and this 
being the case, there seems to be no way to see how a term can be used 
and thus applied to its extensions; that is, to the range of individual 
cases to which it applies. However, let us suppose for a while that there 
are no "intensions", again, as Blackburn points out27, there must be 
something -no matter what this fact can be- in virtue of which we 
might sensibly speak of a term's being used correctly or incorrectly on 
the grounds of the prima facie fact that there is such a distinction in our 
26 See Boghossian (1989), p. 523. By the same token, the incoherence of irrealism or 
global non-factualism about meaning and truth is evident, since such a view itself seems 
to presuppose a realist (or robust) notion of truth in that the non-factualist denial of a 
truth-conditional theory of meaning and truth presupposes a truth-conditional theory and 
therefore it treats "truth" as a real property. For such an argument see Boghossian (1990), 
pp. 157-184; and for a defence in minimalist terms, see Wright (1992), pp. 231-236. 
27 (1984b), p. 281. 
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language. Then, the question is what else can be responsible for fixing the 
meaning of a term and thus its correct-use conditions, if not the realist 
"intensions"? 
The prevailing Wittgensteinian rejoinder to this question is that it is the 
communal agreement -communal dispositions- which determines what is the 
correct or incorrect use of a term by an individual. 28 To be sure, it is possible 
for the community to decide whether an individual is using a term in accord 
with the communal agreement, but then the question becomes how and 
against which criterion the community itself is able to determine whether the 
individual is on the right track? Clearly unless the intension of a property is 
available to the community there seems to be no way to see how the 
community itself can perform the proposed task. And even worse, without 
such an intension -meaning- it is difficult to see how the very notion of "the 
communal agreement" can be understood, or indeed how such a fact might 
come into existence. 29 The difficulty with the communitarian account, in 
Boghossian's words, is "that we are still lacking what communitarianism was 
supposed to provide: the specification of a property M such that, possession of 
M by a disposition is necessary and sufficient for that disposition's 
correctness"30. If so, however, the Wittgensteinian argument of meaning in 
terms of communal agreement seems to fail to resolve the problem. 
On the other hand, surely one's manifestation of his understanding of a 
term by using it correctly to the satisfaction of the community is a fact which 
comes about in a community, but what reasons can be provided for supposing 
that the meaning of a term itself is somehow identical with the use of that 
28 Wright (1980), pp. 219-220. 
29 Of course, it might be argued that the intension of a property -meaning- itself is 
something which results out of a communal agreement, but this takes us back to the 
linguistic conventionalist argument that meanings are conventional, which has already 
been considered to be untenable. 
30 (1989), p. 536. 
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term? On the face of it, a manifestation must be a manifestation of something, 
and likewise, a "use" must be according to something. And this something, it 
seems to me, is precisely what the realist is looking for. 31 
Consequently, I do not see how there can be a fact determining the 
meaning of an expression other than the one proposed by the realist, that is, 
an intensional content which determines the meaning of an expression. 32 If 
so, what is wrong with Wittgenstein's deviant pupil in performing the 
command "+2" in the way described is that he fails to grasp the meaning 
-intension- of the expression "+2" which does not exist in the Wittgensteinian 
picture of meaning. What is missing in the so-called the Wittgensteinian 
paradox of rule-following, accordingly, is the meaning of the term itself, 33 
and to be sure, there seem to be good reasons for thinking that it is the 
absence of the meaning of the expression in question which yields the 
possibility of a deviant way of following the command, while, by contrast, it 
would be the presence of such an abstract object, provided that there being no 
mistake or misunderstanding, which can secure the correct application. 
By the same token, once the meanings of terms and thus statements are 
assured, there seems to be no way to give credence to someone who agrees with 
us on the premises that 
(1) All men are mortal, 
and 
(2) Socrates is a man, 
31 In this connection, it would be right to consider that the Wittgensteinian theory of 
meaning is also extensionalist in the sense that it identifies meaning with the way it (the 
meaning, or intension of a term) extends itself in use and manifestation. 
32 There are a number of approaches other than realism to meet such a requirement, which 
I shall not consider here, but for an excellent critical examination of these views, see 
Boghossian (1989). 
33 See Katz (1990), p. 161. 
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but nevertheless disagrees with us on the conclusion which necessarily 
follows from (1) and (2), that is, 
(3) Socrates is mortal. 
That is to say, once we agreed on the premises and the rules of 
inferences, with Dummett we might say, "when the proof is shown us, we are 
mere spectators. ... we do not know what it would be like for someone, who by 
ordinary criteria, already understood the concepts employed, to reject the 
proof"34. 
What next of the central idea of the Wittgensteinian argument that 
logical laws can be seen as the rules of a language-game? But what is a game, 
how are we to define it? Can there be radically different language-games with 
entirely different sets of rules, that is, logical laws, than ours? If the answer is 
"yes", how do we know them, if they are knowable at all? 
In order to make a justified claim for even the (possible) existence of 
radically different language-games, it seems to me, there must be something 
common to all language-games of which we can speak; or else, there seems to 
be no way to know even that there are different language-games than ours. 
However, it might be argued, there is a well-known Wittgensteinian doctrine 
of "family resemblances" which exactly aims to show that nothing is common 
to language-games but "the various resemblances between members of a 
family: build, features, colours of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and 
criss-cross in the same way. "35 
It is, to be sure, a matter of an independent discussion whether the 
Wittgensteinian doctrine of "family resemblances" can be defended in 
general, or, whether it can solve the problem of universals etc., but this is not 
our question. What concerns us here is rather to see whether such a doctrine 
can help us to understand the idea that the logical rules are the rules of a 
34 (1959b), pp. 171-173. 
35 Wittgenstein (1953), § 67. 
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language-game to the effect that there can or could have been a different 
class of logical rules for a different language-game. I think not. 
To start with, in the case of games such as "... board-games, card-games, 
ball- games... "36 which Wittgenstein has in mind, there is a clear opportunity 
of comparing one with the other, and also, it is perfectly conceivable that we 
should have chosen different rules for each of these games. However these 
games are disanalogous to the game of logic in some important respects: for 
one thing, we do not have the opportunity of comparing our game of logic 
with the other logical games. Hence such a contention can make sense if and 
only if one can produce at least one logical game (if we can legitimately call 
them 'logical' at all) radically different than ours. Again, unlike the purported 
game, we find it difficult to conceive of such radically deviant logical games. 
Furthermore, there are good reasons for one to doubt that there can be 
such games; thus, we might rightly ask, can there be a game in which the law 
of contradiction is violated, or indeed, a game which works solely on the 
grounds of inconsistency? Can we play such a game at all? Perhaps the very 
notion of a "rule", regardless of its content, does not make any sense if it is 
established on the ground of, in Putnam's words, "the absolutely inconsistent 
rule"37. But if the notion of a game cannot accommodate absolute 
inconsistency, then, there the law of contradiction seems to be a common 
property of all conceivable language-games. That is to say, logical laws cannot 
be identified with the rules of a particular language-game. 
Again, as Ne1138 points out, it is crucial to know what we mean by being 
"the same" or "different" in order to make a sensible claim about "disagreeing" 
with the rules of another language-game, and thus for any debate or 
36 Ibid., § 66. 
37 (1983b), p. 130. 
38 (1961), pp. 70-71. 
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conversation to take place in such a context. If so, the law of identity too seems 
to be another logical principle which is indispensable for any language-game. 
It could be said that since, on the Wittgensteinian view, there is not an 
objective viewpoint -indeed there is no such a reality independent of our 
ratification- against which one can decide which of the rules of a different 
language-games are the right ones, by the same reason, there cannot be any 
difference between the rules of our language-game and the rules of a deviant 
language-game. Even to maintain that our rules are correct with reference to 
the semantic criterion that they are truth-preserving, on this account, begs 
the question given the Wittgensteinian principle that logic is antecedent to 
truth, and hence no one can possibly decide between a consistent and 
inconsistent, and thus between the truth-yielding and the falsity-yielding 
rules of two radically different language-games 39 Wittgenstein thus seems to 
have thought that since the rules of logic do not correspond to any further 
reality than the contingent practises of the rules of our language-game, they 
cannot be either true or false. 
According to realism, logic has its own ontology and logical rules 
correspond to abstract objects and their intrinsic properties and the relations 
obtaining among them. Thus realists think logical laws are true to the extent 
that they correspond to these objects. Therefore, just as a contingent 
proposition p is said to be true or false by reference to whether the 
corresponding state of affairs obtains, similarly, logical rules are be said to be 
true if and only if they refer to the ontology of logic, that is, logical 
properties. 
Wittgenstein however rejects such a view. Indeed, let us suppose for the 
sake of argument that this view is indeed false. But the real question then 
seems to be what reasons might Wittgenstein have for the contention that 
logical rules do not have a ground or source independent from us? The roots 
39 See Wright (1980), pp. 310-311. 
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of the Wittgensteinian denial of the view that logic has an independent reality 
are intimately related to his considerations that logical rules are grounded in 
the arbitrary rules of our language-game; therefore, Wittgenstein, as a matter 
of fact, thinks that logical rules do correspond to a reality (the rules of a 
language-game); but such a reality -unlike the realistic one which is 
independent and thus necessary- depends upon our contingent language- 
game. 
It is here where I think the Wittgensteinian position involves some 
substantial difficulties. To start with, such a position can be credible only if it 
can be demonstrated exactly in which sense logical rules depend upon our 
(contingent) language-game. That is, the onus of the proof is on the 
Wittgensteinian to show that logical rules are merely the rules of our 
language-game; therefore, that there can be radically different logical rules 
in other language-games; namely, only if it can be shown how there could 
have been an absolutely inconsistent language-game where every proposition 
p holds together with not p. Otherwise the Wittgensteinian contention remains 
unsubstantiated. 
Secondly, in arguing that logical truths are contingent as they are the 
rules of a language-game, it is conceptually necessary that Wittgenstein 
should presuppose the possibility of other language-games with different 
rules responsible for their, so to speak, logical principles. But then there 
remains a real question to be answered: what kind of possibility is taken to be 
responsible for the alleged possibility of radically different language-games? 
A logical possibility? 
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3.2 Anthropological Conventionalism 
Yet it has been argued40 that it is incorrect to think that the 
Wittgensteinian position entails such a radical "full-blooded conventionalism" 
as there are certain passages in his writings which might lead us to think that 
he advanced what might be labelled "anthropological conventionalism". 
According to this position, logical necessity is not an arbitrary rule which sets 
someone free to accept or reject the proof, rather it is a phenomenon to be 
explained in terms of human nature as determined by human biology, the 
natural history of man, or in terms of the linguistic agreement constituted by 
the human forms of life. In fact, such a suggestion seems to be accurate given, 
for example, the following passages: 
"Then according to you everybody could continue the series as he likes; 
and so infer anyhow! " In that case we shan't call it "continuing the series" and 
also presumably not "inference". And thinking and inferring (like counting) is 
of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but by natural limits 
corresponding to the body of what can be called the role of thinking and 
inferring in our life. 41 
And similarly elsewhere Wittgenstein says, 
"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is 
false? "-It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in 
the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life 42 
"What has to be accepted, the given, is -so one could say- forms of life"43. 
40 For such a line of interpreting Wittgenstein's philosophy of logical necessity, see 
Stroud (1965), pp. 79-84. 
41(1956)I, §116. 
42 (1953), § 241. 
43 (1953), p. 226. 
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It seems that Wittgenstein agrees with the objectivity of logical 
necessities as they are presupposed by certain intellectual activities of human 
beings such as thinking, reasoning, or inferring. But even though they are in 
this sense unassailable for us as they are certain natural constraints on our 
thinking, it is equally true that Wittgenstein would not concede that there is 
something more than the contingent anthropological phenomenon in virtue 
of which one should account for the existence of logical patterns. For, 
according to Wittgenstein, logical necessities are embedded in the actual 
linguistic practices in which each of us is engaged through our form of life; 
and this is a phenomenon to be related to the natural history of human 
beings-44 Thus, on this understanding, conventions are not a matter of an 
explicit choice. 
Apparently, anthropological conventionalism also seems to be a clear 
denial of a realist view of necessary truths: even though there are certain 
logical indispensibilities for there to be human thinking, what at best can 
account for this phenomenon is contingent human existence, not timelessly 
existing abstract interrelations. In other words, even if they are necessary for 
us, they are not necessary in themselves, that is to say, logical truths are not 
necessarily necessary, but contingently necessary. Provided that the natural 
history of mankind led it to adopt a different language-game or form of life, 
there would be a different set of logical truths than ours. In this connection, it 
becomes easier to see the basic motivation behind Wittgenstein's endeavour to 
portray the conceivability of aforementioned deviant ways of following a rule, 
measuring, and inferring. It is to show that what we ordinarily take to be 
unassailable and thus necessary need not have been so, and indeed, could have 
been otherwise; that is why one should not look for a metaphysical ground 
underlying the nature of logical necessity. 
44 (1956), I, § 142. 
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This position, indeed, seems to be intimately related to Wittgenstein's 
observations concerning grammar when he says, "it [grammar] is akin both to 
what is arbitrary and to what is not arbitrary"45. Correspondingly, grammar is 
arbitrary in the sense that there is not such a "meta-level" (an independent 
reality) to force it to be as it is; but still non-arbitrary to the extent that it is 
essential to our language-game, our form of life, and hence unassailable for 
us. 
To sum up, then, on the anthropological conventionalist interpretation, 
the arbitrariness of logical necessity is not external, but internal to our 
language-game, or to our form of life. That is to say, there is no such external 
necessitation to force us to adopt one language-game rather the other save the 
fact that we are bound to particular constraints for there to be certain 
intellectual activities such as thinking, reasoning, inferring which are basic 
elements of our form of life. Logical truths are true not in every possible 
world46, but true only in the actual world. There could have been a possible 
world in which a different set of logical truths would have been actual. 
But is that really true? Is it really conceivable47 that there exists a 
possible world W in which the law of contradiction is untrue, or indeed 
necessarily false for the inhabitants of W whose form of life and way of 
thinking are entirely different than ours? We are, by ordinary criteria, 
inclined to say "no". But a possible Wittgensteinian move might be to question 
the notion of "conceivability", on the grounds of what Wittgenstein himself 
pointed out, "... so long as one thinks it can't be otherwise, one draws logical 
conclusions"48 and that this is presumably due to the fact that "... he has not 
45 (1967), § 358. 
46 By the notion of "a possible world" In this context, I mean a possible form of life. 
47 It does not seem to me as reasonable to think that "conceivability" in this context can 
be a matter of temporal indexicality in that our future imaginations might accommodate, 
say, an absolutely inconsistent form of life. 
48 (1956), 1, § 156. 
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any clear concept of what it would be like for it to be otherwise"49. One can 
agree with Wittgenstein on this point, but if this is true then the 
Wittgensteinian position itself turns out to be indefensible: if we are 
constrained by logical necessities in terms of certain anthropological facts 
related to our form of life and that they are in this sense unassailable for us, 
exactly on which ground can we say that logical truths could have been 
otherwise for some other, so to speak, conceivable creatures with a different 
natural/ cultural history? How can we say, on these grounds, that logical 
truths are necessary in that they are unassailable for us, but not in 
themselves? 
Note that the Wittgensteinian position is considerably different from 
the Cartesian doctrine of modalities despite the similarity of the fact that both 
of them take logical necessities to be the outcomes of contingent facts, either 
in terms of the structure/ constitution of the human mind or of the set of 
particular anthropological facts. Descartes' argument that logical truths could 
have been otherwise even though we cannot conceive how, is explained by 
the postulation that there is no restriction whatsoever to God's power, that is, 
that God has an absolute control over the modal truth of necessary 
propositions. Therefore, if we do not know what it would be like to understand 
the negation of the law of contradiction, this is basically because of the fact 
that God has given us a mind such that we cannot conceive how a 
contradiction can be true; but, according to Descartes, this is not sufficient to 
establish that God cannot make a contradiction true, for our intellect is finite 
and God's power is infinite. 50 
Of course, the question whether the Cartesian position itself is coherent 
is a separate issue, therefore, I shall not go into any further discussion of it at 
this stage. However, one thing is clear: the Wittgensteinian anthropological 
49 (1956), IV, § 29. 
50 See Descartes (1970), pp. 240-241. 
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conventionalism lacks the Cartesian, so to speak, "meta-level postulation"; that 
is, the existence of a further reality such as God. Hence, one might understand 
the motivation behind the Cartesian contention that logical truths could have 
been otherwise, as infinite Divine power contradicts the thought that logical 
necessities are fixed, but how are we to understand Wittgenstein? 
It seems to me that there are two possible ways of understanding the 
contention that although we are bound to the actual set of logical principles, 
and thus even though they are necessary for us, nevertheless they are 
contingently so. In order to maintain that position one must show how a 
different set of logical laws could be the paradigmatic patterns of a different 
language-game or form of life, where it is shown how, for example, a 
contradiction can be true; or the denial of the law of contradiction can 
function as the fundamental law in the paradigm. But this seems to be a very 
difficult, if not impossible, task, for the simple reason that we do not know 
what an inconsistent language-game or form of life would be like. If this is 
impossible, then, there seems to be at least another indispensable logical 
principle common to all possible language-games, grammars, or forms of life, 
namely, the law of contradiction. Hence it seems that there cannot be a 
language-game or grammar in which every statement is both true and false. 
But, could there have been certain contingent anthropological facts which 
might have led us to adopt a form of life in which every statement was both 
true and false? Or, could our form of life have made an absolutely inconsistent 
set of propositions true? 
It is difficult to answer this question in the affirmative, for 
"consistency", one might say, is after all an objective fact, thus for example, in 
mathematics, we can understand the claim that we could have chosen another 
consistent set of axioms instead of the Peano axioms, but our nature cannot 
possibly make an inconsistent set of axioms true51. If so, there seems to be 
51 (1983b), pp. 125-126. 
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something more than contingent human facts which makes the actual set of 
logical laws true or necessarily true. 
Nevertheless, one might say, given the basic anthropological 
conventionalist intuition, it has already been agreed that this is not achievable 
because of the fact that it is a possibility beyond the bounds of the actual 
human way of thinking or, form of life. But if one cannot be provided with 
such an alternative picture, anthropological conventionalism seems to end up 
with incoherence as it maintains that there can be radically different 
alternative sets of logical principles, but we do not know what-it-would-be- 
like, because they are beyond the bounds of our conceiving capacity. Indeed, 
this position would be very akin to the Kantian contention that there is a world 
of noumena to which we have no epistemic access, that is, none of our 
categories applies to it. But the question is: how we do know that there is such a 
world at all? Obviously if we can know that there is such a world, at least one of 
our concepts applies to it. Similarly, on which epistemic ground(s) might the 
anthropological conventionalist be justified in claiming that even though the 
actual set of logical principles is necessary or unassailable for us due to 
certain contingent anthropological facts, still there are or there could have 
been radically different logical schemes? Can we really make sense of such a 
proposal? 
Surely, if we cannot conceive how necessary truths can be or could 
have been false, by the same token, it is beyond our conceiving-ability to 
argue that necessary truths nonetheless could have been otherwise. In other 
words, if 
(1) The human-conceiving abilities determine the modal properties of 
necessary propositions (i. e., what is necessarily true and necessarily false) 
is true, and (1) entails 
(2) Human beings cannot conceive how necessary truths can be or 
could have been false 
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then, the following proposition, 
(3) What is actually necessary for us is contingently so, hence, could 
have been otherwise, 
does not seem to be a legitimate assertion. That is to say, if (1) and (2) are true, 
we cannot possibly have the conceiving-ability that one needs for holding (3), 
and for, so to speak, a possible epistemic access to the domain of what is as a 
matter of fact inconceivable by us. In order to maintain (3), in other words, it 
has to be possible for us to imagine the negation of the actual set of necessary 
propositions, this, however, would simply beg the question as it has already 
been conceded that this is humanly inconceivable. Of course, (3) can be 
maintained together with (1) and (2) if and only if one presupposes an 
external "god's-eye view" point, from which ex hypothesi one can discover 
whether what is humanly inconceivable, necessary, is, as a matter of fact 
contingently or necessarily so -hence whether the human mental constitution 
could have been different than it is- (once again, this seems to be the main 
difference between the Cartesian and the Wittgensteinian argument). Or else, 
what seems to be compatible with (1) and (2) is an agnosticism with respect to 
(3); that is, to assent to the contention that one cannot know whether the 
actual set of logical necessities is contingently or necessarily so on the basis of 
the fact that no human being can have access to, so to say, the "meta- 
conceivabilities", if there is such a realm at all. 52 
52 Nevertheless, one might think that the contingency of the set of necessary truths is 
defensible on the basis of the fact that it is human intellectual abilities that is ultimately 
responsible for the existence of necessary propositions and that human beings do not 
exist necessarily, but contingently. Hence, in this case, the counterfactual, 
(1) If there were no human beings, there would be no necessary propositions, 
would have been true. But this is a different proposal (I shall return to this later) than 
Wittgenstein's; for his argument is not related the existence of necessary propositions as 
such, but rather, with their intrinsic properties, that is, with the nature of their modal 
properties. To be sure, it is one thing to think that necessary propositions could or could 
not have failed to exist, and altogether different thing to say that they could have existed 
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The difficulty, in other words, is with the anthropological 
conventionalist idea that even though we are bound to the actual set of 
necessary truths and thus that they are unassailable for us in the sense that 
they are an indispensable part of our form of life; nevertheless they are 
contingent. Now to say that p is contingent, to be sure, is to say that there 
alternatives to p, but, then, the real question is whether there are alternatives 
to the actual set of necessary truths. 
Of course, nothing seems to be wrong with the idea that there are 
different forms of life, indeed, our form of life is conceivably contingent in 
many respects, but that is not the issue. Rather, the problem is whether all 
aspects of our form of life are contingent, and in particular, whether it is a 
matter of contingency that we treat necessary truths as unassailable. Now, to 
say that is contingent is to maintain that there are alternatives to our form of 
life in this respect, that is, there are alternatives to our actual set of necessary 
truths. But what are these alternatives, if there are any at all? 
If the anthropological conventionalist rejoinder is again that these 
alternatives are not conceivable by us, then, the question once more is: how do 
we know that there are alternatives at a111 On the other hand, if we cannot 
conceive that there are alternatives to the actual set of necessary truths, how 
do we know that it is contingent? It seems to me that if the anthropological 
conventionalist view is to survive the charge of inconsistency, it must show 
how the alternative ways of thinking, calculating, inferring are indeed 
with different modal properties. So for example, it might be said, on the former view, it is 
a possible state of affair that number 7 or the proposition 
(2) 2x2=4 
should not have existed, but once number 7 exist, it could not have been smaller than 
number 5, similarly, (2) could not have failed to be 2x2-4; that is, it could not have 
been 2x2-3, or 2x2-5; yet on the latter view, this could have been true. The former 
seems to relate to the ontological status of necessary truth whereas the former to their 
modal aspects, if such a distinction can be drawn at all. 
ion 
possible (conceivable), otherwise it seems to be incoherent in that it 
presupposes the conceivability of what itself grants to be inconceivable 53. If 
so, the very contention of the anthropological conventionalism, that is, that 
the actual set of necessary truths is contingently as it is, turns out to be an 
unjustified claim. 
Then, it seems accurate to conclude that both radical conventionalism 
and anthropological conventionalism are untenable. 
53 Wittgenstein, it seems to me, was well-aware of such a difficulty and presumably this 
is why he explicitly tried to show how different ways of calculation etc., -therefore, 
radical conventionalism- could be made intelligible. Kripke seems to have pointed out the 
same difficulty when he writes: 
Can we imagine forms of life other than our own, that is, can we Imagine 
creatures who follow rules in bizarre quus-like ways? It seems to me that there 
may be certain tension in Wittgenstein's philosophy here. On the one hand, it 
would seem that Wittgenstein's paradox argues that there is no a priori reason 
why a creature could not follow a quus-like rule, and thus in this sense we 
ought to regard such creatures as conceivable. On the other hand, it is 
supposed to be part of our very form of life that we find natural and indeed 
inevitable that we follow the rule for addition in the particular way that we do. 
(... ) But then it seems that we should be unable to understand 'from the inside' 
(... ) how any creature could follow a quus-like rule. (1982, p. 98,78n). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCEPTUALISM, REALISM AND GOD 
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4. CONCEPTUALISM, REALISM AND GOD 
The task we set for ourselves on the philosophical problem of necessity 
was to answer the two fundamental questions posed by Dummett, that is: what is 
the source of necessity and how do we recognise it? Thus formulated, it was 
maintained, the problem of necessary truths, on the one hand, is concerned 
with the metaphysical issue of necessity, appealing for what might be the 
ground of our modal commitments, and, on the other hand, it is concerned with 
the epistemological issue of necessity by asking what might be the nature of 
our knowledge of modal propositions. 
Having considered certain prominent approaches thus far we have not 
attained a satisfactory answer to our problem. Both the naturalistic and 
conventionalist proposals fail, I think, because of their reductionist character. 
In this connection, it has been argued that necessary truths can hardly be 
taken to be either an extension of physical reality -logical necessity 
naturalized- nor be grounded in their being true in terms of the meaning of 
the words involved -analyticity-, nor to be a matter of the grammar of 
arbitrarily set down conventions or language-games. By contrast, most of the 
foregoing considerations seem to have shown that there are certain, so to 
speak, necessity-involved boundaries which are indispensable for any 
intelligible discourse to take place, and thus for there being certain rational 
activities such as thinking, inferring and so on. This, on the face of it, fortifies 
the intuition that there is a non-arbitrary modal reality independent of any 
subjective dispositions to which our modal speech is answerable. 
Indeed, the admission of such an independent (or external) modal 
reality is crucial to modal realism which, contrary to reductionist approaches, 
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holds that necessary propositions are either true or false, and thus if true 
could not have been false, and similarly if false could not possibly have been 
true. Hence it seems accurate to mark the realism of necessary truths as an 
essentialist thesis in that it holds the view that necessary propositions have 
their truth-values essentially: a necessary proposition therefore has the 
property of being either true or false essentially while a contingent 
proposition has the property of being either true or false accidentallyl. And 
the modal reality itself to which the truth conditions of modal propositions are 
answerable, the modal realist might say, is timelessly existing abstract objects 
and their intrinsic properties and the relations obtaining between them. 
In the preceding chapter, it has been argued that the 
Wittengensteinian anthropological conventionalism, according to which 
necessary propositions are to be understood in reference to contingent facts 
about the natural or cultural history of human beings, is untenable. Moreover, 
it has been argued that such a position cannot consistently be maintained on 
the grounds that once it is assumed that we cannot transcend the bounds of 
conceivabilities, then it does not seem to be a warranted claim to maintain that 
necessities thus conceived are a matter of contingency. However this can by 
no means be taken to be the final verdict on any attempt to account for the 
necessities in anthropocentric terms. 
In this chapter, I shall argue that a better picture for our 
understanding of necessary truths can be developed on the basis of the divine- 
mind dependency which one might label as "Divine Conceptualism". However, 
before that, we have to see why a conceptualism in terms of the human-mind 
dependency is not tenable. Therefore, I shall examine a couple of such 
approaches. Human Conceptualism comes in different forms, for example it 
can be psychologistic, or naturalistic, or rationalistic or intuitionistic, all of 
1 Plantinga (1987), pp. 189-191. 
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which, however, explain necessary truths with reference to certain human 
intellectual faculties. 
4.1 Quasi-Realism 
Simon Blackburn has recently argued that necessary truths can be 
explained with reference to the bounds of our imagination under what he calls 
"projectivism" or "quasi-realism": 
Projectivism is ... a promising option in the theory of 
logical necessity. We not 
only believe it to be true that 7+5= 12, but we also find the truth inexorable: 
it could not have been otherwise. We cannot imagine it otherwise; we could 
make nothing of a way of thought which denied it. But this may be just a fact 
about us and the limitations of our present imaginations,... he [the quasi- 
realist] will deny that anything more can be meant by the real modal status of a 
proposition, than can be understood by seeing it as a projection of our (best) 
attitude of comprehension or imagination towards it. 2 
The quasi-realist does not think that there is a set of modal facts, to 
which the truth-value of modal propositions are subject, independently of our 
projective mental states; therefore, the talk of necessary truths "involves no 
irreducible appeal to a ... modal reality. It is here that the opposition [of quasi- 
realism] to realism lies... "3 
The problem of necessity, thus understood, leads one to a psychological 
account of modality inasmuch as a proposition is held to be necessary on the 
grounds of our own mental attitudes in terms of its being unimaginable to 
have been otherwise. The notion of necessity, and therefore, of necessary 
truths and falsehoods are embedded in the human mind, and thus it is human 
2 Blackburn (1984a), pp. 216-217. 
3 Blackburn (1993), p. 55. 
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conceiving which delimits what is necessary and possible. On this view, 
therefore, 
" (A) P is necessary if and only if it is impossible to conceive p otherwise. 
But can one really maintain (A)? Our objection to the Wittgensteinian 
anthropological conventionalist was that one cannot consistently hold the 
view that it is inconceivable how a different set of necessary truths could have 
been true other than the actual one together with the thesis that, 
nevertheless, the actual set of necessary truths is contingently as it is, and 
therefore, it could have been otherwise. However, it does not seem to be that 
clear whether one can hold a similar position in the following way. For, given 
that modality, in principle, is a matter of what is humanly conceivable, it 
seems to be a justified claim, 4 in counterfactual terms, to say that, 
(1) If the human beings had different conceiving limitations necessary 
propositions could have been otherwise. 
Even though, on the face of it, nothing seems to be wrong with such a 
counterfactual (1), in that given (A), it seems to be a justified claim, 
nevertheless, it is obscure whether the antecedent of (1) could have been true 
at all. Could human beings have had different imagination, and thus different 
limitations on their conceiving-power? 
One might find it natural to say they could not, given that we cannot 
conceive its being otherwise. Thus if, it would be argued, our imagination 
could not have been otherwise, if there is no way to conceive how the 
antecedent of (1) could have been true, then (1), as a counterfactual with a 
necessarily false antecedent, will be vacuously true. 5 
4 See Cassam (1986), pp. 452-453. 
5 For an account of vacuously true counterfactuals, see D. Lewis (1973), p. 16. 
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This point can be a matter of further debate but I shall not pursue this 
line of argument any further as it seems to me that there is, after all, a prima 
facie difficulty with the quasi-realist account of necessary truths in general: 
how are we to know whether the fact responsible for the phenomena of 
necessary truths is our conceiving-power or not? Clearly, it is one thing to 
claim that our imagination (or conceiving-power) is bound to the actual set of 
necessary truths, and indeed, it is an altogether different thing to take our 
imagination as being responsible for the existence of necessary truths and 
thus to hold that it is the seat of modality. Yes, it seems to be an incorrigible 
fact that our imagination is limited to certain necessities and also 
impossibilities, but, it is not thus transparent to us whether this fact, our 
imagination with its actual limits, can legitimately be taken to be responsible 
for the very ground or source of necessary truths. Certainly, it is intelligible 
that there should be a fact, other than our imagination, to which the existence 
of necessary truths -and perhaps our imagination as well- is accountable even 
though we suppose that there is a full correspondence between what is 
necessary and what is unimaginable for us. If so, it is not a legitimate step to 
jump from the fact that we cannot, as a matter of fact, imagine how necessary 
truths could have been otherwise to the conclusion that what is responsible 
for necessary truths being as they are is our actual imagination. 
To be sure, whether one can reasonably hold the view that our 
imagination is responsible for necessary truths is another question. However, 
the quasi-realist contention is stronger than such a view in that it maintains 
that necessary truths "could not have been otherwise". Indeed this seems to 
manifest a hidden contradiction in the quasi-realist account as it, on the one 
hand, maintains that necessary truths may be about us and our present 
imaginations and, on the other hand, holds that they could not have been 
otherwise. Before considering this point, however, one might ask, how can we 
make sure that there is not a fact other than our imagination for the 
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necessities of our thinking? Given that it cannot be our imagination which 
informs us whether itself is the fact responsible for the phenomena of 
necessary truths, what else it can be? 
It seems to me that one needs to presuppose an external "god's eye view" 
for making the claim that necessary truths are answerable to our imagination, 
that is to say, that our imagination is the necessity-making faculty and the 
source of modal propositions, yet, I cannot see how the quasi-realist can 
legitimately have such an external eye view. 6 
Apart from such general difficulties with any psychological account of 
logical necessity in terms of being dependent on the human mental 
dispositions, the Blackburnian projectivist (quasi-realist) exposition of the 
problem in hand seems to involve some further difficulties: even though one 
might agree with the basic projectivist claim that it is the limit of our 
imaginations which makes something necessary for us, it is hard to see what 
reasons Blackburn might have for the contention that "this may be just a fact 
about... the limitations of our present imaginations". What do we exactly mean 
by "present imaginations" in this context? If by that Blackburn has in mind 
the idea that modality, as a matter of mental dispositions, is, so to say, the 
product of an evolutionary process, then, one needs to show how it would be 
understandable that, although 2+2=4 is necessary due to the fact that the 
limits of our present imaginations disallow us to think it otherwise, 
nevertheless, it is possible that, for instance, our "future imaginations" might 
6 There can be, on the other hand, a general difficulty with the identification of necessary 
truths with what is in principle imaginable or conceivable in that one can to some extent 
fictionalise violating the laws of logic where, say, a fictional character x is here and there 
(or, x is F and not-F) at the same time. Thus, with Morris, one might say that even if 
"... many impossibilities are consistently describable to a point, and in this sense 
conceivable ... we must always carefully distinguish this sort of conceivability and 
genuine possibility. something is genuinely possible in the broadly logical sense ... only 
if it is actuality would be compatible with all the necessary features of reality, including, 
for example, the laws of mathematics. " (1986, p. 114). 
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accommodate the fact that this is false, and thus provide the means whereby 
2+2=5, or the number 9 is smaller than number 7. 
Yet, by "the limitations of our present imaginations" Blackburn might 
have in mind "the limitations of our actual imaginations", and thus, it might be 
argued, such a position cannot fairly be drawn from what has been said 
considering that, after all, it contradicts the projectivist's own claim that 7+5= 
12 is not merely true, but indeed necessarily true, since "it could not have been 
otherwise". To be sure, this might be true, but then what about the projectivist 
claim that a necessary proposition such as 7+5= 12 could not have been 
otherwise? Given that the modal truth of necessary propositions is ultimately a 
matter of our own mental attitudes, or imaginations, it does not seem to be a 
legitimate assertion that necessary truths could not have been otherwise. 
In fact, this is rather dissimilar to the Wittgensteinian position 
criticised in the previous chapter. The difference is that while the 
Wittgensteinian argues that what we take as necessary propositions could have 
been otherwise, the quasi-realist holds that they could not have been 
otherwise. But if so, again, given that 
(2) P is logically necessary for us if and only if we cannot imagine 
(conceive) p otherwise, 
and that (2) implies, 
(3) What is logically necessary delimits the bounds of our imagination, 
it is hard to see how one can legitimately maintain that, 
(4) What is logically necessary could not have been otherwise. 
Once again, if (2) and (3) are true, then the verdict "could not have been 
otherwise", viz., (4) mediates a fact beyond the limits of our imagination, and 
thus beyond our knowledge. 
Again, what seems to be compatible with (2) and (3) is an agnosticism 
with respect to (4). If the bounds of our conceiving or imaginative abilities are 
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limited by what is logically necessary, then neither the claim that what is 
logically necessary could have been nor the claim that it could not have been 
otherwise, seems to be warranted. In short, therefore, if necessity- 
impossibility and contingency-possibility are to be defined in terms of 
inconceivabilities and conceivabilities for which the human imaginative 
capacities are taken to be responsible, it seems that we cannot possibly know 
whether the bounds of our conceiving power could have been otherwise. 
Furthermore, given that the quasi-realist acknowledges the fact that 
necessary truths could not have been otherwise, then, as Cassam rightly 
pointed out7, one might wonder what explanation he can propose for such 
modal claims, that is, that necessary truths could not have been otherwise, 
hence that their falsity is impossible. Indeed, such a position turns out to be 
circular in the sense that it states that we cannot conceive necessary truths 
being otherwise because they are impossible, but, in turn, necessary truths 
are impossible because we cannot conceive their falsity. 8 
Such a difficulty, I think, partly stems from the ontological reductionist 
character of the quasi-realist view of modality in that modal discourse is 
basically seen to be "expressive" rather than truth-conditional or assertoric, 9 
and therefore, one can talk as if there is modal fact where in fact there is 
not. 10 
7 Op. cit., pp. 458-59. 
8 Ibid., p. 459. 
9 For such a line of criticism of the quasi-realist view, see Wright (1987), pp. 33-35, and 
(1989), p. 50. 
10 See Blackburn (1993), p. 55. 
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4.2 The Cautious Man 
However, there has been another proposal, advocated by C. Wright 11 
and E J. Craig, 12 which seems to be invulnerable to some of the criticisms 
levelled against quasi-realism. The attempt is characterized by a sceptical 
character, "the Cautious Man", who, even though he agrees with us on the 
inconceivability or unimaginability of necessary truths being otherwise, 
nevertheless holds back in ascribing necessity to them: 
the distinctive feature of his [the Cautious Man's] behaviour is that he will 
never admit that any truth is necessary. Faced with a proof, or an allegedly 
necessary statement, the Cautious Man will happily say everything else that we 
would (... ). He will give the same accounts of the meanings of all the terms 
involve; he will agree that the allegedly necessary statement is, if not 
necessary, at any rate true, that he feels the greatest confidence that it will 
always be true, and indeed that he cannot imagine its being otherwise. If what 
is in question is not a single statement but a proof, he will agree with us that 
every line is either an axiom or the result of the correct application of one of 
the rules of inference to an earlier line or lines; he will agree that he can't 
imagine that sequence of symbols failing to be an admissible result of applying 
those rules of inferences to those premises. But he goes on insisting that, as 
far as he is concerned, all these things are just truths - he is not disposed to 
take the step from unimaginability of the contrary to their necessity. The limit 
of his imagination, ... is still just another fact about him, he sees no reason to 
take it as a guide to what must of necessity be the case. 13 
The Cautious Man standpoint, as one can see, resembles the quasi-realist 
in regarding so-called necessary truths to be embedded in our imaginative 
powers; but unlike quasi-realism it refrains from modalising the set of so- 
called necessary propositions. Hence, although the quasi-realist affirms that 
11 (1980), pp. 452-467. 
12 (1985), pp. 89-112. 
13 Ibid., p. 93. 
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(B) P cannot be imagined otherwise =P is necessary, 
the Cautious Man does not. For he thinks that there is an element of decision 
involving in modalising a statement, in going "beyond the Cautious attitude, 
moving from an acknowledgement of everything which that attitude grants in 
the particular case to acceptance of a necessity" 14, 
One might wonder what the Cautious Man's conception of necessity 
might be, therefore, what exactly he repudiates when refusing to modalise a 
proposition which by ordinary criteria we take to be necessary. One of the 
motivations which Craig points out is that: "We might, for instance, come to be 
able to imagine what we can't now imagine, there may be other beings who 
can imagine what we can't and never will be able to imagine and so on. " 15 
Certainly, the Cautious Man is right in challenging the equation 
between "unimaginability" and "necessity". Thus, for example, as Forbes 
pointed out, given that we have been visually presented with a creature which 
to the best of our knowledge is either a human or an android, but in fact is an 
android, then, it would seem that it is conceivable or imaginable that the 
creature in question is a human being. However, given that it is of logical 
necessity that an android is not a human being, then it would follow that one 
cannot identify what is conceivable or imaginable with necessary truths. 16 So, 
although our imagination can indeed be fallible, this bears no relevance to 
what is in fact logically, modally, the case. But if there is not a necessary 
relation and thus they are not co-extensive, then one can reasonably agree 
with the Cautious Man in rejecting (B). 
14 Wright (1980), p. 457. 
15 (1985), pp. 90-91. 
16 Forbes (1985), pp. 221-222. 
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Again, it can be argued that the idea that the limitations of our 
imagination might change deserves respect, because there is a clear sense in 
which such limitations can be thought to be indexed to our knowledge and 
experience; hence they are flexible rather than being fixed. Thus, for 
example, something can be unimaginable to Sat tl , but this might turn out to 
be imaginable to S at t2 , and also what can be imaginable to 
S, might not be 
imaginable to M, and so on. After all, there can be certain things which 
though imaginable, are nevertheless impossible, thus, for instance, someone 
other than Caesar can imagine himself being Caesar, but his being Caesar is 
not logically possible. Accordingly, taking (un)imaginability as the ground of 
(im)possibility does seem to be wrong17. But then the question would be on 
which grounds the Cautious Man can reject necessitation? If necessity has 
nothing to do with unimaginability then it becomes difficult to see how the 
Cautious Man's rejection of necessity on the grounds of the fact that our 
imaginative powers are changeable is to be understood. 
Secondly, consider 
(5) Water is unwet 
and 
(6) 2+2=5. 
Arguably, we cannot imagine how (5) and (6) can be other than false, 
and moreover we can have a strong disposition to believe that neither (5) nor 
(6) will ever be true. If so, on the Cautious Man's view, there should be no 
difference between (5) and (6) if the issue turns on what is in principle 
unimaginable. Yet, there is an intelligible difference between these two 
propositions in that while (5) seems to be false on inductive grounds and thus 
logically contingent, (6) does not seem to be so. Indeed, at this point, the 
Cautious Man position seems to be indistinguishable from the Millian 
17 See, Blackburn (1993), pp. 68-69. It is notable that, Blackburn, later on, recognizes the 
difference between what is "unimaginable" and "inconceivable". See ibid., p. 68. 
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inductivist. Yet it has already been shown that necessary propositions cannot 
be considered as equivalent to empirical propositions, no matter how highly 
probable those propositions may be. The defender of the Cautious Man position 
might challenge this inference, but I cannot see how he can introduce a 
distinction between two different kinds of propositions such as (5) and (6) on 
the proposed grounds of unimaginability alone. 
Thirdly, can we really make sense of the contention that there is an 
element of decision involving in one's modalising a proposition or a proof? 
How about entailment-statements such as, if 
(7) All men are mortal 
and 
(8) Socrates is a man, 
then, 
(9) Socrates is mortal. 
Given the truth of (7) and (8), there seems to be no way to avoid the conclusion 
(9) which necessarily follows from them. Can we make sense of such an 
inference or entailment without presupposing the notion of necessity? Can 
one agree on the premises (7) and (8), yet reject the conclusion, that is, (9)? 
The Cautious Man's rejoinder to this would presumably be negative, but, if so, 
what is the exact role of decision involved here? What difference would the 
Cautious Man's modalising make to the conclusion of such an argument? Could 
the Cautious Man have an independent reason for holding back in the 
necessitation of such an argument? I do not see any. 
More importantly, the notion of necessity is essential for our 
understanding of the notion of logical form in the sense that a logical form, 
such as modus ponens, can be thought to be valid if and only if it is necessarily 
truth-preserving, that is, if and only if it necessarily yields no falsity from 
true premises for all its instances. If so, the Cautious Man cannot give a proper 
explanation for the validity of logical forms. 
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Consequently, it seems to me that the notion of necessity, is 
indispensable in order to make sense of the difference between various 
propositions as well as there being certain intellectual activities such as 
arguing, thinking. The Cautious Man's attitude thus seems to be unpromising 
inasmuch as, after all, it does not add anything considerable in one's 
understanding of the problem of necessary truths; in other words, it resolves 
the problem at the cost of removing it from the scene. 
4.3 Realism, Anti-Realism and Truth 
Having considered two non-realist attempts to analyse necessary truths 
in terms of "imaginability" or "inconceivability", it seems reasonable to 
conclude that neither of them can satisfactorily explain the ground of 
necessity and necessary truths. But given that not all approaches in terms of 
mind-dependency need be reductionist, it might be argued that the basic idea 
of such an approach (mind-dependency) seems to be rather insightful 
inasmuch as it is counter-intuitive to suppose that there are propositions, 
necessary truths, independently of minds, persons holding or judging them18. 
Thus, it could be argued that necessary truths are mind-dependent in that they 
are the products of human mental activities, and therefore, on this view, 
(C) Had there been no minds -i. e. no human beings- there would not have been 
necessary truths. 
18 For such an argument for the mental reality of propositions, see Plantinga (1982), pp. 
67-68. And also see Pollock (1984), pp. 7-8. Similarly, Bealer pointed out that "Thoughts 
[propositions] are the sort of thing that can be believed, disbelieved, remembered, 
forgotten, understood, asserted or denied in language, advanced as theories, etc. This to 
say, thoughts are natural objects of intensional relations" (1982, p. 184). 
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Conceptualism thus understood seems to situate itself in an intermediary 
position between realism (platonism) and nominalism, in the sense that while 
it repudiates the platonic view according to which necessary truths designate 
logically necessary relationships among the eternally existing realm of 
necessary objects (the Forms, universals), nevertheless, it does not reject the 
very existence of necessary truths (and thus the existence of abstract objects 
such as properties, relations and propositions). Rather the basic dispute 
between realism and conceptualism hinges upon the ontological character of 
abstract objects and necessary truths. Thus, although for the conceptualist, the 
existence of a mind is a necessary condition for the existence of necessary 
truths as they are essentially mind-dependent entities, the realist thinks that 
there would have been necessary truths even if there had existed no minds at 
all. 
Apart from this disagreement, however, another fundamental 
disagreement between realism and conceptualism seems to be that while, in 
the former, necessary truths are discovered, therefore, from an 
epistemological point of view, recognised by us, in the latter, they are mental 
constructions. Viewed from this perspective, however, conceptualism seems to 
be reminiscent of intuitionism, 19 hence it seems appropriate to consider it in 
conjunction with an intuitionist account of necessary truths, which also seems 
to link with the ongoing debate between realist and anti-realist theories of 
meaning and truth. 
At the heart of any realist theory of meaning is its affirmation that the 
meaning of a declarative sentence S consists in Ss truth-conditions which 
obtain independently of our epistemic/ noetic structure. Thus, for any 
statement there is an independent state of affairs in virtue of which it is 
either true or false; and it is in principle a possibility that the truth value, 
19 Indeed as Quine (1953a, p. 14) rightly pointed out, Intuitionism is the modern 
counterpart of the medieval conceptualism of universals. 
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therefore, the meaning of a statement might outrun our epistemic capacity to 
recognise it, i. e., transcend the limits of our knowledge. So, for example, given 
the fact that our knowledge of mathematics does not exhaust all mathematical 
propositions (truths or falsehoods), on this account, it is a legitimate assertion 
that there could be a mathematical proposition which, even though it 
transcends our capacity to recognise it is nonetheless determinately either 
true or false. Therefore, it might be said that it is a part of realist semantics to 
endorse the principle of bivalence for all possible statements including the 
possibility of verification transcendent truths. 20 
By contrast, on an anti-realist account, the meaning of a sentence S, it 
is argued, consists in S's assertibility conditions, and therefore, the gap 
between S's being independently true or false and our capacity to recognise 
that truth is removed. Indeed, since, on this account, there cannot be any 
proposition which might be true independently of its assertibility or 
verifiability conditions, the set of meaningful statements must be restricted to 
those which as a matter of fact are decidable inasmuch as there is no 
determinate reality beyond our epistemic access to it. And thus, for example, 
whether a mathematical statement is meaningful (true or false) crucially 
depends upon the availability of the proof for that statement; the proof being a 
matter of the fully exercisable mathematical capacities of the speaker. 
Therefore, the proof or refutation presented for a mathematical proposition to 
be true or false is ultimately a finite construction as it is ultimately grounded 
in the intellectual activities of human creatures which are finite. In other 
words, since, for the anti-realist, truth is basically an epistemic rather than a 
metaphysical notion, what makes a proposition true -if "true" is predicable on 
the anti-realist theory of meaning at all- is its assertibility-conditions. 
Consequently, although, on the anti-realist account, the existence of non- 
20 This is Dummett's characterisation of realism, see his (1959a) and (1973b) especially 
p. 315, and also Rasmussen and Ravnkilde (1982). 
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decidable propositions is admitted, yet, contrary to realist view, there cannot 
be verification-transcendent truths. Consequently, the realist claim that the 
principle of bivalence is applicable to these -undecidable- propositions is 
radically rejected. For, the anti-realist argues, our language accommodates 
certain sentences such as subjunctive, counterfactual conditionals, sentences 
referring to the humanly inaccessible realms, and those which make 
reference to unbounded quantification over infinite totalities, which make the 
realist principle that every statement is determinately either true or false 
inapplicable. 21 
The main difficulty with anti-realism, however, pertains to its criterion 
that what makes a sentence meaningful is its assertibility-verifiability 
conditions. But why should we think that what makes a sentence meaningful 
and thus either true or false is its assertibility conditions? Could there not be a 
sentence S which is assertible -justifiably warranted- but still false or vice- 
versa? What seems to be problematic is that the notion of assertibility is far 
from clear. Thus, given that the standards of assertibility might change from 
person to person, or from community to community, this seems to lead us to 
some kind of relativism. So, for example, if we assume that there might be some 
creatures who are much more intelligent than ourselves, there seems to be no 
reason why their epistemic standards, hence the standards of assertibility, 
should not be much higher than ours. 22 
Still what seems to be most counter-intuitive on this account, is its 
denial of the possibility that truth might outrun our epistemic capacity; i. e. the 
existence of truth beyond our possible recognition. But granted that it is an 
essential fact about us that we are finite and thus time and space bounded 
creatures, it seems inevitable that our epistemic capacities must be restricted. 
21 Dummett (1991), p. 315. 
22 See Plantanga (1982), p. 51. 
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If so, however, there seems to be no reason to think that our recognitional 
capacity should exhaust what is in principle knowable. 
On the other hand, the intuitionist (anti-realist) thesis that 
mathematical reality is fully grounded in our recognitional capacities seems to 
necessarily entail finitism in mathematics. Thus, considering certain natural 
facts about human beings such that they are necessarily finite, bounded with 
time and spatial order, intuitionism, contrary to classical view of mathematics, 
repudiates the idea that infinite mathematical structures can in principle be 
completed. So, for example, 23 the realist might hold that Goldbach's conjecture, 
that is, that every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes, 
submits to the principle of bivalence, viz., that it is determinately either true 
or false. Whereas the anti-realist -intuitionist- denies this, since there is no 
procedure enabling us to check all even numbers one by one in order to see 
whether there is a proof for'the conjecture in question. She must deny that 
this task can successfully be performed. Likewise, from an anti-realist point of 
view, it is unfeasible to quantify over infinite mathematical or non- 
mathematical totalities, but the question why this is impossible turns on 
certain aforementioned natural and necessary constraints about ourselves, 
namely, that we are time-space bound creatures. Yet, there seems to be no 
reason why a being free from these constraints, so to speak, a being with 
infinite recognitional capacities, cannot know the truth value of quantified 
statements over infinite structures, and thus to know whether Goldbach's 
conjecture is true or false. Consequently, the anti-realist, restricting all 
meaningful statements to those which are humanly recognisable, and thus 
assertable on these grounds, seems to unnecessarily restrict such a legitimate 
idealisation24 with respect to the truth value of the statements transcending 
our recognitional capacities. 
23 McDowell (1989), pp. 173-192. 
24 George (1993), pp. 53-72. 
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As seen, most of the difficulties with anti-realism stem from the anti- 
realist understanding of "truth" as an epistemic notion, to be defined in 
human noetic terms, and from the basic anti-realist intuition that if there 
were no human beings (minds), there would not be things like propositions. 
Yet, this only seems to be an outcome of the ill-founded anti-realist assumption 
that human knowledge should exhaust what is in principle knowable. In 
addition to this, and to the challenge of finitism which goes against the 
rationality of explaining the ground of necessary truth in terms of human 
conceptualism, there seems to be some further reasons for thinking that anti- 
realist (conceptualist-intuitionist) proposal is far from being convincing. For 
one thing, it is as matter of fact true, as Adams pointed out, that "we are too 
easily mistaken about necessary truths and too often unable to recognise 
them"25; and secondly and more importantly, although one might agree with 
the basic intuition behind the conceptualist -anti-realist- view that necessary 
truths are essentially mind-dependent objects, nevertheless, it contains some 
radical difficulties when one takes the modal properties of necessary truths 
into consideration. Thus it is agreed by all that, essential to the conceptualist 
view is the idea that necessary truths are mind-dependent, therefore, on this 
account, it is a necessary truth that, 
(D) Necessary truths exist if and only if there is a mind to hold them. 
Given (D) the existence of a mind is a necessary condition for the 
existence of necessary truths. But, it is an undeniable fact that human beings 
exist contingently, hence that it could have been the case that there are no 
human beings. Yet it is equally true that propositions, as abstract objects, could 
not have failed to exist, and more significantly, as necessary truths could not 
have failed to be true. Thus it can plausibly be argued that one can, for 
25 (1983), p. 51. 
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example26, conceive that there was a time when no human mind existed, but it 
is hard to imagine a time when the proposition that 2+2=4 or that the whole 
is greater than the part did not exist or was false. If that is true, however, one 
runs into a paradox: necessary truths owe their existence and the property of 
being essentially (necessarily) true to the contingent existence of human 
beings. But how can this be true? 
4.4 Realism, Conceptualism and God 
Considering that none of the theories hitherto examined does real 
justice to our intuitions about necessary truths, we have seen that there are 
good reasons for eliminating them in favour of realism which explains 
necessary truths by reference to abstract objects and their intrinsic 
properties and the relations obtaining between them. 
Realism, however, has its own problems. Thus, one of the prevalent 
objections to realism has been that it is somehow unable to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for our knowledge of abstract objects. This objection, 
however, as Hale put it, "has been developed against the background 
assumption of a broadly causal conception of knowledge"27. Yet, given that a 
causal theory of knowledge is not self-evidently or necessarily true for all 
domains of our knowledge, it might be said that the realist is under no 
obligation to give a causal explanation for our knowledge of abstract objects. It 
is thus open to the realist to maintain that a causal theory of knowledge is 
simply irrelevant to the case of abstract objects in that they, unlike physical 
objects, do not exist in space-time. Instead, she can hold a rationalist view 
26 See Plantinga (1980), p. 4. 
27 (1994), p. 299. Thus, according to Hale, since a satisfactory epistemology of necessary 
truths is yet be developed, there is not a special epistemological problem facing realism 
in particular. See ibid pp. 299-325. 
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according to which our knowledge of abstract objects and necessary truths is 
purely a priori, and therefore it can be seated in reason alone. 28 
In saying this, the realist might indeed be right, but it seems that such 
an explanation can carry conviction only when it is made clear how the 
relation between the propounded a priori contents of the human mind and the 
mind-independently existing abstract objects can take place. A further 
explanation is needed for the interaction occurring between ontologically 
independent abstract objects and the epistemological faculties of the human 
mind in this respect. But given that abstract objects, as causally inert entities, 
cannot cause the human mind to have such an innate faculty, the question is: 
what else can? 
On the other hand, the realist says that necessary truths owe their truth 
and necessity to the intrinsic properties of abstract objects and the relations 
obtaining between them. Necessary truths, thus understood, are explained in 
de re terms as they reflect the nature or essence of objects (abstract or 
whatever) involved. 29 Necessary truths also reflect the relational properties 
of abstract objects. Indeed, the role of the ontology of the relations is 
momentous in explaining necessary truths: they not only knit abstract objects 
together such that they make a proposition (necessarily) true, but are also 
crucial for our understanding of why a proposition p can entail another 
proposition q. It is therefore hard to account for the ground of certain logical 
operations such as "deduction", "entailment" or "consequence" etc., without 
invoking the existence of the relations between abstract objects. 
Abstract objects or (in Platonic terms) the Forms30 therefore stand in 
certain relation to each other like, so to speak, a 'family structure'; there seems 
28 For a recent defence of a rationalist epistemology of abstract objects on these grounds, 
see Katz (1995). 
29 Fine (1994) defends a generalized view of de re necessity in virtue of the nature or 
essence of the objects involved. 
30 Hereafter, I shall use the terms 'abstract objects' and the 'Forms' interchangeably. 
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to be, in other words, a kind of a hierarchy of the relations between the Forms. 
So, for example, all the Forms seem to have the property of being self-identical 
and this brings them together under the Form of 'Sameness', and likewise, 
since 'Threeness' and 'Fiveness' have the property of being numerically odd 
they come together under the Form of 'Oddness'. Although the Forms stand in 
certain relation to each other, they are not identical; 31 each Form has a 
distinct nature which is not exhausted by its relational properties. Then the 
basic question, which the realist needs to answer, is: how are we to explain the 
ground and nature of these relations as well as distinctions between abstract 
objects? Why should they have relations to each other at all? 
In what follows, I shall first pursue how an answer to these questions 
can be developed by postulating an eternal and universal mind along a line of 
thought which seems to have a. perennial place in philosophy as it harks back 
to the ancient debate about the metaphysics of the Forms, embarked on by 
Plato himself and notably maintained by Plotinus. 32 Secondly, I shall consider 
how this might also provide an explanation for the epistemological problem of 
abstract objects. 
Once the issue is the interconnectedness of abstract objects, as Gerson 
points out, it natural to think that there is a 'partial identity' between them 
such that it is a part the nature of, say, F to bear a relation to the nature of G, 
or vice versa. The partial analysis of each Form, in other words, necessarily 
overlaps the other Forms, and thus the relational properties of a Form turn out 
to be a part of its nature. Thus, considering that all the Forms are somehow 
interconnected and that there are Forms such as 'Sameness' from whose 
natures all the Forms partake, one way of explaining the interrelatedness of 
31 See Gerson (1990), pp. 54-55. 
32 I shall generally follow Gerson's Interpretation of Plato and Plotinus on this issue, I 
shall therefore not get into the exegetical debate here. 
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the Forms is to view them as proper parts of one whole. 33 Following such a 
line of thought, Plato postulated a superordinate metaphysical principle, the 
Form of the Good, which not only accounts for the existence, truth and 
knowability of other Forms but also unifies them. 34 But, how exactly? 
Given that each Form's being partially identical with the Form of the 
Good in terms of different aspects or attributes of the Good is difficult to 
conceive and also intolerable for Plato (as he would have found it difficult to 
identify Forms with attributes35), it is more promising to conceive of such an 
identification in terms of 'virtuality'. Thus, it might be suggested that the Form 
of the Good virtually contains all the rest of the Forms insofar as it is the cause 
of their existence and thus accommodates their effects. 36 Unfortunately, this 
too seems to come short. Even if we suppose that the Form of the Good virtually 
contains all the complexity of the other Forms in a simple variegated fashion, 
it is not clear how this is supposed to explain the interconnectedness of the 
Forms and how such an identification is to mark the distinct nature of each 
Form. 37 
Yet, given that the Forms depend upon the Form of the Good and are 
virtually identical with it, it has been argued that any cognitive association 
with the Forms would be different ways of associating with the Good. 38 And 
such an intellectual activity of associating with the Forms, it would be said, is 
the proper activity of the soul inasmuch as only an immaterial being like soul 
(which is extremely similar to the Forms) can have a cognitive association 
with the Forms, and in so doing, 
33 Ibid., pp. 54-57. 
341bid., p. 57. 
35 Ibid., p. 59. 
36 Ibid., p. 61. 
37 Ibid., p. 80. 
38 Ibid.; pp. 60-61. 
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... it appears that the relationship 
between that which knows and the Forms 
themselves is some sort of identity. ... [and] this suggests, roughly, that 
thinking and the Form that is thought are what the Good is when thinking 
occurs 39 
But, then it might be said that 
... the necessary interconnections of Forms become articulations of a simple 
nature [the Form of the Good] qua object of intellection 40 
Thus, considering that the connections and distinctions between the 
Forms might therefore be conceived as something akin to 'conceptual 
connections and distinctions', according to Gerson, "Plato, in developing a 
defensible metaphysics of Forms, first posits a Form of the Good as an 
explanatory arche for Forms and then is led to considerations regarding 
mind"41. 
Now, given that "Forms are interrelated distinct natures only as objects 
of thinking ... [and] the multiplicity of natures of Forms and their necessary 
relations are ontologically prior to temporally situated cognitive agents"42 it 
would seem evident that the proposed task cannot be performed by imperfect 
minds such as ours. To solve this, Plato introduces a divine mind of a complex 
nature, nous, which is eternally engaged in perfect contemplation of all the 
Forms. Thus, in Plato's metaphysics of the Forms, while the Form of the Good is 
employed as the ontological ground of the other Forms; nous is hypothesized to 
explain their connections and distinctions. 43 Therefore, 
391bid, p. 67. 
40 Ibid., p. 61. 
41 Ibid., p. 63. 
42 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
43 Ibid., pp. 68-71. 
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... the Form of the Good alone is not sufficient as arche. 
Nous is required as 
eternal contemplator of Forms by its eternal orientation to the finality of the 
Good. 44 
Thus, noes and the Form of the Good conjointly serve to guarantee the integrity 
of the other Forms 45 
To sum up, therefore, even though the Forms derive their existence 
from the Form of the Good, such an ontological dependence does not supply the 
possibility of there being interconnected Forms of distinct natures. 
Considering that the relations and distinctions between Forms are better 
understood in terms of conceptual connections and distinctions, Plato seems to 
postulate an eternal mind, nous, which is eternally engaged in thinking the 
Forms. And the Form of the Good, as an arche, seems to eternally manifest the 
Forms and their interrelations to an eternal intellect seeking for the Good as a 
goal. 46 The very existence of the Forms together with their connections and 
distinctions, therefore, entails there being an eternal mind which is eternally 
(cognitively) identical with the Forms. Thus, "the multiplicity of Forms would 
neither be reduced to appearances nor obliterated by identification with the 
Good"47, they are identified with nous which has a complex nature and thus 
internalized to it in conceptual-like terms. 48 
The division of labour between the Form of the Good and nous seems to 
make it difficult to see whether or not, in Plato's view, the Forms are internal 
to nous. But, can it be the case that nous thinks the externally existing Forms 
and thus interconnects them? It was Plotinus who considered and rejected 
such a possibility: 
44 Ibid., p. 230. 
45 Ibid., p. 70. 
46 Ibid, p. 63. 
47 ibid., p. 68. 
48 Ibid, p. 70. 
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The 'link' among the Forms is noun, but not in the sense that the Forms are 
united because there is one eternal thinker of them. Rather they are identical 
with the ousia of noes. Unity is retained because nous is one; multiplicity 
among Forms, and duality between Forms and noun is retained because noes is 
simultaneously thinking all the distinct Forms; unity-in-multiplicity is 
established by the fact that nous's thinking is self-thinking. 49 
Thus, Plotinus, according to Gerson, "not only makes explicit what ... is 
in the background in Plato, but goes well beyond"50. Essential to Plotinus' 
reasoning seems to be the idea that the Forms can be interconnected distinct 
natures only if they are identical with the nature of nous. For, according to 
Plotinus, were Forms external to nous, each Form would "be cut off from the 
others"51 there would not be a unity in the realm of the Forms. To think that 
the Forms are not outside nous is therefore a necessary step for a proper 
understanding of the eternal interconnectedness of the Forms and this leads 
us to think that "[t]he Forms are not really distinct entities, but really distinct 
aspects of Intellect"52. 
Moreover, the internalization of the Forms into nous not only is a 
necessary step for a proper understanding of the eternal interconnectedness 
of the Forms but also needed for guaranteeing eternal truth. Because, 
according to Plotinus, to suppose that the Forms are outside nous would cause 
well-known epistemological difficulties to surface: if the Forms are outside 
nous, how are we to account for nous' knowledge of the Forms? In order to 
guarantee eternal truth, nous' knowledge of the Forms must be infallible 
49 Ibid, p. 196. 
50 Ibid., p. 196. Elsewhere Gerson writes: "In Plato, the elements of Plotinian metaphysics 
are surely present - Forms, a divine mind, and a first principle above these called 'Good' 
or perhaps even 'One'. It must be confessed, however, that these elements are not well 
integrated in the dialogues" (1994, pp. 67-68). 
51 Plotinus (1966-88), V. 5.1. 
52 Gerson (1994), p. 51. 
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(incorrigible), but if the Forms were external to nous this cannot be the case. 
For, if we suppose that they are external to nous we have to appeal to a 
perceptual/ representational account of knowledge and such knowledge 
cannot enjoy the epistemic privilege of being self-evidently true as it is 
mediated by certain intermediary representationalist metaphors such as 
images, pictures. 53 After all, 
it is entirely obscure what it means for a picture to represent an immaterial 
entity ... and more importantly, if knowing is picturing, one must have a way of 
distinguishing between a true picture and a false one, between knowing and 
being deceived. But the only way to do this is to compare the picture with what 
it is a picture of. And if this is possible, one does not need the picture in the 
first place. 54 
On Plotinus' account, therefore, nous could never comprehend the real 
nature of the Forms if they were outside it because there would always have 
been an ontological gap between the cognizer and the objects of cognition, 
and this would have caused uncertainties in nous' knowledge of the Forms. 
And in this case, the truth found in nous would have been doubtful and 
imperfect, 55 or rather, Plotinus thinks, there would be no truth in nous, 
because "the real truth ... does not agree with something else, but with itself, 
and says nothing other than itself, but it is what it says and it says what it 
is"56. 
If truth is a matter of self-accordance and the Forms were external to 
nous, then there would not be truth in nous, however, "if there is not truth in 
Intellect... then truth will not be anywhere else either"57. But, granted that 
53 Plotinus op. cit, V. 5.1; Gerson (1990), p. 197. 
54 Gerson (1990), p. 197. 
55 Plotinus, op. cit., V. 5.2. 
56 Ibid., V. 5.2. 
57 Ibid., V. 5.2. 
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there are eternal truths, Plotinus asks us to think that nous' knowledge of the 
Forms must be self-evident and this can occur only when nous is directly 
acquainted with the Forms in terms of self-knowledge where nous' knowledge 
of them is nothing other than the knowledge of its own mental states where 
the thinker and the objects of thought are the same. 58 
In sum, Plotinus seems to put forward two distinct arguments for the 
internalization of the Forms into nous. The first argument is put forward on 
the grounds that the Forms can be interconnected only if they are somehow 
identical with the nature of nous. In Plato, we have seen, a division of labour 
was made between the Form of the Good and nous to guarantee the integrity 
(the interconnectedness) of the other Forms. Thus, while the Form of the Good 
is virtually identical with the other Forms, it is nous which explains the 
complexity of the Forms as interconnected distinct objects. It is difficult to 
understand such a division of labour. Given that nous does not somehow create 
the Forms as interconnected objects by thinking the Form of the Good, then, 
how are we to understand its function of interconnecting the Forms? Can nous 
interconnect them as they exist outside it? 
It is hard to think how nous could interconnect the Forms if they were 
external to it, and even harder when nous is considered to be mental and the 
Forms to be abstract in nature. Or else, one has to think that nous 
interconnects the Forms, not at the level of reference, but at the level of 
representation, but this would indicate that the relations between the Forms 
are inessential and thus somehow irrelevant to them as they would have been 
superadded or imposed upon them. To think that nous interconnects the Forms 
at the level of representation, therefore, will invoke a non-realist conception 
of the relations among the Forms and this would clearly undermine the realist 
view of necessary truths which presumes that the Forms have their relations 
essentially. However, if we think that the Forms are interconnected as they 
58 Gerson (1990), p. 198, and (1994), p. 55. 
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are somehow identical with the nature of noes, then we might think that they 
have their relations essentially. If so, it seems plausible to think that the 
interconnectedness of the Forms is better conceived if they are in one way or 
another identical with the nature of such a mind. 
Plotinus' second argument is put forward on the grounds of 'eternal 
truth' and, in this connection, he makes two distinct claims about the nature of 
'truth': (i) truth cannot exist without Intellect, and (ii) truth is a matter of self- 
accordance. To start with (i), Plotinus argues that "if Forms exist, eternal truth 
exists. But truth is being for or in relation to an Intellect. Hence eternal truth 
entails an eternal Intellect"$9. However, what is the exact relation between the 
Forms, Truth and Intellect? Why should they entail each other? 
One reason why 'eternal truth' entails an eternal Intellect seems to be 
the idea that "what causes the truth of such propositions is an eternal state of 
affairs"60 involves both the existence of the Forms and their necessary 
interconnectedness. Therefore, both the Forms and their interrelations are 
eternal and ontologically on the same par. That is, since the eternal 'link' or 
'partial identity' of two Forms, say Fness and Gness, is explained in terms of 
being grounded in a reality (nous) which can at the same time be (partially) 
identified with both Rness and Gness, then such a reality must be equally 
eternal. The eternality of the Forms thus entails the eternal coexistence of 
nous due to their interconnectedness. Thus, for example, the proposition all 
fathers are male is eternally true because the Form of Father and the Form of 
Male are eternally connected to the extent that one cannot imagine a time 
when the Form of Father and the Form of Male existed disconnected. 61 
59 Gerson (1994), p. 48. 
60 Gerson (1990), 196. 
61 Gerson (1994), pp. 48-49; and Gerson (1990), p. 197. In a similar fashion, Leibniz 
argued that "God not only sees individual monads and the modifications of every monad 
whatsoever, but he also sees their relations and in this consists the reality of relations 
and of truth" (1989, p. 199). 
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Similarly, we might say, there was no time when the Form of Father and the 
Form of Male were interconnected and the proposition that all fathers are 
male was false. 
Apart from these considerations, Plotinus thinks that the very seat of 
'truth' can be nowhere but Intellect because 'truth is being for or in relation 
to an Intellect'. One might take this to mean that there cannot be truths 
without there being certain intellectual activities such an thinking, believing 
and judging. 62 And one way to understand this to think that truth consists in 
the relation of the correspondence of a cognition (a truth-bearer) with a fact 
or state of affairs. However, we have already seen that, according to Plotinus, 
truth is a matter of self-accordance; indeed this is an important reason for him 
to reinforce his basic claim that the Forms are not outside nous. Thus, Plotinus 
seems to think that 'truth' cannot consists in the relation of correspondence if 
the two terms of such a relation are distinct, that is, if the reality which makes 
a cognition true is, so to speak, an extra-mental reality. At this point, the 
parallelism between Plotinus' thought and Frege's following remarks might 
seem striking: 
A correspondence ... can only be perfect if the corresponding things coincide 
and are, therefore, not distinct things at all.... It would only be possible to 
compare an idea with a thing if the thing were an idea too. ... But this is not at 
all what is wanted when truth is defined as the correspondence of an idea with 
something real. For it is absolutely essential that the reality be distinct from 
the Idea. But then there can be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. 
So nothing at all would be true; for what is only half true is untrue. Truth 
cannot tolerate a more or less. 63 
62 See Plantinga (1982), p. 68. 
63 (1956), pp. 18-19. Also, there is a similarity between Leibniz and Frege's anti- 
semantical considerations on the concept of truth. See Adams (1994), p. 69. 
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There can be many questions which might be raised in this context. 
Thus, for example, if what makes a cognition true is not an extra-mental 
reality, then what is it? It might true that there cannot be a full 
correspondence between, in Frege's words, an idea and something real, does it 
then follow that 'truth' is not independent of our noetic activities and thus that 
the reality distinct from our ideas has no bearing on the truth of our 
cognitions? 
On the correspondence theory of truth, a cognition (belief, proposition 
or whatever) is true if and only if there is a fact (or a state of affairs) to which 
it corresponds. Since the 'correspondence' is usually explicated in terms of 
'structural isomorphism' between truth-bearers and facts, the pivotal task of 
the defender of the correspondence view is to give a specification of each term 
of the relation independently in order to show that both terms share the same 
structure. 64 Such an enterprise, however, is often argued to end in frustration 
inasmuch as any attempt to compare a belief with an outside fact results in a 
circularity; that is, it is not possible for one to get beyond the circle of her 
beliefs to show that things are in the way she believes and thus the gap 
between mental and non-mental reality can never be transcended. 
Nevertheless, Davidson has recently argued that this objection is not 
cogent particularly because it is raised against the background assumption 
that truth is somehow an epistemic concept whereas, he maintains, it is always 
open to the correspondence theorist to hold that truth is "indepedent of our 
beliefs or our ability to learn the truth"65. Even though this might be 
accurate, it will not help us with the question of elucidating the 
'correspondence' relation, and much of the difficulty consists in providing an 
independent account of the very nature of things to which true beliefs are 
supposed to correspond. Presumably, therefore, Davidson maintains that the 
64 See Johnson (1992), p. 45. 
65 Davidson (1990), pp. 302-303. 
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real problem with the correspondence theory "is that there is nothing 
interesting or instructive to which true sentences might correspond"66. 
It is facts which are often considered to make our beliefs true. The very 
nature of facts, however, is rather vague mostly because it is not immediately 
clear whether they are to be considered within the objective furniture of 
extra-mental reality (the world) or be somehow identified with certain mind- 
dependent entities. Consider, for example, the relation of the fact that there 
are books on the shelf to the physical objects books and shelf. It is not clear 
whether the fact that there are books on the shelf itself, like physical objects 
such as books and shelf, is a part of the world, and thus it is unclear whether 
facts can be reduced to ordinary physical objects and vice versa. 67 There 
might be good reasons for thinking that physical objects such as books, 
shelves, tables etc., belong to the furniture of the world, but what reasons 
might one have for thinking facts too belong to the world? Facts, on the one 
hand, seem to supervene upon outside physical objects, on the other hand, 
seem to be structured in a very similar way in which true beliefs are 
structured. Thus, with Johnson, one might rightly ask, "[t]he belief is 
structured mentally by the believer, but what structures a fact? "68. 
The resemblance between the structure of facts and that of true beliefs 
(thoughts or propositions) has led some philosophers to hold to what is 
sometimes called 'identity-theory' according to which, facts are identical with 
true beliefs. 69 However, considering that such a line of thought would 
undermine the whole idea of correspondence, it has been argued70 that facts 
are to be altogether eliminated in the formulations of the correspondence 
view of truth; instead, one should take bare independent an sich reality to be 
66 Ibid., p. 303. 
67 See Bonjour (1985), p. 166, and Johnson (1992), pp. 45-46. 
68 (1992), p. 45. 
69 For a criticism of the identity theory of truth, see Kirkham (1992), pp. 138-139. 
70 See Bontour, (1985), pp. 166-167. 
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what makes our cognitions true. Accordingly, "a proposition corresponds to an 
sich reality if it refers to a particular which does exist and attributes to that 
particular either existence itself or else some specific property that it actually 
has (and analogously for relational properties)"71. 
Such a line of thought, it might be said, relies for its truth on the 
supposition that external objects together with their properties and relations 
have a mind-independent reality in the world and that they are epistemically 
accessible to us. Therefore, it seems to be open to a sceptical challenge, 
however I shall not pursue them here. Instead, I shall suppose that such an 
explanation is indeed tenable to the extent that it can be backed up by 
inductive evidence to show that concrete objects as well as their properties 
and relations can enter into a causal relation to make our cognitions true. 
Moreover, with Bealer72, I shall assume that a condition (a state of affairs or a 
fact) can be built up from the properties, relations (qualities and connections) 
instantiated by the actual objects. 
Even so, however, it should be evident that such an account can only be 
appropriate for the properties and relations of physical objects which exist in 
space-time and which might be said to enter into a causal relation. Thus, even 
if we think that the correspondence view of truth, in the way described thus 
far, can be vindicated from the aforementioned difficulties, there are good 
reasons for thinking it has to be confined to the 'truths' of phenomenal, 
spatio-temporal reality, viz. contingent truths. 73 One can therefore find good 
reasons for thinking that such a theory can at best be adequate for the truths 
about the actual instances of abstract objects (the Forms) which exist in space- 
71 Ibid., p. 167. 
72 (1982), pp. 177-204. 
73 Cf. Bontour (1985), p. 167. Similarly, Kirkham argues that 'facts' can enter into causal 
relations. See, op. ciL, 138. 
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time, but not for the truths about abstract objects per se. 74 Therefore, since 
the Forms are causally inert thought of existing independent of nous, its 
knowledge of them cannot be sense-perceptual. 
However, if we think that the Forms are somehow internal to nous, 
there might be good reasons for thinking that a causal relation can take place 
between nous as cognizer and the Forms as the objects of its cognition. And 
this can be backed up by the view that a semantic externalism of mental 
content might not enjoy the epistemic transparency of the introspective self- 
knowledge or incorrigible mental contents (beliefs). 75 And it is at this point 
where, I think, the idea that truth is a matter of self-accordance seems to 
manifest its strength. 
Now, if the Forms are identical with the nature of nous, then, in 
thinking them nous thinks nothing other than itself where, so to speak, both 
terms of the correspondence relation become somehow identical. In Frege's 
words, this is a 'perfect correspondence' which seems to be the core of 
Plotinus' thesis that truth is a matter of self-accordance where it "does not 
agree with something else, but with itself, and says nothing other than itself, 
but it is what it says and it says what it is"76 Thus, the truth of a necessary 
proposition is to be explicated in terms of identity77 in the sense that divine 
thoughts become cognitively identical with the very facts which make them 
true. 
Aristotle entertained similar considerations when he said that "... the 
divine thought and its object will be the same, i. e. thinking will be one with 
74 Here we shall not get into the debate whether the Form of the Good (the One) can be 
somehow causally responsible for noes' knowledge of abstract objects. 
75 For a discussion of semantic externalism and the transparency of introspective self- 
knowledge, see Boghossian (1994). 
76 Plotinus, op. cit., V. 5.2. 
77 For a general defence of the (Fregean) Identity theory of truth which identifies facts 
with true thoughts, see Hornsby (1997). 
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the object of its thought"78 even though he held that the divine self-thinking 
is not tantamount to thinking of the Forms but thinking thinking. 
79 Plotinus 
is in agreement with Aristotle in thinking that nous is identical with the 
objects of its cognition save the difference that he holds that nous, in thinking 
itself, thinks the Forms and therefore that there is a distinction between nous 
and its objects of cognition, i. e., the Forms. 80 More precisely, "the thinker as 
subject and the thinker as object must contain ... [a] duality, that is, they must 
be distinguished yet identical" 81. 
Presumably, it is the existence of such a duality which, one might say, 
enables us to understand the contention that 'truth is a matter of self- 
accordance' and that it is in relation to an Intellect. And it seems to me that 
Plotinus is basically right in maintaining that there must be a distinction 
between nous and the Forms in that even though nous is eternally cognitively 
identical with the objects of its cognition. For, although we might think that it 
cannot be the case that nous thinks that p without at the same time 
recognizing that pis the case82, nevertheless nous' thinking that p must be 
logically distinct from the state of affairs designated by p. 
But, what is the exact relation between nous and the objects of its 
cognition, i. e., the Forms? Plotinus seems to think that the Forms are identical 
with nous. The crucial idea operating here is that of the relation of identity. 
There does not seem to be a particular difficulty in understanding this claim if 
by this is meant that the thinker and the objects of thought are co-present in 
78 Aristotle (1941a), 1075a1-5. 
79 Gerson (1990), p. 137. Crucial to Aristotle's reasoning is that the divine thought should 
not depend on something other than itself as this would imply potency and imperfection in 
divine knowledge. See Aristotle, op. cit., 1074b15-35. 
80 See Gerson (1990), pp. 193-194; and (1994), pp. 50-53. 
81 Gerson (1994), p. 54. 
82 Cf. Hornsby, op. cit, p. 6. 
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the same subject; but, if that is not what is in mind, how are we to understand 
the claim that nous is identical with the Forms? 
This turns out to be a rather obscure and troublesome point in Plotinus' 
account and thus, for example, he might be taken to be saying that each Form 
(intelligible) is an individual intellect where nous is a multiplicity of these 
thinkers, 83 or that every intellect is cognitively identical with all the Forms, 
nous is what all particular intellects commonly have. 84 However, I shall not 
get into this debate as it might carry us beyond the scope of our interest. 85 
Nevertheless, it seems to me rather intuitive to think that the Forms are 
in fact Ideas in nous, where each Form is identical with a distinct Idea. The 
interconnectedness of the Forms can still be retained because they would be 
ideas in the same mind which has them by its very nature. The ontological 
status of the Forms, it might be said, would also be maintained since they are 
uniquely identified with the Ideas in nous. 86 However, the ontological status of 
the Forms is related to the ontological status of such a mind. What kind of a 
being must such a mind be in order to retain the ontological status enjoyed by 
abstract objects and necessary truths? 
Our considerations about nous in a historical context so far seem to 
have, in a tentative manner, shown that, in order to explain the 
interconnectedness of the Forms and therefore eternal truths, there must exist 
an eternal mind which is the seat of the Forms and which thinks them 
eternally. 87 Such a mind, in order to be able to perform such a paradigmatic 
83 See Gerson (1990), p. 198, O'Meara op. ck, p. 37. 
84 Gerson (1994), pp. 55-57. 
85 For this debate, see Gerson (1990), p. 198; Gerson (1994), p. 55; O'Meara, op. cit., p. 
37. 
86 Cf. Gerson (1990), p. 70. 
87 According to Gerson, although Plotinus thinks there must exists at least one intellect 
to guarantee eternal truth "no one particular intellect is the guarantor" (1994, pp. 55-56). 
However, given the assumption that abstract objects can be interconnected distinct natures 
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task, as seen, must be eternal. This is true insofar as it is hard to imagine a 
time when abstract objects and necessary truths did not exist. By the same 
token, evidently such a mind has to be necessary since abstract objects are 
necessary beings, and thus could not have failed to exist. And finally, to 
guarantee necessary truths, we should think that such a mind, unlike ours, 
has to be omniscient with respect to recognizing abstract objects, that is, with 
respect to its own nature. 
Granted that only a mind with these qualifications can be the seat of 
abstract objects and necessary truths it is a question whether nous in the way 
characterised thus far can meet these conditions. The fundamental reason for 
hesitating is that nous is not the ultimate being but subordinate to the archtF, 
that is, it is secondary to the Form of the Good or the One. Thus, in Plato88, a 
division of labour is drawn in between the ultimate arche and noun; while the 
Form of the Good accounts for the ontological ground of Forms; nous is 
hypothesized to explain the interrelations and distinctions between Forms in 
conceptualistic terms. Correspondingly, in Plotinus, even though eternal 
truths cannot be identified with the One because of the complexity of eternal 
truth and the absolute simplicity of the One, nonetheless, what is ultimately 
responsible for the existence of eternal truths is the causal activity of the 
One. 89 
What seems to be problematic, explicitly in the case of Plotinus, is the 
instrumentality of nous in that it is somehow generated (emanated) or caused 
to exist as the device of the One as an eternal cognizer90 of the Forms to 
guarantee eternal truths. However, aside from the fact that it is difficult make 
sense of the Plotinian contention that nous owes its existence to the One and its 
only if they are identified with the ideas or nature of the same mind, there are good 
reasons for thinking that there must exist one intellect rather than many. 
88 Gerson, (1990), p. 71. 
89 Gerson (1994), p. 65-65. 
901bid, p. 46. 
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nature to itself, 91 the real difficulty is that it is hard to conceive how abstract 
objects, which exist necessarily, can depend on such a derivative being. 92 On 
the face of it, if nous is created or somehow caused to exist, it would then follow 
that abstract objects and necessary truths too are created or caused to exist and 
this seems to be in a plain contradiction with our ontological and modal 
intuitions about abstract objects and necessary truths. 
The difficulty with the ontological derivativeness of nous, it might be 
said, is a problem stemming from the ancient considerations about the ultimate 
arch'e. In a very similar way to the doctrine of divine simplicity, the ultimate 
being, arche, is considered to be devoid of any nature. 93 However, once these 
considerations are set aside there seems to remain no reason why an ultimate, 
necessary mind should not be sufficient to substitute both the arche (the Form 
of the Good or the One) and nous. 
It is therefore my contention that our considerations regarding a 
universal mind and conceptualism so far can reasonably be wedded to a 
traditional theistic conception of God, who is necessary, ultimate and, as 
omniscient, free from all epistemic restrictions. This not only would 
circumvent the problems facing nous, but also provide a far more simple 
explanation for the phenomenon of abstract objects and necessary truths. 
Thus if we consider that God has the Forms are Ideas (or Concepts) in his mind 
by his nature, and he, as a part of his nature, thinks them eternally and 
necessarily, following Ockham's razor, there remains no reason to postulate an 
arche as the ultimate ground of being, plus an eternal mind; only one being, 
God, suffices to function as the ultimate source of being and as an eternal 
mind. Let us designate this view as "Divine Conceptualism". 
91 Gerson (1990), p. 221. 
92 Cf. Peterson (1995), p. 356.1 shall return to the issue whether necessary can be 
created in the following two chapters. 
93 See Gerson (1990), pp. 57-58. 
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Thus, the divine conceptualist can rightly maintain that the 
paradigmatic status of the Forms and of such an eternal mind in terms of 
having necessary existence can be retained if we think that God is a necessary 
being and has these ideas in his mind by his very nature. In so doing, the 
divine conceptualist would reject the troublesome doctrine of divine 
simplicity94 as false and repudiate the idea that God is absolutely simple in that 
he does not have concepts or that there are no distinctions between his 
attributes. The rejection of such a doctrine would thus enable the divine 
conceptualist to remove the existence of an intermediary being such as nous 
between the archee (or God) and the multiplicity of the Forms and the 
complexity of necessary truth. 
Having identified the Forms with ideas or concepts in the mind of God, 
the divine, conceptualist can identify necessary truths with necessary God's 
thoughts95 whose truth is answerable to the facts about his concepts. Thus, 
one might say, necessary truths are divine conceptual truths in the sense that 
the truth and necessity of these propositions are answered to God's concepts 
and their intrinsic properties and the relations obtaining between them. 
Thus, necessary truths, on the divine conceptualist account, arise out of 
God's self-thinking. And since God is essentially what he is and has these ideas 
in his mind by his very nature, his concepts are essentially as they are, that is, 
they have their intrinsic properties and relations necessarily. On the other 
hand, since God is essentially omniscient, he is necessarily and eternally 
engaged in thinking the ideas in his mind, the actuality of his nature is only 
logically prior to his thinking. 
94 This doctrine has recently been subject to decisive objections, for such a controversy, 
see Plantinga (1980); Mann (1982), Morris (1985); Stump and Kretzmann (1985); Hughes 
C. (1989); Leftow (1990a); Wolterstorff (1991); Vanicella (1992); Miller (1994). 
95 Cf. Morris and Menzel (1986), p. 355. 
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On the divine conceptualist account, therefore, all abstract objects are 
in fact ideas (concepts) and necessary truths are thoughts in the mind of God. 
However, unlike the human concepts and thoughts which are grasped from an 
outside realm (i. e., from the divine mind) which exist independently from 
human graspings, the divine concepts are the very abstract objects (the 
Forms) and the divine thoughts are the very propositions 96 That is to say, the 
divine concepts and thoughts, unlike the human concepts and thoughts, are 
non-relational in the sense that God does not grasp them via being 
intentionally directed to certain objects and states of affairs existing apart 
from himself. 97 To mark the distinction between the identification of the 
divine and the human concepts/ thoughts with abstract objects/ necessary 
truths, we might think that the divine concepts/ thoughts are eternally, 
necessarily and directly identical with abstract objects and necessary truths, 
whereas the human concepts/ thoughts are temporarily, contingently and 
indirectly express them by their cognitive associations with God's concepts 
and thoughts. 98 
The hypothesis of divine conceptualism also sheds light on the 
epistemological problem of necessary truths. One of the basic motivations 
behind the repudiation of realism, as we have seen, has been that it is 
somehow unable to explain our knowledge of necessary truths. In fact, such a 
difficulty is not a problem just for realism, it has been an enduring issue for 
almost every philosophical school to explain our (a priori) knowledge of 
truths of logic and mathematics. The difficulty is stated almost on every 
occasion when the issue is necessary truths: how can we possibly have an 
96 See ibid., p. 355. 
97 See Loux (1986), pp. 498-501. 
98 For Plato, what distinguishes noes from all the other intellects such as ours is the fact 
that while the Forms can only be (cognitively) identified with nous, it is the nature of the 
Forms which is multiply present as numerically distinct concepts in other intellects. See 
Gerson, (1990), p. 70. 
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epistemic faculty which might account for our knowledge of abstract objects 
and necessary truths? One way to answer this question, to be sure, is to say 
with the realist that reason has a faculty for a priori knowledge, but we have 
seen that this cannot be a satisfactory answer unless it is shown how the 
relation between reason and abstract objects can obtain and thus how reason 
can be endowed with such an innate capacity. 
The divine conceptualist's answer to this problem, however, can be 
really attractive: given that abstract objects are to be identified with God's 
concepts and that God is a causal power, our knowledge of abstract objects and 
necessary truths can be considered as an outcome of God's action on us. Thus, 
after all, as Plantinga points out, 99 the causal requirement can be met: if a 
causal relation can be said to hold between God and abstract objects in terms of 
a thinker and his ideas, then "we can enter into a causal relation with them by 
virtue of our causal relation to God"100. God's action (causal relation) on us in 
this respect could be understood in different ways: one can suppose that God 
created us with an innate (a priori) capacity to know necessary truths and also 
one can take this to be a matter of continuous divine illumination. 101 
By contrast, abstract objects are causally ineffective if conceived as 
existing independent of a causal agent, and therefore it is hard to see how they 
could have their actual instances without being caused by something else. 
With Frege, one might rightly think that the effects of abstract objects can 
only be "brought about by an act of the thinker without which they would be 
ineffective" 102. However, contingent thinkers like ourselves can hardly be 
responsible for bringing about all the effects of abstract objects. For one 
thing, it is conceivable (logically possible) that abstract objects are 
99 (1993), p. 121. 
100 Ibid., p. 121. 
101 Adams (1983), pp. 51-52. 
102 (1956), p. 38. 
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instantiated without there being contingent thinkers. Prima facie, there are 
uncountably large numbers of the Forms, the Form of Man included, 
instantiated in the natural world. Yet, it is conceivable that; for example, the 
Form of Man exists eternally without there being an actual man; and 
considering that it cannot be the Form of Man which, as a matter of fact, 
caused the actual existence of human beings, we might rightly think that 
there must be a causal agent responsible for their actual existence. Indeed 
given that the God of theism is also a "creator", the divine conceptualist might 
consistently hold that such a causal agent is God who brings about the causal 
effects of abstract objects and this explains why abstract objects have their 
instances in the actual world via his creative power. 
Having the above considerations in mind, it seems to me rather 
attractive to maintain that the realist ontology of abstract objects is best 
understood as ideas in the mind of God and therefore that divine conceptualism 
is the most advantageous account of necessary truths so far. Divine 
conceptualism both retains the advantages of a conceptualist line of thought 
developed via nous and avoids the problems facing nous by identifying the 
Forms with the ideas (concepts) in the mind of God. Thus, the paradigmatic 
status of the Forms and necessary truths is maintained inasmuch as they are 
identified with the concepts and thoughts of an ultimate and necessary being; 
and the interconnectedness of the Forms is explained in terms of being the 
different interrelated concepts in the same mind (God's mind); and finally, 
necessary truths are guaranteed because God is omniscient. 
Divine conceptualism thus not only gives an explanation for God's 
relation to abstract objects but also for our knowledge of abstract objects since 
God is a causal power and therefore can be causally effective on us in this 
respect. Also, by identifying abstract objects with ideas in the mind of God who 
is a causal power at the same time, divine conceptualism answers the question 
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of how causally inert abstract objects might have their effects in the actual 
world. 
There is more to be said about divine conceptualism and I shall return to 
this in the final chapter, but before that it is necessary to examine two other 
accounts which also relate necessary truths to God. 
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S. CREATIONISM: THE CARTESIAN VOLUNTARISM 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that there is no way to account 
for necessary truths in a reductive manner, therefore we have granted that 
the reference of necessary truths is the ontology of abstract objects which 
exist necessarily and have their properties and relations necessarily. To 
overcome certain problems facing this ontology, however, we have also seen, 
in a tentative spirit, that there are good reasons for thinking that this 
ontology is to be identified with the mental contents of an eternal mind. 
In this connection, we have seen that nous cannot retain the 
paradigmatic ontological status of abstract objects because it is somehow 
created or caused to exist. Thus I have argued that since abstract objects 
together with their properties and relations exist necessarily and therefore 
cannot depend upon something such as nous which is somehow ontologically 
derivative, they are best conceived as the ideas in the mind of God who is a 
necessary being. In so doing, however, one does not commit herself to the idea 
that abstract objects and necessary truths somehow could have failed to exist or 
could have been otherwise; accordingly, by identifying such an ontology with 
God's mental contents, one does no harm to the ontological and modal 
properties of abstract objects and necessary truths. 
God's relation to abstract objects and necessary truths seems to call the 
scope and limits of the divine power into question. Thus, it might be asked, if 
God is truly -unrestrictedly- omnipotent, can he change the ontological and 
modal properties of abstract objects and necessary truths? If he can, how after 
all can there be necessary truths, or in which sense one might call them 
necessary? If he cannot, is not "divine omnipotence" somehow restricted in 
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this respect? The question, to be sure, is reminiscent of the Euthyphro 
dilemma. 1 Thus, one might wonder, whether necessary truths are necessary 
because God wishes them so of his free choice, or are they necessary anyway 
such that even he cannot make or could not have made them otherwise. 
Having identified the realist ontology of abstract objects with God's 
mental contents (divine ideas) we seem to have already rejected the first horn 
of the dilemma which leads one to account for the existence of abstract objects 
and necessary truths in terms of the divine will. For, such a voluntarism would 
entail that God would have power over the ontological and modal properties of 
abstract objects and therefore of necessary truths such that, if he wishes, 
abstract objects would no longer be necessary beings or have their intrinsic 
and relational properties, and the truths about them would no longer be 
necessary. This, to be sure, contradicts our intuitions about the realistic 
picture of necessary truths which make reference to the ontology of abstract 
objects and their properties and relations, and therefore we have to think that 
God cannot be responsible for the ontological and modal properties of abstract 
objects in terms of his will. To strengthen this intuition, in this chapter, I shall 
critically examine the Cartesian doctrine of the creation of eternal truths. 
Thus, I shall first give a detailed exposition of the Cartesian doctrine and then 
argue that there are good reasons for rejecting such a view as it leads us to 
some unacceptable consequences. 
1 The core of the Euthyphro dilemma Is this: are moral truths/actions obligatory because 
God wishes them so of his free choice, or does God wishes them so because they are 
obligatory anyway, i. e., independently true of God. If the theist takes the first horn of the 
dilemma, he seems to face a difficulty such that what is morally right and wrong is just 
God's arbitrary choice, hence he could have made what is morally good, bad; and also what 
is morally bad, good. If he takes the second horn of the dilemma he seems to infringe upon 
God's sovereignty, because what is morally right or wrong would be independently true of 
God. They would be true in themselves. See Swinburne (1974), pp. 120-121. 
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5.1 The Cartesian Argument: an Overview 
Descartes clearly entertains the view that necessary truths depend upon 
God for their existence, since, according to him, it would be mistaken to think 
"... that if God did not exist nonetheless these truths would be true; for the 
existence of God is the first and the most eternal of all possible truths and the 
one from which alone all others derive"2. Therefore, for Descartes, the 
counterfactual that 
(A) If God did not exist, there would be no necessary truths 
is (necessarily) true. Divine existence therefore is the very ground of all 
necessary (eternal) truths; however, they are distinct from God's essence, and 
thus, not identical with the divine mind or somehow subsumed in being God. On 
the contrary, God is creatively responsible for the existence of necessary 
truths inasmuch as he is responsible for the rest of created beings: 
The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and 
depend on Him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. Indeed to say 
that these truths are independent of God is to talk of Him as if He were Jupiter 
or Saturn and to subject Him to the Styx and Fates. Please do not hesitate to 
assert and proclaim everywhere that it is God who has laid down these laws In 
nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom. .... It will be said that If 
God has established these truths He could change them as a king changes his 
laws. To this the answer is: 'Yes he can, if his will can change. ' 'But I 
understand them to be eternal and unchangeable. ' - 'I make the same judgement 
about God: 'But His will is free. ' - 'Yes, but his power Is incomprehensible. '3 
2 (1970), p. 14. 
316id., pp. 11-12. 
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Although Descartes here mentions only mathematical truths as the 
paradigmatic necessary truths, as Plantinga points out, ' referring to his 
statements that God "... is no less the author of creatures' essence than he is of 
their existence; and this essence is nothing other than the eternal truths"5 
one can rightly extend this account to the host of all abstract objects. Thus, one 
might even think that Descartes entertained the view that necessary truths 
reflect the properties and relations of abstract objects but thought that they 
are to be considered within the limits of creation. Therefore, God is causally 
responsible for the existence of eternal truths: "You ask me by what kind of 
causality God established the eternal truths. I reply: by the same kind of 
causality as he created all things, that is to say, as their efficient and total 
cause"6. And in so doing, God was in no way determined, therefore he was 
absolutely free in respect of creating eternal truths: 
You ask also what necessitated God to create these truths; and I reply that just 
as he was free not to create the world, so he was no less free to make it untrue 
that all lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are equal. 
And it is certain that these truths are no more necessarily attached to his 
essence than other creatures are. You ask what God did in order to produce 
them. I reply that from all eternity he willed and understood them to be, and 
by that very fact he created them. Or, if you reserve the word created for the 
existence of things, then he established them and made them. In God, willing, 
understanding, and creating are all the same thing without one being prior to 
the other even conceptually.? 
Thus, it should be evident that from what Descartes says that it is God's 
free will which determines the establishment of eternal truths; in other 
4 (1980), p. 98. 
5 (1970), p. 14. 
6 Ibid., p. 14. 
7 Ibid., p. 15. 
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words, it is the divine will which makes p true or necessarily true. Since, he 
maintains 
... even if God has willed that some truths should 
be necessary, this does not 
mean that he willed them necessarily, for it is one thing to will that they be 
necessary, and quite another to will them necessarily, to be necessitated to 
will them. 8 
On the other hand, since for God knowing and willing are all one and 
the same thing, Descartes obviously employs the traditional doctrine of divine 
simplicity, according to which God has no parts or components whatsoever 
and concludes that God's willing from all eternity that 2+2=4 is equivalent to 
his knowing that 2+2=4 is true as well as to his creating 2+2=4. In fact, it 
has been argued10 that this is a crucial point in Descartes' argument, in that 
there were no possibilities prior to God's creative act. Since God's willing, 
knowing and creating are one and the same thing, there was no realm or set of 
possibilities prior to creation, from which God chose what he wanted to 
actualise. But in any case, 
(B) For any necessary proposition p, it is God's will which makes pa necessary 
truth; therefore, p is a necessary truth if and only if God wishes p to be a 
necessary truth. 
8 Ibid., p. 151. 
9 To be sure, It is difficult to see how God's understanding, knowing and willing could be 
one and the same thing. But, as seen, according to Descartes one cannot envisage any 
distinction between God's knowledge and his act of creation. In fact, although this seems to 
be a natural consequence of the doctrine of "divine simplicity", one should note that the 
scholastic philosophers, despite their approval of this doctrine, still have made a 
distinction between God's knowing and his creating, or between the divine understanding 
and the divine will. See Frankfurt (1977), p. 40. 
10 See, for example, la Croix (1984), p. 467. 
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Thus, it is/ was perfectly within God's power to make it true that 2+2=5, 
or to make the law of contradiction false; ll but, according to Descartes, it is 
futile to ask how God could have done so; and this is basically because of the 
fact that our mind is finite, hence incapable of conceiving God's infinite 
power: 
I turn to the difficulty of conceiving how it was free and indifferent for God to 
make it not be true that the three angles of a triangle were equal to right 
angles, or in general that contradictories cannot be true together. It is easy to 
dispel this difficulty by considering that the power of God cannot have any 
limits, and that our mind is finite and so created as to be able to conceive as 
possible things which God has wished to be in fact possible, but not to be able 
to conceive as possible things which God could have made possible, but which 
he has in fact wished to make impossible. The first consideration shows us that 
God cannot have been determined to make It true that contradictories cannot be 
true together, and therefore that he could have done the opposite. The second 
consideration shows us that even if this be true, we should not try to 
comprehend it since our nature is incapable of doing so. 12 
In sum, therefore, absolutely everything distinct from God is created, 
and therefore even if we think that the reference of necessary truths, for 
Descartes, is the ontology of abstract objects, such an ontology itself falls 
within the limits of creation. However, to say that x is created immediately 
seems to entail that (i) x could have failed to exist, (ii) x could have been 
otherwise. And if so, it is/ was within the divine freedom to have made such 
11 In dealing with this question, the scholastic philosophers have generally held the view 
that necessary truths -truths of logic and mathematics- set the limits of divine power. 
Therefore, God has the power to make p, if and only if p is logically possible. However, on 
this account, while necessary truths and objects were conceived to depend on God for their 
ontological and modal characters, "voluntarism" was clearly rejected. Thus, in relating 
abstract objects and necessary truths to God in terms of dependence, the scholastic 
philosophers such as Aquinas conceived them to be comprised in the divine essence; while 
Augustine thought that they are "divine ideas". See Kenny (1979), pp. 19-25. 
12 (1970), pp. 150-151. 
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that there are no abstract objects or that they exist with different properties 
and relations. Thus God could have made it such that there are no necessary 
truths as it is/ was within his power to make any necessary truth p false, and 
its negation non-p true. But can we make sense of the creation of something 
whose ontological and modal properties are essential, that is, where it is 
impossible for us to conceive how they could have failed to exist, or could have 
been otherwise? 
5.2 Universal and Limited Possibilism 
If necessary truths are created, however, does it follow that, on 
Descartes' account, there are no necessary truths? This is a controversial issue 
and it has been a matter of considerable exegetical debate. Some writers such 
as Frankfurt13 and Plantinga14 favour identifying the Cartesian position with 
the view which denies that there are any necessary truths; every proposition 
is, in the final analysis, contingently true or false. In Plantinga's words, 
Descartes' position entails "universal possibilism", according to which, "there 
are no necessary truths, and no impossible falsehoods; everything, every 
proposition, is possible because God could have made it true" 15. On the 
universal possibilist account, therefore, 
(Dl) Mp 
is true for every proposition, that is, every proposition is 'possibly true'. 
Such an interpretation is taken16 to be justified in reference to 
Descartes' following statements: "... God cannot have been determined to make it 
true that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that he could 
13 Op. cit., p. 42. 
14 (1980), p. 112. 
15 Ibid., p. 107. 
16 Ibid., p. 101. 
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have done the opposite" 17, and also "... it is useless to inquire how God could 
from all eternity bring it about that it should be untrue that twice four is 
eight, etc.; for I admit that that cannot be understood by us" 18. These passages 
indicate that it was within God's power to make it false that, 
(1)2+2=4 
or, 
(2) It is the case that God has created the universe and it has not been 
created by God. 
On the universal possibilist reading of Descartes, therefore, since God is 
infinite in power, nothing is impossible. 19 But, is "universal possibilism" 
possible? 
Harry Frankfurt argued that the view that God could have made a 
contradiction (p & non-p) true implies the logical possibility of the logically 
impossible, which is somehow incoherent: 
The assertion that some state of affairs can be brought about ordinarily entails 
that that state of affairs is logically possible. Descartes's statement that God 
could have made contradictions true seems to entail, accordingly, the logical 
possibility of the logically impossible. This appears to make very little sense, 
which... characterises. Descartes's doctrine concerning the creation of the 
eternal truths as "incoherent". 20 
Furthermore, Frankfurt has argued that Descartes' position is 
unintelligible: 
That there is a deity with infinite power is supposed by Descartes to entail the 
possibility of what is logically impossible. But if it must entail this, then the 
assertion that God has infinite (... ) power seems Itself unintelligible. ... If we 
17 (1970), p. 151. 
18 (1934), p. 251. 
19 See Plantinga (1980), pp. 102-103. 
20 (1977), p. 43. 
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cannot understand "infinite power, " we also cannot understand, and hence 
cannot believe or know, the proposition that God's power is infinite. 
21 
To consider Frankfurt's first objection, does Descartes' position entail 
the logical possibility of the logically impossible? Is it somehow incoherent? 
Given that Descartes' position can be identified as "universal 
possibilism", with Plantinga one might argue that Frankfurt's objection can be 
met along the following lines. Since according to universal possibilism, every 
proposition is possibly true, that is, no statement is necessarily true, there is 
not such a thing as "logical impossibility". On this interpretation, therefore, 
Descartes would not claim that for God the logically impossible is possible, but 
rather that nothing is logically impossible. 22 If so, Descartes' argument can 
coherently be formulated as follows: 
(3) God has infinite power, 
(4) If God has infinite power, there are no necessary truths; 
(5) There are no necessary truths. 
But, in this case, is not the defender of Descartes committed to at least 
one necessary truth, namely, modus ponens? He is not. Because, in the same 
way, the defender of Descartes can maintain the truth of all his theorems 
without affirming that they are necessarily true. In other words, one is 
committed only to the truth of the second premise, (4), rather than its 
necessity. 23 
What about Frankfurt's claim that if we cannot understand what is 
"infinite power", by the same token, we cannot understand the assertion that 
God's power is infinite; and therefore that this is unintelligible? Indeed 
Descartes already seems to have considered that difficulty as he maintained 
21 Ibid., p. 44. 
22 See Plantinga (1980), p. 116. 
23 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
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that in order to know that God is infinite one does not need to encompass it in 
one's understanding completely: "To comprehend something is to embrace it in 
one's thought; to know something it is sufficient to touch it with one's 
thought"24. Thus, on Descartes' account, we need to make a distinction between 
"comprehending that p" and "knowing that p"; accordingly, even though we 
cannot comprehend how God can or could have made a contradiction true, this 
is not an obstacle for knowing the claim that since God's infinite in power, he 
can make a contradiction true. 
It is not entirely clear to me whether such a cleavage can legitimately 
be made in such a context. To be sure, given that we are finite in our 
understanding there seem to be a priori reasons why we cannot comprehend 
how an infinitely powerful God can make something which we cannot 
conceive. But the problem then turns out to be how do we know that God can 
perform such an inconceivable task at all? 
Descartes can be taken25 to be arguing that in order to grasp the 
meaning of "infinite power" in this connection we do not need to able to 
conceive how God can exercise his "infinite power", that is, even though we do 
not know how a logically impossible task can be achieved, we can nevertheless 
know that such a being can have such an ability. Surely, we can suppose the 
existence of such a being and in so doing we understand what we are saying, 
and in this sense, Descartes' argument is understandable. That is, one can 
clearly see what is involved in such an assertion. If what Descartes is saying is 
tantamount to the claim that God has infinite power if and only if it is within 
his power to make any proposition true, nothing seems to be unintelligible26 
in this sense. And if that is the target of Frankfurt's objection, clearly such an 
objection is not conclusive, but it seems to me that Frankfurt's worries about 
24 (1970), p. 15. 
25 See Conee (1991), p. 454. 
26 Plantinga (1980), p. 118. 
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the intelligibility of the Cartesian doctrine go deeper; there is a substantial 
point (implicitly, at least) in his objection. 
I shall return to this issue, before this however, to be fair to Descartes, 
one should not overlook the distinction between the propositions "God could 
have done x" and "God can do a! '; for what Descartes seems to be saying is not 
that God can now make necessary truths false, but that he could have made 
necessary truths false. In other words, according to Descartes, although it was 
within God's power not to create the law of contradiction, or to make it false 
before creation, having created it once, he cannot (or does not) make it false, 
presumably because of the fact that God's will is immutable. 27 Hence, God, 
having created necessary truths, seems, so to say, to have limited himself to 
them. In a word, it is simply one thing to say that "God could have done a" and 
still another thing to say that "God can do x"; hence, the former does not Imply 
the latter. 
What exactly does "could" imply in this context? One might rightly say 
that the assertion that God could have made a contradiction true implies that 
there were alternative possibilities for God other than, say, the law of 
contradiction which God could have actualised (created); and thus for example, 
he could have actualised "the negation of the law of contradiction" instead. 
However La Croix has argued28 that it is unfair to attribute this view to 
Descartes; for, on Descartes' account, there are no alternative possibilities 
prior to God's creative activity. That is to speak, since God's creative activity 
does not consist in actualising unactualised possibilities and states of affairs, 
thus, necessary truths too are not actualised/ created out of already existing 
possibilities. 
Indeed, this might be partly true, given that, according to Descartes, in 
God, willing, understanding, and creating are one and the same thing, and that 
27 See La Croix (1984), p. 462. 
28 Ibid., pp. 460-461. 
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none of them is even conceptually prior to the other. But if that is true, that is, 
if there were no alternative possibilities prior to God's creative activity, does 
not Descartes' claim that "... God cannot have been determined to make it true 
that contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that he could have 
done the opposite"29 seem to remain unintelligible? Surely, to say that S is not 
determined with respect to doing p, or that S could do non-p instead of p means 
that S has alternatives other than p, and that means there are alternative 
possibilities prior to S's performing p. 
On the face of it, if universal possibilism is true, as Plantinga rightly 
pointed out, 30 this would imply that, in fact, God has no nature, because none 
of his properties would be essential to him. This is the case even if we think 
that it is no longer within God's power to make a any change to necessary 
truths. Since, as it was within God's power to make any proposition -including 
the law of contradiction and presumably the very proposition that 'God is 
omnipotent'- false, it follows that he could have made any proposition 
predicating a property of him false. But, could God have made the proposition 
that God exists together with the negation of that proposition, God does not 
exist, true ? Could God have made it true that he knows that he does not exist? 
Or, could God have made it the case that there is no difference between 
believing and disbelieving in the existence of God such that there would not be 
any difference between theism and atheism? Of course not. None of these 
claims seems to be intelligible nor can they consistently be held together with 
the traditional theistic concept of God. 
The ascription of "universal possibilism" to Descartes is however 
sometimes challenged. Thus it has been argued31 that Descartes never argued 
to the effect that there are no necessary truths; rather, he admitted that the 
29 (1970), pp. 150-151. 
30 Ibid., pp. 126-129. 
31 See La Croix op. cit, pp. 455-475; Conee (1991), pp. 450-458. 
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existence of necessary truths, but denied that they are necessarily 
necessary. 32 Thus, for example, Curley suggests: 
... we should understand 
Descartes's doctrine of the creation of eternal truths 
as involving, not a denial that there are necessary truths, but a denial that 
those which are necessary are necessarily necessary. To think that of these 
truths as created is neither to think that they are not necessary, nor to think 
that there was a time when they were not necessary, but to think that it is not 
necessary that they be necessary. 33 
Indeed, some of Descartes' texts seem to indicate that he held such a 
view, thus for example, he says "... if God has willed that some truths should be 
necessary, this does not mean that he willed them necessarily; for it is one 
thing to will that they be necessary, and quite another to will them 
necessarily, to be necessitated to will them"34. Accordingly, although there are 
in fact necessary truths and necessary falsehoods, and that they cannot be 
otherwise, they are not necessarily necessary. Since it is God who made them 
so - necessary or impossible- hence he could have made them otherwise. So, 
although there are necessary propositions, there are not modal propositions, 
thus for example, while the proposition (1) is a necessary truth and (2) is 
impossible or a necessary falsehood; they are not necessarily necessary truths 
or falsehoods; since all modal propositions are in fact con tingen t. 35 On this 
interpretation, then, 
(D2) MLp 
32 Such a position seems to have been ascribed to Descartes, first, by Geach (1973, p. 10), 
which is also considered but rejected Descartes' real position in Plantanga (1980), pp. 
103-114. 
33 (1984), p. 581. 
34 (1970), p. 151. 
35 Plantanga (1980), p. 108. Thus, there is a considerable similarity between a 
conventionalist and the Cartesian view of necessary truths which might alternatively be 
labelled "divine conventionalism". 
158 
that is to say, necessary propositions are possibly (contingently) necessary. 
Hence, one might say, God affirms 2+2=4 in every possible world, but he 
affirms 
(6) Necessarily 2+2=4 
in the actual world. 36 Consequently, there are worlds in which God does not 
affirm (6); and "if they had been actual, then there would have been possible 
worlds in which God does not affirm [6]. In fact there are no such possible 
worlds; but God could have brought it about that there were some"37. Hence, 
although God could not have made (1) false, he could have made it the case that 
he could have made (1) false, that is, he could have made (1) possibly false. 38 
Thus, one might think that there is a clear distinction between the 
universal possibilist account of modality which entails a "no necessity" view of 
so-called necessary truths, and the limited possibilist account which 
acknowledges that there are necessary truths, though it rejects that they are 
necessarily necessary. But, first let us consider what exactly it means to say 
that necessary truths are contingently necessary? Can we make sense of the 
idea that necessary truths are contingently necessary? 
Evidently, there are certain necessities which are necessary but only 
contingently, such as nomological necessities which we can conceive to have 
been otherwise. Even though they are in a sense unassailable necessities for 
us, in another sense, we can conceive their being otherwise without there 
being a contradiction in our understanding. Therefore, it makes perfect sense 
to say that nomological necessities are contingently necessary and not 
necessarily necessary. We can conceive that had God wished, he could have 
created another world other than the actual one, in which a different set of 
natural laws would have been true. But, what enables us to think so, however, 
36 Ibid., p. 109. 
37 Ibid., p. 109. 
38 Ibid., pp. 112-113 
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is the fact that what is 'nomologically necessary' is logically contingent'; the 
reference of 'contingently' in the modal iteration of natural necessities is 
'logical'. 
If so, however, how are we to understand that logico-mathematical 
necessities too are contingently necessary? What might be the reference or 
ground of 'contingently' involved here? If the answer is 'logical possibility' 
one seems to run into a contradiction. For, if by 'logical necessity' we mean 
which we cannot conceive to have been otherwise, then, in saying that what is 
logically necessary is contingently so, we seem to be saying that we can 
conceive what is granted to be inconceivable. As I shall return to this issue (in 
5.4), there is a prima facie difficulty with the contention that necessary truths 
are contingently necessary if both 'contingent' and 'necessary' are used in the 
logical sense. 
However, are necessary truths necessarily necessary? Thus far, we seem 
to have implied that "for any proposition p, p is a necessary truth if and only if 
it is necessarily true that p is necessarily true". This is equivalent to the S4 
modal principle that 
(N) LM LLp. 
On the face of it, it is rather counter-intuitive to think that Lp is true 
but LLp is false; any argument establishing the contingency of Lp seems to 
equally establish the contingency of p. 39 It is therefore rather intuitive to 
think that if p is logically necessary, this can hardly be a matter of accident or 
certain contingent facts that p is necessary40 and thus that they are 
necessarily necessary. This matter however is arguable and I do not intend to 
settle the controversy here; therefore, I shall for the sake of argument assume 
that (N) is correct, that is, a proposition is a necessary truth if and only if it is 
39 See Konyndyk (1986), p. 48. 
40 See Hughes and Creswell (1968), p. 43. 
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necessarily true that it is a necessary truth, 41 and thus I shall, with Van Cleve, 
think that "theories that seek to ground necessary truths in something 
contingent do not merely throw overboard the axiom Lp = Up, they do away 
with necessity altogether"42. Thus, I assume, no progress can be made on the 
grounds of substituting "limited possibilism" with "universal possibilism", and 
therefore, if there are good reasons for rejecting that God could have made, 
say, the law of contradiction false, by the same reason, there are good reasons 
for rejecting that he could have made it the case that he could have made it 
false. 
5.3 Necessary Truths and the Divine Nature 
Let us set aside the conceivability of how the mathematical truth 2+2=4 
could have been untrue, there seem to be some necessary truths such that if 
we think that they could have been different from what they are, or indeed 
that they could have been false, we simply find ourselves in a viciously 
circular situation such that we cannot attach a meaning even to what we are 
arguing for. So for example, if we consider the law of contradiction within the 
scope of created objects, interestingly enough, it seems that we would be 
committed to that, 
(7) God has created necessary (or eternal) truths and that they have not 
been created by God, 
41 For this dispute, see Strawson (1948), pp. 184-200; Lewy (1950), pp. 195-210; Pap 
(1958), pp. 119-127; Plantinga (1974), pp. 51-54, Lewy (1976) pp. 58-64; Quinn (1982); 
Wright (1985), pp. 183-189, and Peacocke (1997), pp. 563-569. The S4 principle is more 
controversial when applied to the certain issues in the domain of metaphysical or logically 
broad necessity; that is, the origins of certain objects/artefacts such as chairs, tables and 
ships. For this, in addition to Plantinga (1974), pp. 51-54, see Chandler (1976), pp. 106- 
109; Salmon (1982), pp. 229-252; (1984), pp. 114-117; (1989), pp. 3-34. 
42 (1994), p. 62. 
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could be true. But, even the expression of (7) requires the observance of the 
law of contradiction. Furthermore, if we take the creation of necessary truths 
and thus the law of contradiction as an indifferent act of God, as aforesaid, this 
seems to create certain predicaments in regard to the divine nature itself, that 
is, God's existence and his essential properties. Thus, for example, it is essential 
to the theistic conception of God that he is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly 
good. But if one considers necessary truths as created beings, or as creatable 
objects, and as a result that the set of necessary truths could have had different 
members, he must concede that 
(8) God is omniscient and he does not know anything, 
or, 
(9) God is omnipotent and he is powerless, 
could have been true. 
But then, it has been said, God seems to have no nature, 43 for it was 
within God's power to have made any proposition predicating a property of 
him false, and consequently no property -not even power- can be predicated 
of God essentially. To put it briefly, it would have been the case that it was 
within divine power to make it true that he knows that he does not exist as he 
could have made himself powerless, ignorant, or morally imperfect. 44 
Nevertheless, referring to Descartes' remarks that "... the existence of 
God is the first and most eternal of all possible truths and the one from which 
43 Nevertheless, it seems open to the defender of Descartes to argue that in fact God has a 
nature in that once God from all eternity establishes necessary truths by his free will, he 
is no longer free to change them, and that in this sense one might attach a sense to God's 
having a nature. In other words, one might say, God follows his will once he creates, that 
is, he follows what he has already decided, since his will is immutable. But then Descartes 
would have to argue that in fact God can create or, in fact from all eternity did create his 
own nature. Of course, this could be an acceptable response to the no nature objection if 
one could make any sense of self-causation and consequently self-creation. I shall 
consider this issue in 6.4. 
44 For the details of this objection, see Plantinga (1980), pp. 126-129. 
162 
alone all others derive"45 some commentators have argued to the effect that, 
according to Descartes, (necessary) truths about God are indeed uncreated; 
whereas some others have found that it would be arbitrary and ad hoc of 
Descartes to exclude essential truths about God from the scope of his doctrine of 
creation. 46 Thus according to the former view necessary truths concerning 
God's essence do not derive from the divine will, but provide the conditions for 
the derivation of the rest of necessary truths. Thus for example, in his 
consideration of this point N. J. Wells highlights a distinction between the 
necessary truths pertaining to the divine nature and those concerning the 
creatures, stressing that the former is more eternal than the latter: 
All essential/ necessary truths are eternal in Descartes, but some are more 
eternal than others. Or, all essential truths are necessary, but some are more 
necessary than others. For uncreated essential truths are absolutely necessary 
while created essential truths are but hypothetically and conditionally 
necessary.... it can even be said that all contradictions are impossible but some 
are more impossible than others.... What is at issue here, in the instance of the 
uncreated eternal truths, would be all the truths dealing with God's existence, 
His essence and nature, His attributes, especially the classical Cartesian 
truths about God's Veracity, Goodness and Omnipotence. Descartes is quite 
emphatic that we can and do know truthfully and certainly, such uncreated 
necessary truths. 47 
In Descartes' view, according to Wells, therefore, the truths concerning 
God's nature, essential attributes and existence are immune from the doctrine 
of creation; and that is why they are absolutely necessary. Unlike the created 
necessary truths which can be known and comprehended by the human mind, 
those having to do with God's nature, the uncreated necessary truths, though 
45 (1970), p. 14. 
46 Wilson (1978), p. 124. 
47 (1982), pp. 193-194. Similarly, see also Curley, op. cat pp. 593-597; and Hughes 
(1995), pp. 138-151. 
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not unintelligible -since the idea of God, on Descartes' account, is the most 
clear, most true, most distinct and therefore most eternal- are nevertheless 
incomprehensible. 48 Now it is time to examine Wells' alleged solution to the 
aforementioned difficulties, in terms of his distinction between created and 
uncreated necessary truths. 
For one thing, it is hard to see how Wells' inference does follow from 
Descartes' related text, namely, that the existence of God is the first and the 
most eternal of all truths which constitutes the ground for the derivation of 
the rest of necessary truths, which has been put forward as textually 
satisfactory ground for the contention in question. Surely, to say that the 
existence of God is the most eternal truth per se does not imply that necessary 
truths about God himself are not created, nor does it seem to imply that they do 
not depend upon the divine will. Even Wells himself seems to have noticed this 
problem when he says, "unlike the region of the created necessary truths 
where nothing is willed [by God] necessarily, in the region of the uncreated 
necessary truths, everything is, and everything is willed, necessarily', 49. But 
just what does it mean to say that necessary truths about God himself are willed 
by God necessarily as opposed to the necessary truths about the creation? Of 
course to say that 'S necessarily wills to do f' (where S is God) does not mean 
that "x is uncreated". By the same token, to say that God necessarily has -from 
all eternity- willed necessary truths about his own nature does not imply that 
they are uncreated. The principal trouble with Wells' interpretation, however, 
is the fact that it is hard to see how "x 's being willed necessarily" could be 
equated to "x's existing uncreated", in other words, there does not seem to be a 
manifest incompatibility between "x's being willed necessarily" and "x's being 
created". By contrast, one might rightly argue, that "x's being willed" implies 
that "x is created", because it is difficult to see how something could have been 
48 Op. cit, pp. 194-195. 
49 Ibid., p. 196. 
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willed (even though necessarily) and still be uncreated. So, it can be said that 
the proposed textual evidence in Descartes does not enable someone to draw 
Wells' created-uncreated distinction. 50 
And on the other hand, it remains to be answered, what would be the 
status of the claim that "God has a will", is it a created or an uncreated 
necessary truth? To say that God necessarily willed that he has a will, is clearly 
circular if not incoherent. 
Another procedure to exempt the necessary truths about God himself 
from the scope of creation is to follow Descartes in his general conviction that 
God cannot be conceived to be an "evil deceiver". Even though God is perfectly 
omnipotent, this does not imply that he could deceive us. But, if that is true, 
then after all God has a nature, and hence there would be some truths about 
God which are not within his power to alter -those truths which are in conflict 
with his nature-. For example, "deceiving" is incompatible with being a 
morally perfect being, etc. - and as a result, it would be an error to ascribe to 
Descartes the view that God can or could make himself morally imperfect, or 
powerless etc. 
In fact, although this seems convincing and thus acceptable to some 
extent, it still remains troublesome and thus insufficient to provide a 
justifiable ground for making the created/ uncreated distinction between 
50 One might say, nevertheless, that even though Wells' distinction In terms of being 
created/ uncreated Is in fact incorrect, it is still untrue to say that Descartes makes no 
distinction at all between necessary truths about God and those about the creation. Given 
that Descartes' doctrine could be expressed in terms of iterated modalities, it might seem 
somewhat reasonable to maintain that some necessary/ eternal truths are necessarily 
necessary while some are contingently necessary. Since, in order to explain the very 
ground of the necessity of so called created necessary truths -which, on Descartes' 
account, is God's Immutable will- one needs at least to suppose that God's immutability, 
hence the necessary truths about God himself belong to a "higher order" of necessary 
truths. But, on the Cartesian picture, this hardly would imply that they are untreated. For 
such an argument see Curley op. city p. 593. 
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necessary truths. So for example, let us consider the law of contradiction that 
is, that p& not-p is false, as a matter of logical necessity. To which realm does it 
belong? Created or uncreated? 
First of all, to suppose that the principle of contradiction merely 
belongs to the realm of created necessary truths, as Wells himself pointed 
out, 51 would entail that in fact God is a "deceiver" and thus, for example, it 
would have been perfectly possible for God to make it true that there is no 
difference at all between the theist who affirms God's existence and the atheist 
who denies that there is a God and this is undoubtedly in conflict with God's 
being essentially truthful. 52 On the other hand, if the principle in question 
only belongs to the realm of created necessary truths, not to the uncreated 
one; that is, the realm of divine existence, nature, and attributes; it would be 
possible to assign to God the truth that 
(10) God exists and that he does not exist, 
or similarly that, 
(11) God is morally perfect and he is sinful. 
To be sure, none of these conclusions is agreeable from a theistic point 
of view. God as a perfect being can neither be a "deceiver" nor should be taken 
to be responsible for lacking the power to make the propositions (10) or (11) 
true. But if so, the question whether the law of contradiction is created or 
uncreated seems to remain unanswered. 
The defender of the created/ uncreated distinction seems ready to bite 
the bullet and maintain that the principle of contradiction belongs to both 
51 Op. cit., p. 196. 
52 It might be nevertheless argued that If God could have actualised a world in which the 
affirmation and the denial of the existence of God would have amounted to the same thing, 
he would then have not been a "deceiver" provided that such a state of affairs reflects the 
reality of that world in that there would have been a correspondence between the 
believers' image and the way things are in this respect. However, it is hard to see how such 
a world can really be possible and what it would look like. 
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realms, as Wells grants "the Cartesian answer to this question, for all the 
tensions and anomalies consequent thereto, is that the principle of non- 
contradiction is both uncreated and created"53. But what does it mean to say 
that the principle of non-contradiction belongs to both created and uncreated 
realms? 
The key to understanding this, according to Wells54, consists in 
Descartes' following remarks: "... it can be said that 'the same thing cannot both 
be and not be at the same time' is a principle which serves in general, not to 
make known the existence of anything else, but simply to confirm its truth 
once known"55. For Wells, this means that the principle of contradiction when 
taken just in itself without any exemplification in some real instances is 
purely formal, hence does not imply the existence of anything. Accordingly, 
given the existence of a created essence, and the principle of non- 
contradiction as instantiated, -or as "embodied" in Wells' terms- in that created 
essence, the principle in question would be a genuinely created truth. Thus for 
example, if there is a rose -existing actually or possibly- then a rose is a rose, 
and cannot not-be a rose so long as the rose continues to exist. On the other 
hand the principle of non-contradiction belongs to the uncreated realm, 
"... given the existential evidence of an uncreated essence, then the principle 
of non-contradiction, structuring that essence, and expressed in uncreated, 
necessary, essential truths, is obviously uncreated"56. And thus Wells 
concludes: 
-. these latter [uncreated] truths, regulated by this untreated principle of non- 
contradiction are absolutely necessary, as is the principle of non- 
contradiction itself on this level. The former truths, i. e. the created variety, 
53 Op. cit., p. 197. 
541bid., p. 197. 
55 Descartes (1970), p. 197. 
56 Wells op. cit., p. 197. 
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are but hypothetically necessary, and the principle of non-contradiction 
attending them is equally hypothetical and conditional. 
57 
Yet, it is a question whether Wells' conclusion follows from Descartes' 
quoted passage, and it seems to me that it does not. Because, first of all, to say 
that the principle of non-contradiction does not imply the existence of 
something can hardly be taken to imply that the principle just taken in itself 
is not something, or rather nothing. Of course, it is one thing to say that the 
principle of non-contradiction, as a purely formal logical truth, does not 
indicate the factual existence of anything, but it is something altogether 
different to say that in itself it is not something or an essence. Indeed, the 
basic point of contention in the Cartesian argument is not whether necessary 
truths -say, the law of contradiction- imply the existence of anything or that 
they are presupposed in the instantiation of beings of different realms, but 
rather whether necessary truths themselves as formal (platonic) essences are 
created. And it seems to me that, from the perspective of being faithful to 
textual evidence, one might rightly argue that Descartes did not think 
necessary truths in themselves are nothing when he says "... [God] is no less 
the author of creatures' essence than he is their existence; and this essence is 
nothing other than the eternal truths. ... but I know that God is the author of 
everything and that these truths are something and consequently that he is 
author"58. Consequently, the whole question is whether the principle of non- 
contradiction itself, as an eternal essence, 59 is created or not, and it seems to 
me that Descartes explicitly thought that it is. 
57 Ibid., p. 197. 
58 (1970), pp. 14-15. Italics are mine. 
59 In fact it Is a controversial matter whether Descartes' position entails Platonism; thus 
for example, according to Kenny, Descartes is the founder of modern Platonism in the 
sense that necessary truths belong to an eternal realm of substances distinct from other 
created substances; while on Gewirth's view, nothing is more contrary to Cartesianism than 
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Secondly, even given the supposed textual evidence, there seems to be 
just no reason for attributing to Descartes the view that the law of non- 
contradiction belongs to both created and uncreated realms. Instead of making 
that distinction, on the contrary, why should we not think that the principle 
in question, as an eternal essence, is exemplified/ instantiated both in the 
created and uncreated realms? Would not the fact that the principle of non- 
contradiction is exemplified in both realms and thus is a property common to 
both, suffice to show that one cannot draw the asserted distinction in the 
principle? After all, it seems to me that Wells' argument begs the question 
because of the fact that the claim that the principle of the law of contradiction 
is both created and uncreated itself is an instance of the very principle in 
question. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be another strategy to defend the view that 
the principle of non-contradiction should belong to both created and 
uncreated realms. That is to think that the principle itself can only be 
considered as something if and only if it is instantiated, namely, exemplified in 
the actual existence of something real or actual. Thus the principle would 
contingently be instantiated in the created realm in the sense that the actual 
existence of the created realm is not a necessary but a contingent fact. At least, 
it is conceivable there was a time when necessary truths regarding the 
physical realm did not exist. In this case, the whole problem will depend upon 
the truth conditions of necessary truths, and hence upon the law of non- 
contradiction. Considering that the created realm may or may not have existed, 
or that it is not eternally actual, the necessary truths (say, the law of non- 
contradiction) instantiated in this (created) realm are created with this realm 
of beings. However, since God's essence by contrast is eternally actual, 
Platonism. For this debate, see Gewirth (1970), pp. 668-685; Kenny (1970), pp. 692-700; 
and Schmaltz (1991), pp. 129-170. 
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necessary truths about God including the principle of non-contradiction 
should constitute a legitimate exception to the doctrine of creation. 
60 
But this also seems to be unsatisfactory. For, in the first place, given 
Descartes' account of creation, it is difficult to conclude from the fact that the 
physical realm may not have come into existence, therefore, that it is 
contingent, that there was a time when it did not exist, or, that there has been 
a time when necessary truths were unactual. By contrast, it seems to me that 
Descartes clearly thought that God did create everything from all eternity. 
Secondly, Descartes made it explicit that although contingent beings 
presuppose necessary truths, they do not depend on contingent beings for 
their existence. Indeed, for him, the immutable essence of, for example, a 
triangle does not depend on the existence of material triangles. 
As a result, it seems to me rather difficult to think that Descartes made a 
distinction between necessary truths about God himself and those regarding 
the beings other than God when he argued that necessary truths are indeed 
created; though it is agreeable for him that the very existence of God belongs 
to a "higher order" of necessary truths, and hence that it constitutes the 
ground for the derivation of the rest of necessary truths. But, if such a 
distinction cannot be made, then the contradictions and counter-intuitive 
consequences of such a doctrine on the issue of the divine nature would 
remain unresolved. 61 
60 See Curley, op. cit, p. 596. Curley himself seems to grant that such a distinction 
involves difficulties. 
61 It is equally difficult to defend Descartes by excluding the necessary truths pertaining 
to "Divine nature" from the scope of the doctrine of the creation of eternal truths on the 
grounds of the negative theology as he clearly holds positive descriptive of divine nature 
such as the claim that God is truly omnipotent. 
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5.4 Necessary Truths, Conceivability and the Human Mind 
To say that necessary truths depend upon God by way of creation 
indicates that they could or might have been otherwise. As we have seen, one 
might have difficulties in understanding this contention, however, Descartes' 
reply to this question seems to highlight one of the most important aspects, the 
epistemological dimension, of his doctrine: the human mind is finite vis-a-vis 
God's infinite power, and thus incapable of conceiving how it could have been 
the case that for example the law of contradiction is not true, or that 2+2-4 is 
not necessarily true. Although contradictions are so evident that we cannot 
put them before our minds without judging them to be entirely impossible 
such as the one that God might have made creatures independent of him, it is 
simply beyond the capacity of our minds to conceive how this could have been 
true. And "... it is useless" in Descartes own words, "to enquire how God could 
from all eternity bring it about that it should be untrue that twice four is 
eight, etc.; ... that cannot be understood by us. " 62 
That is why, it might be said, Descartes' argument is invulnerable to an 
objection which might be raised on the grounds of the general conviction that 
the absolute criterion of x's being logically impossible is equivalent to a's 
being logically (or epistemically) inconceivable. Simply, Descartes' doctrine, 
in this respect, seems to be epistemically unassailable. Even though our minds 
as a result of certain restrictions which have been put by God when he created 
the human mind cannot conceive how some logical, or mathematical truths 
such as the law of contradiction, or 2+2=4 could have been otherwise, or even 
false; this, in itself cannot be taken as a sufficient reason for concluding that 
they cannot be or could not have been otherwise, and therefore that Descartes' 
theory is false; rather he maintains, 
62 Descartes (1934), p. 251. 
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I merely say that He has given me such a mind that I cannot conceive a 
mountain without a valley, or an aggregate of one and two which is not three, 
and that such things involve a contradiction in my conception. 63 
For my part, I know that my intellect is finite and God's power is infinite, and 
thus I set no bounds to it; I consider only what I can conceive and what I cannot 
conceive, and I take great pains that my judgement should accord with my 
understanding. And so I boldly assert that God can do everything which I 
conceive to be possible, but I am not so bold as to deny that He can do whatever 
conflicts with my understanding -I merely say that it Involves a 
contradiction. 64 
So, according to Descartes, the apparent contradiction between God's 
omnipotence and our conception of logical or mathematical necessity will be 
reconciled and thus will fade out only when we consider the fact that God, in 
creating us, has put certain restrictions on our understanding. It is therefore 
inconceivable to us how, for example, the negation of 2+2=4 or, of the law of 
contradiction could have been true since our mind is not supposed to delimit 
the ultimate scope of what is possible -all necessities and possibilities. 
Therefore, we are not entitled to exclude them as possibilities in themselves; 
but rather we should think that the scope of human understanding is 
restricted to the actual set of necessary truths, and this is characteristic of our 
mind which has been created with this particular constitution. This, in other 
words, would indicate that the scope of the human understanding is narrower 
than what is possible in the ultimate sense, and therefore narrower than what 
God can actually do. The mind is incapable of conceiving how God could have 
exercised his power in creating a different set of necessary truths. 
63 (1970), pp. 236-237. 
641bid., pp. 240-41. 
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Furthermore, considering certain passages in a related text, it seems 
likely that Descartes in fact thought that necessary truths are rooted in the 
particular mode of the human mind: 
... when we apprehend that it is impossible that anything can be formed of 
nothing, the proposition ex nihilo nihil fit is not to be considered as an 
existing thing, or the mode of a thing, but as a certain eternal truth which has 
its seat in our mind, and is a common notion or axiom. 65 
All modalities therefore seem to do with the scope and limits of the 
human mind; all necessities and possibilities therefore can be seen as certain 
consequences of the function of the constitution of the human mind. 
But, would it fair to call Descartes' notion of modality epistemic? This 
point needs some clarification. Of course, Descartes' conception of modality 
does not depend on the function of certain minds in the sense that one mind 
might grasp necessary truths better than the other, or on the social and 
historical conditions of human knowledge, 66 nor on the evolutionary process 
of our epistemic categories. Rather, as Ishiguro rightly pointed out, 
... what Descartes means by eternal truths having their seat in the [human] mind 
seems closer to Kant's view on the a priori than it does to the epistemic views 
like that of Hume. What is at issue is the universal validity of these eternal 
truths in our mental constitution 67 
On this account, necessary truths are embedded in, so to speak-, the 
ontological mode of the human mind, hence it seems to me more accurate to 
label Descartes' notion of modality as meta-epistemic (or metaphysical) rather 
than epistemic. But once again, though this innate set of necessary truths 
65 Descartes (1968), pp. 238-239. 
66 Ishiguro (1986), p. 463. 
67 Ibid., p. 463. 
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exists in every human individual, since the actual set of necessary truths need 
not have been the way it is, God could have chosen a different set of necessary 
truths and imposed them as a priori truths on the human mind. 
In sum, then, by this account, necessary truths are conditionally 
(hypothetically) necessary, namely they are necessary if and only if God 
creates the human mind, which is the seat of necessary truths, in one mode 
rather than another. In other words, since all modality is conditional - depends 
on the particular way God creates our minds68, it follows that the fact that a 
proposition cannot be at the same time both true and false, or that 2+2a4 is 
true, owes its validity to God's creating the human mind in the actual (present) 
form. 
However, there seems to be an overall difficulty with the conviction 
that, on Descartes' account, necessary truths owe their ontological nature, that 
is, unchanging properties or essences, to their seat in our minds. And most of 
the confusion seems to arise from Descartes' own ambiguous and bewildering 
text. The chief difficulty with this interpretation consists in considering 
Descartes altogether as an anti-realist with respect to the ontological nature of 
(abstract objects and) necessary truths. Thus for example, Descartes might 
rightly be considered to be propounding a creaturely mind-dependent, anti- 
realist or conceptualist view of necessary truths on the basis of the passage 
indicating that the seat of eternal truths is the human mind. Yet this seems to 
be inconsistent with some other passages in Descartes' related text, which 
reasonably might lead someone to think that he is somehow a realist in this 
respect. Thus for example, if we consider his following statements, we might 
68 For a detailed exposition of this kind of interpretation of Descartes' account of 
modality, see ibid, pp. 463-464. One might wonder how such a meta-epistemic of modality 
can held together with the platonic elements concerning necessary truths in Descartes. 
This can be a matter of an independent debate. 
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plausibly think that his position clearly indicates that necessary truths are 
mind-independent: 
... [God] is no less the author of creatures' essence than he is their existence; 
and this essence is nothing other than the eternal truths. ... but I know that God 
is the author of everything and that these truths are something and 
consequently that he is author. 69 
So, there can be conflicting intuitions about whether Descartes held a 
mind-depedendent view of (abstract objects and) necessary truths or not. 70 
However, this is beyond our interest and as we have already seen that an anti- 
realism (conceptualism) of that abstract objects and necessary truths in terms 
of human mind-depedency is untenable I shall not get into this debate again. 
The basic issue, however, is that Descartes' doctrine of the creation of 
eternal truths implies that although it is inconceivable to the human mind, 
nevertheless, necessary truths could have been otherwise in a metaphysical 
sense. The reason why this is inconceivable by us, is the fact that our mental 
constitution is from all eternity determined to be limited in conceiving, and 
thus it is a created property -ontological mode- of the human mind to regard 
2+2=5 as inconceivable, hence it is incapable of understanding how God 
could have exercised his power over necessary truths and make them false. If 
so, then, 
(C) For any necessary proposition p, God could have made p otherwise even if lt 
is inconceivable for us how p could have been so given the fact that the divine 
power is infinite and our minds are finite. 
Here, we might to have some difficulties. Let us set aside the problems 
such as whether God could have created a human mind which necessarily 
69 (1970) pp. 14-15. 
70 1 shall not enter into further exegetical debate here. 
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violates, say, the law of contradiction; it seems to me that there are some 
further difficulties which I think are in essence related to Frankfurt's 
aforementioned objection about the intelligibility of Descartes' position which 
seems to entail that there are possibilities beyond what is logically impossible 
thanks to the infinite divine power. 
(C) obviously entails that it was a possibility for God to have created a 
different (human) mind with a different set of restrictions, i. e., necessities and 
possibilities, and also it entails that what is in fact necessary and impossible 
for us is not necessary, therefore, is possible for God7i. In this case, there 
seems to be two different kinds of possibilities at work here: what is divinely 
possible and what is humanly possible. These two kinds of possibilities differ 
from each other both intensionally and extensionally; "possible" means one 
thing when used for God, still another thing when used for human beings; 
similarly, the things which cannot be done by us, can be done by infinite 
divine power. But the trouble is that it remains unclear how such a position 
can be consistently maintained. Which of these two possibilities is involved in 
such a contention? Given Descartes' claim that our minds are meta- 
epistemically bounded by the limits imposed by God, which in turn determines 
what is necessary and possible for us, what would be the epistemic status of the 
claim that God could have made necessary truths otherwise (by us)? Such a 
thing, namely, that God could have made necessary truths otherwise, seems to 
be a possibility beyond our conceiving power, and such a possibility, on the 
very grounds of the proposed hypothesis, is not supposed to be conceivable by 
Descartes72. This, it seems to me, is the core of Frankfurt's "unintelligibility 
objection" which remains unanswered. 
71 We have already seen that a Cartesian defence on the grounds of that there are no 
possibilities prior to creation is ill-founded. Similarly, one cannot consistently hold both 
the view that there were no possibilities prior to the creation of the human mind and that 
God could have created another human mind with a different set of necessary truths 
72 This point is well-underlined in McFetridge (1990b), p. 189. 
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In conclusion, it seems that there are good reasons for rejecting the 
Cartesian view that necessary truths depend on God by way of creation. Thus, 
considering the Cartesian doctrine of necesary truths entails "universal 
possibilism", that is, that God could have changed the * modal property of 
necessary truths, we have seen how this conflicts radically with our 
philosophical as well as theistic intuitions as it leaves us with untenable 
consequences. Given that necessary truths are necessarily necessary, such a 
doctrine does not circumvent these problems when construed as "limited 
possibilism". And finally, we have seen that such a view can hardly be 
consistently maintained on the grounds of epistemic unassailability. 
If so, there are good reasons for thinking that necessary truths cannot 
be considered within the limits of 'creation' and that not even God can change 
the ontological and modal properties of abstract objects and therefore of 
necessary truths by creating different worlds. On the contrary, abstract 
objects and necessary truths turn out to be prior to the creation or 
actualisation any possible world; they delimit what is possible, or indeed, what 
can be true about any possible world. Therefore, I conclude that these 
considerations, once again, strengthen our realistic intuition that necessary 
truths reflect the essential properties and relations of necessarily existing 
abstract objects which, in the previous chapter, we have identified with ideas 
in the mind of God. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CREATIONISM: THEISTIC ACTIVISM 
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6. CREATIONISM: THEISTIC ACTIVISM 
Having examined the Cartesian doctrine of eternal truths, we have 
seen that God cannot be responsible for the existence of abstract objects and 
necessary truths via his creation inasmuch as this would entail that it was 
within God's power to have created a different set of necessary truths as well 
refraining from creating any necessary truths at all which leads us to some 
insurmountable difficulties. However, T. V. Morris and C. Menzel have argued 
that one can plausibly hold that the divine creative activity is responsible for 
the realm of abstract objects and necessary truths without committing oneself 
to the problems facing the Cartesian doctrine. ' Thus, according to what they 
call "Theistic Activism", one can consistently maintain that God creates 
abstract objects and necessary truths in conjunction with the realist intuition 
that they exist necessarily and that they have their properties and relations 
necessarily. However, in what follows, I shall argue that the very concept of 
"creation" employed in such a context is incorrect and therefore cannot be 
properly predicated of abstract objects and therefore necessary truths. 
6.1 Theistic Activism 
In fact, there is a considerable overlapping between theistic activism 
and divine conceptualism in that both take the reference of necessary truths 
to be the realist ontology of abstract objects and ground this ontology in the 
nature and mind of God. However, theistic activism differs fundamentally from 
divine conceptualism by maintaining that such an account can be reconciled 
1 See T. V. Morris and C. Menzel (1986), pp. 353-356. 
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with a traditional doctrine of creation. Thus, provided that the traditional 
theistic God can be characterized as "an active, creative intellect", according to 
Morris and Menzel, there are good reasons for supposing that he is creatively 
responsible for the existence of the necessary realm along the following lines: 
... all properties and relations are God's concepts, the products, or perhaps 
better, the contents of a divine intellective activity, a causally efficacious or 
productive sort of divine conceiving. Unlike human concepts, which are 
graspings of properties that exist ontologically distinct from and independent 
of those graspings, divine concepts are those very properties themselves; and 
unlike what is assumed in standard platonism, those properties are not 
ontologically independent, but rather depend on certain divine activities.... 
this view can be extended to the rest of the traditional platonic domain. All 
necessarily existent propositions, for example, can be thought of as "built up" 
out of properties. Thus, in the way in which we characterize properties as 
God's concepts, we can characterize propositions as God's thoughts. So, for 
example, the proposition that red is a color can be construed as the content of 
God's thinking: Red exemplifies being a color. So the existence of propositions 
as well derives from an efficacious divine conceiving. And taking numbers to 
be a variety of property (... ), we thus have all necessarily existent abstract 
reality, from necessary mathematical objects to haecceities, to non- 
mathematical universals, to propositions, deriving existence from God .2 
It is the nature of God's concepts which makes certain true propositions 
necessarily true where propositions are considered to be divine thoughts. So, 
for example, let us consider the necessary proposition 
(1)2+2=4. 
On this account, 
the number 2, the number 4, the relation of addition, and that of equality are 
all divine concepts, all products of the divine conceiving activity. The 
2 Ibid., p. 355. 
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existence of the proposition that 2+2=4 is thus the existence of a divine 
thought. Its truth is also a function of that divine activity. 
3 
Furthermore, according to the theistic activist, since God thinks (1) in 
every possible world, (1) is not merely true, but necessarily true, hence both 
the truth value and modal status of a necessary proposition are dependent on 
God. By contrast with the Cartesian voluntarism, on the account of "theistic 
activism", God could not have created a (possible) world in which 2+2-5, 
because all modality is a function of the efficacious conceiving activity in 
which God (himself) is in fact engaged. God, therefore, cannot/ could not have 
created abstract objects and necessary truths other than the way they actually 
are, and therefore it would be incorrect to say that he was indifferent with 
respect to the actual set of necessary truths and objects. Rather, "God's creation 
of the framework of reality [the framework of abstract objects and necessary 
truths] is ... eternal and necessary -it never was, will be, and could not 
have 
been, other than it is. -4 So, according to the theistic activist view, 
(TA) For any abstract object 0 or necessary truth T to be created is to be 
thought by God eternally and necessarily. 
But just what does (TA) mean? How can God's thinking of an abstract 
object 0 eternally and necessarily be taken as equivalent to the eternal and 
necessary creation of 0? We might agree with Morris and Menzel that there 
are good reasons for identifying the ontology of abstract objects and necessary 
truths with God's mental contents but might find it hard to accept (TA). 
3 Ibid., p. 356. 
4 Ibid., p. 357. 
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6.2 Creation, Time and Beginning 
What is it for something to be created? It seems rather plausible to say, 
(2) x is created if and only if x's existence has a beginning. 
But it would be ex hypothesi conceded that no abstract objects such as 
number 4, or no necessary truth, such as "the whole is greater than the part", 
ever began to exist. Thus as Plantinga pointed out, it is reasonable to think that 
what God has created are the heavens and the earth and all that they contain; 
he has not created himself, or numbers, propositions, properties, or states of 
affairs... to suppose that they have been created is to suppose that although 
they exist now, there was a time at which they did not; and this seems clearly 
false. 5 
But given (TA) and (2) the theistic activist seems inevitably committed 
to the view that there was a time before which abstract objects and necessary 
truths did not exist. More importantly, given that God himself has properties, it 
would follow that there was a time before which he did not have his 
properties, thus, that there was a time when he was neither omnipotent nor 
omniscient and so on. But would not that simply indicate that there was a time 
before which God was not God? 
The defender of "theistic activism", however, might avoid this kind of 
nonsensical consequence if he could show that (2) is false; and that after all 
the notion of "beginningless creation" is not indefensible; for there seem to be 
many philosophers, such as Aquinas, in the theistic tradition who endorsed 
the reasonability of the beginningless creation of the universe. 
5 (1974), p. 169. 
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The question then turns out to be whether one can attach any sense to 
the notion of beginningless creation6; and this being the issue, one needs to 
focus on the very conceivability of actually infinite temporal events of past 
series. For it is the inconceivability of actual infinity which has been 
frequently argued to be a counter-argument to the idea of beginningless 
creation by the upholder of the view that the universe and therefore that the 
creation has a beginning. 
Aristotle seems to have taken "infinity" in the sense of extendible 
finitude, that is, "however large a finite number you have taken, you can take 
more". 7 Thus, infinity is not an all-embracing process, completed whole, 
which has nothing outside it but rather a never completed unceasing process 
which always has something outside it. But this kind of infinity is just 
potential infinity, and cannot actually exist, and thus, for example, although 
the serial of natural numbers can be extended in an infinite way, there can 
never be an actually infinite series of natural numbers; and similarly 
although the space can be infinitely divided, it is never actually infinite .8 
Yet the conviction that infinity can only be potential not actual seems 
to have been undermined by the recent set theoretic developments, 
particularly by Cantor's work. The core of Cantor's theory of transfinite 
numbers is that there can be actual infinite sets, and in contrast to the 
Euclidean axiom that the whole is greater than a part, a set is argued to be 
infinite if and only if a part of it is equivalent to the whole. Thus for example, 
let us take the set of natural numbers and the set of even numbers. At first 
sight, while we expect the set of natural numbers to be greater than the set of 
even numbers -since the latter is a proper subset of the former- when we 
6 By "beginningless creation", I understand a creation which is not preceded by any 
period of uncreation whatsoever. 
7 Sorabji (1983), p. 210. 
8 Craig, W. L, (1979), pp. 65-66. 
183 
place them in a one-to-one correspondence, they turn out to be equivalent. 
Therefore, the basic feature of an infinite set appears to be that it has a proper 
subset which is equivalent to itself-9 So, given these set theoretic 
considerations, infinity no longer seems to be merely potential and therefore, 
one might say, there is no reason why the actual infinite cannot exist. But, is it 
just that kind of infinite actuality which is presupposed to be impossible by 
the defender of the view that creation has a beginning? 
Indeed this is the crux of the problem. The Cantorian account of actual 
infinity, it has been argued, has nothing to do with the real world, because 
"the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor 
provides a legitimate basis for rational thought -a remarkable harmony 
between being and thought. "10 Accordingly, Cantor's set theoretic infinite 
actuality is something to be considered only within the limits of the 
mathematical world and therefore cannot possibly undermine the alleged 
impossibility of actual infinity. The actual infinity that Is considered to be 
impossible, therefore, is not a "mental-mathematical" impossibility, but rather 
is an "extra-mental" existence which instantiates in the real world. 11 
However, since "beginningless creation" presupposes the very real possibility 
of actual infinity, W. L Craig argued that this would leave us with certain 
absurdities to the effect that there can be infinities of different sizes, which is 
clearly nonsensical. To mention one of these alleged absurdities which Craig 
attributes to al-Ghazali, 
Jupiter revolves once every twelve years, Saturn every thirty years, and the 
sphere of the fixed stars every thirty-six thousand years. If the world were 
eternal, then these bodies will each have completed an Infinite number of 
9 Ibid., p. 73. 
10 Hilbert, (1964), p. 201. 
11 Cog, W. L, op. cit., p. 69. 
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revolutions, and yet one will have completed twice as many or thousands of 
times as many revolutions as another, which is absurd. 12 
On this account, therefore, it seems unintelligible that each planet 
should have completed the same number of revolutions. But if the past time is 
infinite, that is, if the universe did not have a beginning, that would have 
been true. 
To support this intuition, Craig suggests one think of a library with an 
actually infinite number of books where the books are either red or black. 
Given that the collection of books is infinite, no one should hesitate to think 
that the number of red books is the same as the number of black books, but 
what if one is "told ... that the number of red 
books in the library is the same as 
the number of red books plus the number of black books? "13 The problem, 
therefore, is that there are actual infinities of different sizes which, being 
infinite, are nevertheless equal to each other. 
However, it has been argued14 that the alleged absurdity involved in 
the revolutions of the planets being equal in terms of infinity and also In the 
infinite number of the books of different colours Is a result of improper 
understanding of the nature of infinity. Given that the difficulty is how we 
are to conceive that an infinite set of actual events can be equal to its infinite 
sub-set, once again, the Cantorian set-theoretic intuitions might help one to 
show how such a seemingly implausible contention can be made intelligible. 
On the Cantorian theory of infinite sets, we might equate, say the infinite set 
of {1,2,3,4,... I to the infinite set of {2,4,6,8,... } on the logic of set-theoretic 
membership by placing the member of each set In a one-to-one 
correpondence. Thus, although the set of even numbers is a proper subset of 
12 Ibid., p. 46. 
13 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
14 See Wainwright (1982), p. 330; Mackie (1982), p. 93; Smith (1987), p. 85. 
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the set of natural numbers, both sets, as being infinite, are equal; no set is 
greater than the other. In other words, since the cardinal number of both the 
set of natural numbers and the set of even numbers is aleph zero there is no 
contradiction in their being equal to each other. By the same token, granted 
that the cardinal number of the set of the revolutions of each planet around 
the sun and of each set of books is aleph zero, it might be argued that there is 
not a logical impossibility in their being equal to each other. Thus, the 
absurdity is removed from the scene once it is properly understood that in the 
case of infinite sets, a set is not greater than the subset of that set. 
Even though Craig thinks that such a account of the set-theoretic actual 
infinite on the purely formal level is not wholly unproblematic and thus not 
patently true, 15 nevertheless, as Wainwright16 correctly observes, he seems to 
allow the logical posibility of the actual infinite as he thinks that it may be 
formulated as a formally consistent system. However, what Craig seems to have 
found really 'impossible' is that such a formal system may have an ontological 
bearing on the possibility of 'actual infinite'. 17 Presumably, therefore, to 
defend the real possibility of the actual infinite on the grounds of the 
Cantorian formal set-theoretic logic of infinite sets, for Craig, is simply to beg 
the question. 
However, if the Cantorian account of infinity is really not logically 
impossible, then what seems to be problematic is the force of the argument 
against the actual infinite: what reason might one have for thinking that 
actual infinity is not just the case, but cannot be the case? 18 Indeed this seems 
to be the point of convergence in the ongoing controversy and there has been 
a cluster of arguments for and against possibility of the actual infinite in 
15 See Craig (1979), p. 95. 
16 (1982), p. 330. As Wainwright points out (ibid., p. 330), by 'logical possibility', Craig 
seems to have 'formal consistency' in mind. 
17 Cog (1979), p. 95. 
18 See Wainwright, op. cit., p. 330 If. 
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I 
terms of, for example, whether the actual infinite can be added to, whether the 
dispute can be settled on purely a priori grounds etc. It is, however, beyond 
the scope of our discussion to examine them all and to settle the issue, hence I 
shall leave the issue as arguable19 but assume, for the sake of further 
argument, that 'x is created if and only if x has a beginning in time'. 
Before closing this section, however, I shall consider another point. Is 
there any reason for us to suppose that 'x creates y' does entail that there was a 
time when y did not exist? J. F. Ross has argued that "God did not begin to create 
other things aftera state of not having created,... The Cosmos or universe, did 
not begin, if 'begin' requires a 'before' it... ". 20 Hence, although the parts of 
the Universe might be ordered in relation of 'before' and 'after' to each other, 
this cannot be applied to the Universe itself, or to the whole constituents of the 
Universe. 21 But does not this entail that the Universe Is co-eternal with God? If 
yes, how are we to understand "eternal creation"? 
According to Ross, the Universe is eternal with God in the sense that it 
did not begin after not being, since "it was never nondenominatively true of 
God that He had not created anything 'yet. ' That is because there can be no 
basis in God's reality for a 'not yet'... "22. Therefore, since there Is no 'before' 
before the creation; it might be said, with Aquinas, "being created In the 
beginning of time means that the heavens and earth were created together 
with time"23. Consequently, on this view, although the universe is created, it is 
eternal in the sense that there is no time before which the universe did not 
exist since time itself comes into existence (simultaneously) with the universe. 
19 For this debate, see Craig (1979), pp. 65-140; Mackie (1982), pp. 92-95; Wainwright 
(1982); Conway (1984); Ells (1988); Craig (1985), (1991), (1993); Smith (1993); Craig and 
Smith (1993). 
20 (1980), p. 621. 
21 IbIcL, p. 621. 
22 Ibid., p. 622. 
23 (1967), la, Q, 46. a. 3. 
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Both time and the universe are co-eternal with God, and indeed, this is true 
because there could not be a time at which God did not create anything, 
therefore the act of creation too is eternal. 24 
Once it is conceded that time itself is simultaneously created with the 
rest of creation, or rather that time itself is a part of creation, it seems that one 
can easily make sense of eternal creation. But this can hardly show that 
creation has no beginning. More precisely, this account seems to be somehow 
compatible with (2) in the sense that it assumes that even though there was no 
time prior to the divine act of creation simply because of the fact that time 
itself is a part of creation, or that time starts with very act of creation, it does 
not entail that the creation or the universe is beginningless. On the contrary, 
it shows that the whole creation including time itself has a beginning but not 
a temporal beginning. But, then, how are we to understand the contention that 
"time is created" or "time has a beginning"1 It is clearly Incoherent to say that 
there was a time when time had not started, but is it equally incoherent to 
maintain that time has a beginning or that it somehow started? 
It seems to me that there can be some serious conceptual difficulties In 
understanding these claims given the fact that one can hardly make sense of 
the notions such as "beginning" "starting" (which arc temporal notions in 
this context) without somehow presupposing "time". One way to understand 
such an assertion is perhaps to make a distinction between two different 
notions of time: metricated and unmetricated. The former kind of time would 
come into existence (therefore would have a beginning) If and only if God 
freely decides to create a (the) universe in which there is a temporal order (of 
"metricated time") which is experienced in natural laws, whereas the latter 
kind of time would exist only in "divine consciousness" even if God creates no 
24 If this account is in fact true it seems to have the advantage of being immune from the 
objection why God did not create sooner. 
188 
universe at all. 25 However even if we suppose that such a distinction is tenable 
it is clear that one can understand that "metricated time" has a beginning only 
if one presupposes another time-involved notion, that is, "unmetricated time". 
However, there might be another way of understanding the contention 
that time is created together with the universe: while "creation" (of the 
universe together with time) has no beginning in time it is nevertheless not 
necessary. That is, the whole creation including time itself is logically 
contingent, and therefore it has a non-temporal beginning. 
Even if we suppose that this is true, still it is hard to give an explicit 
account of the contention that abstract objects and necessary truths are 
created: either "create" means "has a temporal beginning", or "is logically 
contingent". Neither horn would be acceptable to the theistic activist. 
6.3 Creation and Divine Freedom 
The creation of abstract objects and necessary truths, the theistic 
activist says, is both eternal and necessary. But is eternal and necessary 
creation compatible with the theistic conception of God's being a free creator? 
Is not the view that, so to speak, God must create in conflict with the traditional 
theistic conception of Deity's being a "free creator"? 
To start with, can action be both eternal and free? Ockham considered 
this point when he said, 
if we hold that these are compatible -that the world was contingently 
produced by God, and from eternity- then we evidently have to say that the 
world could have not existed from eternity for this reason, that by natural or 
conceptual priority [as distinct from temporal priority] God could have not 
25 For such a distinction, see Swinburne (1993), pp. 218.222. 
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produced the world at A, since to produce it at A or not to produce it was in 
his will. 26 
And it seems to me that Ockham is basically right. There does not seem to 
be a manifest incompatibility between eternal creation and divine freedom 
provided that it is within God's freedom to create x or not to create Y. 
Considering the fact that there is a conceptual priority between God and the 
object of creation -if not a temporal priority- implied in God's creating x or 
refraining from creating x, this does not seem to contradict the theistic deity's 
being essentially a free creator. 
The question, however, is whether such an account of creation is 
applicable to the case of the creation of abstract objects and necessary truths? 
In other words, can we say that God was in the same way free or indifferent to 
the creation of the cluster of necessary beings? Not at all. For, unlike 
contingent beings, it has been granted that abstract objects and necessary 
truths exist necessarily. Indeed, there seem to be substantial disanalogies in 
this respect between necessary and contingent objects. Thus, although God 
was free to create or not to create even the eternally existing universe, 
-therefore it is conceptually possible that God could have refrained from 
creating it- it does not seem to be within his power not to have created abstract 
objects and necessary truths. Likewise, we already have seen, while it is 
epistemically conceivable that God could have created contingent beings 
otherwise, it is epistemically inconceivable how God could have created 
abstract objects and necessary truths otherwise. Thus, for example, it is 
epistemically and logically possible for God to create, or to have created three- 
legged human beings, it is not conceivable how God can or could have created 
an abstract object such as number 4 or a necessary truth such as 2+2-4, 
otherwise. 
26 Quoted in Kretzmann, op. cit, p. 29. 
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The theistic activists seem to have already noticed this problem as they 
argue that divine freedom should not be a genuine difficulty, since they think 
that the theistic idea of God as a free creator should be taken with reference to 
the physical universe, not abstract objects and necessary truths which God 
necessarily creates. Nevertheless, according to the theistic activists, there is a 
sense in which one might say that God is free even with respect to creating 
the framework of reality: 
God's creation of the framework of reality Is both eternal and necessary -it 
never was, never will be, and could not have been, other than It Is. But there is 
a sense, a different sense, in which even it can be considered free. It Is an 
activity which is conscious, intentional, and neither constrained nor compelled 
by anything existing independent of God and his causally efficacious power. 
The necessity of his creating the framework Is not Imposed on him from 
without, but rather is a feature and result of the nature of his own activity 
Itself, which is a function of what he Is 27 
But how exactly can God be considered to be free with respect to the 
creation of abstract objects and necessary truths if the very act of creation is 
necessary, if they could not have failed to exist, and also could not have been 
other than they are? In other words, how can one think of God's being free, if 
it was not within God's power to do otherwise? Surely, it is a conceptual 
necessity to say that if Sis free and thus not determined with respect to doing 
p, then S has alternatives to do otherwise than p, and that means there are 
alternative possibilities prior to S's performing Therefore, we might say, 
(3) For any x, if x is created by S (where Sis God) then x is created by S freely. 
Again, 
(4) For any x, x is created if and only if there are alternatives to x. 
27 Morris and Menzel, (1986), p. 357 
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But (3) and (4) together entail 
(5) For any x, x is created by S (where S is God) if and only if x is contingent. 
We might articulate the issue of divine freedom in this connection 
in 
at least two different senses: for God to be free with respect to performing a 
creative act either (i) there must be alternatives available to him with 
different outcomes such that he can or could have chosen to create another 
framework of reality or (ii) he must be free with respect to the very act of 
creation to the effect that he can or could have refrained from creating any 
such framework at all. Clearly enough, on the theistic activist account, God 
seems to be deprived of freedom in both respects. Both (I) and (il) are 
irrelevant to the case of abstract objects and necessary truths. But then, if 
there was no alternative for God and he cannot create the necessary 
framework otherwise, or refrain from creating it at all, it simply must follow 
that God is not free in this respect. If so, the so-called framework of reality, if 
created, is not necessary; and if it is necessary, then it is uncreated. 
28 Granted 
that the reference of necessary truths is the ontology of abstract objects 
which exist necessarily and have their properties and relations essentially, 
then there are good reasons for thinking that they are uncrcated. 
Of course, it seems reasonable to think that there is a sense in which 
one might consider God's being free in that the necessary framework is not 
imposed upon God from outside, or that it is the result of "a function of what 
God is". As the preceding considerations show, however, most of the difficulties 
remain with the mysterious understanding that such a divine self-functioning 
28 I have already noted that if the evidence (ground) produced for necessary truths Is 
Itself a matter of contingency, then It must follow that they are not necessary at all. 
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could be taken as an intentional free act, to the effect that it can be expressed 
in terms of "creation". 29 
So, the theistic account of the creation of the framework of abstract 
objects and necessary truths, once again, seems to be inadequate. For we have 
seen that 'creation' can be a divine free act only if there is at least a 
conceptual or logical priority between God and the objects of creation in order 
to understand how God could have freely done otherwise; yet, in the case of the 
necessary framework, it is hard to see how there could have been even such a 
priority30 to the effect that it was within God's freedom to have done 
otherwise. 
To be sure, in 4.4, we have granted that necessary truths arise out of 
God's self-thinking, and therefore that there is a logical priority between God's 
thinking and the objects of his thought, viz. the ideas in his mind. It is true 
that, in thinking his ideas, God becomes cognitively identical with them but, 
given that it is (the facts - about) his ideas (concepts) which make the 
propositions in question (his thoughts) necessarily true, then one cannot, in a 
circular way, say that it is God's thinking which brings about (the very facts 
about) his ideas. So, from the fact that the divine intellective activity is 
necessary for there to be necessary truths, it should not be concluded that it is 
such an activity which makes them necessarily true. 
On the other hand, even if God's thinking is necessary for there to be 
necessary truths this does not mean that he was somehow free to have done 
29 On the other hand, If the theistic activist conception of creation with respect to the 
necessary framework entails that creation is a necessary divine act, then, as S. A. Davison 
(1991, p. 495) rightly pointed out, this seems much more closer to the neo-platonic 
conception of "emanation" than the theistic notion of creation. 
30 In fact, Morris and Menzel (op. cit., p. 359) think that there may be no temporal 
priority, but that there is a conceptual, or in their terms, a metaphysical priority of God's 
conceiving activity to the existence of the necessary framework. Even so, this does not 
mean that it was within God's freedom to have done otherwise. 
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otherwise in the way he was free in creating the world otherwise or in 
refraining from creating any world at all. This, we might say, is simply 
because of the fact that God has the property of being omniscient essentially, 
whereas he has the property of being a creator contingently. As a result, 
therefore, if creation is a free act, there are good reasons for thinking that 
abstract objects and necessary truths could not have been created. 
6.4 Creation and Divine Nature 
It has been pointed out that, on the theistic activist account, for any 
abstract object and necessary truth to be created it is sufficient for it to be 
thought by God; it is God's intellective activity which is held to be responsible 
for the act of creation. In other words, God's conceiving activity is tantamount 
to the divine activity of creating abstract objects and necessary truths. In 
Morris and Menzel's terms, this is a natural consequence of the "function of 
what he [God] is". 31 Thus it is "a function what God is" that it is necessarily the 
case that the law of contradiction is true, or that 2 is smaller than 5, or again 
that 4+4=8. Again supposing that the existence of the necessary framework 
naturally flows from God's own nature, it would be inconceivable to detach the 
existence of the necessary framework from God's existence; thus it cannot be 
the case that God exists and abstract objects and necessary truths fail to exist, 
or exist differently from what they are. 
But can an activity thus described be 'creation'? That is, is the concept 
of creation used properly when applied to God's functioning, his nature or 
himself? This might be more accurately understood along the following 
Kantian lines: why should we think, for instance, that we create necessary 
truths such as that 2+2=4 simply because of the fact that it is a part of our 
nature that we take 2+2=4 to be necessarily true? For a moment, let us 
31 Ibid., p. 357. 
194 
suppose that God's relation to the necessary framework is akin to our relation 
to the Kantian a priori / necessary categories and concepts, and likewise that 
the whole set of abstract objects and necessary truths composes God's a priori 
conceptual scheme in the sense that they are a result of the function of his 
nature. And moreover, given that the Kantian a priori categories and concepts 
are essential to the human mind, similarly let us suppose that the necessary 
framework is an essential part of the divine mind's functioning in this way 
rather than the other. Following out these lines of thought, abstract objects 
and necessary truths are considered to be the outcome of the function of 
certain minds, either divine or human. Given that this analogy does justice to 
the theistic activist account of the relation between God and the framework of 
abstract objects and necessary truths, we might now ask whether it would be 
accurate to think that, on this Kantian analogy, we create our a priori 
conceptual scheme, or the necessary framework which is essential to our 
intellective activity, and thus a product of the functioning of the human 
nature? If the answer is "no" -to me it is pretty clear that it should be- it 
becomes hard to see how the theistic activist assertion that God is creatively 
responsible for the existence of the necessary framework in the sense that it 
is "a function of what God is" could be true. Moreover, if the necessary 
framework is a function of what God is, then how are we to understand the 
very nature of such a functioning? On which grounds does God, so to speak, 
cause his nature to function his nature so as to create the necessary 
framework? 
To employ the concept of creation for the existence of the framework of 
abstract objects and necessary truths seems to generate some more difficult 
questions. Thus for example, God himself seems to have some essential as well 
as accidental properties, thus it is an essential part of the divine nature that he 
is omniscient or omnipotent as it is a contingent property of God that he is the 
creator of this world. But what matters here is the set of divine essential 
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properties which are considered to be constitutive of the divine nature. Do 
they fall within the scope of the created framework of necessary truths and 
objects? If the answer is yes, in what sense can God's own necessary and 
eternal intellective activity be responsible for his own essential properties? 
For, if this were so, would it not follow that God would be creatively responsible 
for his own nature, and perhaps therefore for himself? And is not that an 
unacceptably circular account? 
The principal difficulty, as seen, concerns the question of "how can God 
himself be the instantiation of the items that he creates"32, and it seems hard 
to give a satisfactory explanation for this claim. To begin with, such a view 
makes it obligatory for the theistic activist to account for the divine essential 
properties in terms of creation. But to think that God creates his own essential 
attributes, given they crucially differ from the rest of abstract objects, 
requires someone to demonstrate that there is a sense in which we might 
think that God can reasonably create his own nature. 
However, If God is essentially omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good it 
would follow that God is necessarily the way he is, in other words, God cannot 
exist without his nature. There are some properties which are requisites of God 
and without exemplifying them he cannot be himself, God. Therefore, 
(6) Necessarily if God exists he exemplifies his nature, viz., his essential 
properties. 
But, on the other hand, according to the theistic activism, 
(7) Necessarily for any abstract object 0, and necessary truth T God is 
creatively responsible for the existence of O and T. 
But (6) and (7) together entail that, 
32 Ibid., p. 359. 
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(8) Necessarily God is creatively responsible for his essential properties. 
Now, If God's individual nature, or essence consists in the conjunction of 
all those properties he has and they are necessarily exemplified in him, then 
if God creates his essential properties, this seems to entail that God creates his 
own nature. But what exactly could that mean? Can God really create his 
nature? 
Morris and Menzel's rejoinder to this question is in the affirmative, and 
for them, there is no absurdity or unacceptable circularity about God's 
creating his nature when properly understood. Indeed, according to them, this 
can be better understood analogously to the following thought experiment. 
Suppose there exists a materialisation machine which has the ability to create 
matter ex nihilo and stands to its products in a relation of continual creation. 
Having been used for a while, the knobs of the materialisation machine begin 
to wear out such that they become unusable, however, they are set to produce 
new knobs, and the old knobs are changed with the new ones. And in the end 
of this process, the materialisation machine similarly continuously creates all 
of its parts. If this thought experiment is acceptable, then, according to Morris 
and Menzel, there is no reason why God's creating his nature should not be 
conceivable. 33 
This thought experiment is meant to show the conceivability of God's 
continuously creating his nature, and- in this respect, it seems to share a 
parallelism with the argument that if God can cause his existence at each 
moment of time, and given that time has no beginning, then he can be the 
cause of his existence at all moments of time. In other words, since God exists at 
all times, for any time t, God's creative activity at t-i can be taken to be 
causally responsible for God's existence at t. Accordingly, for every moment of 
33 (1986), p. 359. 
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time t at which God exists, God's creative activity prior to t, namely t-1, would 
account for his existence. 34 Then, it would seem that God exists because he has 
caused himself to exist, and consequently, it would be true that God owes his 
existence to his creative activity. 
With Swinburne, however, we might think that this argument depends 
for its validity on the principle that, 
(9) S is the cause of the occurrence of a collection of states if and only if it is a 
collection of the causes of each 35 
According to Swinburne, (9) holds for any finite or infinite set of effects, 
where none of the causes of any members of the collection of effects is itself a 
member of the collection of effects. Thus for instance, if the cause of a is a', b 
is W, and c is c, thus a, b, c, a, W, and c' , being distinct states, then a'+b'+c' is 
the cause of a+b+c. But, given the cases where the cause or part of the cause of 
some member of a collection of effects is itself a member of that set36, 
Swinburne maintains 
when b is the cause of a, and c is the cause of b, we say that the cause of a+b is 
c, not b+c If c is the lighting of a fuse, b is an explosion caused by c, a an 
explosion caused by b, then the case of a+b is just c. Again if b and c are 
conjointly the cause of a, d is the cause of b, and e is the cause of d, then the 
cause of a+b+d is not b+c+d+e, but merely c+e. 37 
Hence (9) must be modified as, 
34 See Swinburne, (1977), pp. 259-263; also, see Leftow (1990b), p. 205. 
35 Swinburne, op. cit., p. 260. 
36 Ibid., p. 261. 
37 Ibid., p. 261. 
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(10) S is the cause of the occurrence of a collection of states if and only' if it is 
a collection of the causes of each, which are not members of the former 
collection 38 
Accordingly, one thing seems essential to this view of causation: the 
cause must lie outside the series. If there are no causes outside the series, then 
the whole series has no cause; thus for instance, if the earliest state of the 
universe has no cause, the whole series has no cause. 39 Now, given that this 
account of causation is true, it seems to me that, Swinburne is basically right 
in his argumentation that, 
although we could then say that God was the cause of his possessing those 
properties at any given moment of time, because (in virtue of possessing those 
properties) he brought it about at the prior moment that he possess at the 
succeeding moment; what we could not say is that he is the cause of his eternal 
possession of those properties. 40 
The real question, therefore, is not whether God once being God can 
maintain his subsequent existence, but rather, whether there was a time, or 
metaphysical priority when, so to speak, God was not God, but subsequently he 
caused his nature, therefore created himself. This seems to be just impossible 
for the simple reason that God presupposes and thus needs his nature in order 
to create his nature/ himself. 41 That is to say, God's exemplifying his nature 
must be prior to creating his nature, and this is unacceptable. It seems to me 
that this conclusion by no means applies to Morris and Menzel's analogical 
thought experiment of the materialisation machine, which at best 
demonstrates the possibility of divine "self-preservation" rather than "self- 
creation" which is the real issue. 
38 Ibid, pp. 261-262. 
39 Ibid, pp. 261-262. 
40 ibid., p. 262. 
41 Leftow (1990a), p. 588. 
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Morris and Menzel can hardly object to this conclusion on the grounds 
that such an argument presupposes a temporal priority of God's creating his 
nature inasmuch as their analogy of the materialisation machine is after all a 
temporal analogy and this, in a sense, seems to show that on the notion of 
creation cannot be devoid of temporal implications. Furthermore, even if one 
agrees with the theistic activist that there is not a temporal priority in God's 
creating his essential properties -his nature- since there is a conceptual or 
logical priority between God and his creative action, to say that God creates his 
nature would imply that God could have refrained from creating his nature 
and also that he could have created his nature other than it is. But this would 
imply that God's nature is logically contingent, which clearly contradicts the 
very theistic activist claim that God is essentially what he is. 
But given that on the theistic activist understanding it is inevitable that 
God creates his nature, does this necessarily lead us to think that God creates 
himself? It does not, according to Morris and Menzel. Because, 
God stands In a relation of logical dependence to his nature (... ). His nature 
stands in a relation of causal dependence to him. It simply does not follow that 
God stands In a relation of causal dependence to himself. Relations of logical 
dependence are always transitive. Relations of continuous causal dependence 
are always transitive. But we have no reason to think that transitivity always 
holds across these two relations. If God creates some bachelor, the existence of 
this bachelor is logically sufficient for the existence of some unmarried man. 
It follows that God creates some unmarried man. But the transitivity we thus 
see across the causal and logical dependence relations holds only in case the 
unmarried man is one and the same individual as the bachelor. Unless the 
doctrine of divine simplicity is true, God is not identical with his nature. 
Since we have rejected the doctrine of divine simplicity, we can reject the 
Inference that from God's nature causally depending on God, and God's 
logically depending on his nature, it follows that God causally depends on 
himself. Thus the view that God is the absolute creator of everything distinct 
from himself does not entail that God is self-caused, or self-created 42 
42 Morris and Menzel, op. cis, p. 360 
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Crucial to the above argument is the supposition that God is not identical 
with his nature. If that is true, then, on Morris and Menzel's account, it goes 
without saying that even if God causes his nature to exist -creates it-, it does 
not follow that he causes himself to exist, and hence that he creates himself. 
But how could we understand this if God's nature entails the existence of God or 
if God is God if and only if he exemplifies his nature? In other words, it is hard 
to see how God and God's nature can be conceived to exist apart from each 
other. If God is essentially what he is, and if he cannot be what he is unless he 
has his nature or unless his essential properties are exemplified, it necessarily 
follows that the existence of God's nature entails God's existence, and vice 
versa. 43 The basic difficulty here is that, unlike contingent beings whose 
essences (natures) are contingently exemplified, God's individual essence (his 
nature) is necessarily exemplified. 
On the other hand, God's creating his nature implies that God makes his 
existence possible, but this is clearly false for the simple reason that God 
cannot make his existence possible unless he already exists. Moreover, one 
might rightly think that if x is God and x's existence is merely possible, then 
something other than x, say y, must exist in order to actualise divine possible 
existence. But this clearly contradicts the very theistic aseity intuition that 
God exists totally independent of all other things and that although God's 
existence accounts for the existence of anything distinct from God, by 
contrast, nothing accounts for his existence. That is why, although one can 
push a regress for the explanation of anything distinct from God which stops 
in God, there cannot be any regress which goes beyond God to explain God's 
own existence. All explanatory regress therefore ends in God. Nothing -causal 
or whatever- can account for God's own existence; his existence does not 
43 See Leftow, (1990b), p. 201. 
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depend upon anything other than himself, he is therefore in a sense self- 
dependent. 44 Accordingly, it is wrong to think that God creates his nature. 
Even though God and his nature cannot exist apart from each other, 
however, it seems to me that one can rightly object to the identification of God 
with his nature on some other grounds. Thus, given that properties, God's 
essential properties included, are abstract objects and that God's nature is the 
conjunction of all his essential properties, it would be agreed that God's nature 
itself is a property. But if God's nature is identical with a property, as 
Plantinga pointed out, "then he isn't a person but a mere abstract object; he 
has no knowledge, awareness, power, love or life. "45 But this is unacceptable. 
Essential to such an argument is that God, as an actual agent, cannot be 
identical with his mere abstract nature, and this seems to entail that there is a 
clear distinction between a property F and the exemplification of F. And 
crucial to such a distinction is the supposition that properties -abstract 
objects- are not self-exemplifying entities, that is to say, redness is not red, 
knowledge does not know, love does not love, etc. 46 Thus, one might say, even 
though divine essential properties are necessarily exemplifying they are not 
self-exemplifying. That is, God exemplifies his essential properties such as 
being omniscient in every possible world but omniscience -as a mere abstract 
object, without being exemplified by an actual being- does not know. 
Accordingly, it seems that the theistic activist can rightly challenge the 
identification of God with his nature, but does this enable him to argue that 
God is creatively responsible for his essential properties, and therefore his 
nature? Of course not. For, as has already been pointed out, to say that God 
creates his essential properties is to say that God is creatively responsible for 
his nature, and there are good reasons for thinking that if God is creatively 
44 See Leftow, (1990a), pp. 584-590. 
45 (1980), p. 47. 
46 See Wolterstorff, (1991), p. 548. 
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responsible for his nature, he could have created his nature other than it is, 
and also he could have refrained from creating his nature. In brief, such a 
thesis is clearly false for two simple reasons: (i) God is essentially what he is, 
that is, God cannot be God unless he has his nature, and (ii) God can be able to 
create something if and only if he exists, and he exists if and only if he 
exemplifies his nature; therefore he cannot create his nature. 
In conclusion, even though the theistic activist view that the reference 
of necessary truths is divine concepts such that "he cannot annihilate or alter 
them intrinsically', 47, at first sight, seems to satisfy our realist considerations 
about abstract objects as ideas in the mind of God, nevertheless this is not the 
case. Some important difficulties arise from the improper use of the concept 
of 'creation'. Thus, first of all, abstract objects and necessary truths, as seen, 
could not have been created if 'create' either means have 'a temporal 
beginning' or 'a non-temporal beginning'. That is, abstract objects and 
_ necessary truths can neither 'have a beginning in time' nor 'be logically 
contingent'. Secondly, although it is true that one might avoid the problems 
facing the Cartesian view by thinking that God necessarily creates abstract 
objects and necessary truths, this seems to contradict the theistic conception 
of God as a free creator. Fiore importantly, if we consider that abstract objects 
are created by God's self-functioning, it then becomes difficult to understand 
the very nature of such a being. Thus, since God himself has certain 
properties constitutive of his nature, the theistic activist view leaves us with 
the incredible consequence that God might have created his nature. Given all 
this, one can rightly conclude that God cannot be creatively responsible for 
the necessary framework (his concepts and necessary thoughts) via his 
intellective activity and therefore that one should take leave of 'creation' in 
regard to abstract objects and necessary truths. 
47 Morris and Menzel, op. cit., p. 357. 
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7. DIVINE CONCEPTUALISM REVISITED 
In 4.4, following a pattern of thought put forward by Plato and Plotinus, 
I argued that the problems facing the realist ontology of abstract objects, 
which we took to be the proper of reference of necessary truths, can be 
overcome when this ontology is construed as ideas in the mind of God. Such a 
position was designated as "Divine Conceptualism" which, I think, not only 
provides an explanation for our understanding of the interconnectedness of 
abstract objects and therefore of the nature of necessary truths but also offers 
an answer to the epistemological problem of abstract objects and necessary 
truths. 
Having examined two accounts which, on the other hand, relate abstract 
objects and necessary truths to God via his creation, we have seen that they 
fail to capture our realistic intuitions about the ontological and modal 
properties of abstract objects and necessary truths, and also they are rendered 
implausible by the problems stemming from the possible implications of the 
concept of 'creation'. However, divine conceptualism has not so far been ruled 
out. But, does divine conceptualism avoid the problems facing the creationist 
approaches? 
Although divine conceptualism is in agreement with both the Cartesian 
voluntarism and theistic activism that God is the ground of abstract objects and 
necessary truths, it nevertheless differs from the Cartesian voluntarism in 
repudiating the idea that God creates (abstract objects and) necessary truths or 
that 
(1) For any necessary proposition p, it is God's will which makes p necessary, 
therefore, p is necessary if and only if God wishes p to be necessary; 
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and differs from theistic activism in rejecting the crucial equation that 
(2) For any abstract object 0 and necessary truth p to be created is to be 
thought by God necessarily and eternally. 
By rejecting (1), it seems to me, the divine conceptualist is able to side- 
step the aforementioned absurdities facing the Cartesian voluntarist. On the 
divine conceptualist account, it is/ was not within divine choice to have 
changed the ontological and modal properties of abstract objects; necessary 
truths therefore show the limit of divine power and of all possibilities. 
However, from this, it should not follow that God is somehow subject to certain 
external limitations, since what sets the boundaries of possibilities is the 
divine concepts (ideas) and their instrinsic properties and the relations 
obtaining between them, which God has in his mind by his nature. 
The divine conceptualist and the theistic activist have in common that 
both reject (1), and also take abstract objects, which are the reference of 
necessary truths, to be somehow grounded in the divine intellect. The divine 
conceptualist disagrees with the theistic activist on (2). Thus the divine 
conceptualist thinks that (i) the theistic activist equation that God's thinking 
of an abstract object 0 or a necessary truth p eternally and necessarily is 
God's creating of 0 or p, is invalid, and therefore such a thing cannot 
legitimately be characterized in terms of creation; and (ii) since the very idea 
of creation (where the act of creation is taken to be a free act) implies 
contingency in that anything created may have not been created or could 
have been created otherwise, it cannot be applied to the case of abstract objects 
and necessary truths; they do not fall within the scope of creation whatsoever. 
And more importantly, (iii) since the divine conceptualist thinks that these 
ideas are in the mind of God because of his nature it rejects the theistic activist 
view that they are the products of the divine intellective activity. 
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On tentative grounds we have seen that abstract objects as the reference 
for the claims of necessary truths are best conceived as ideas in the mind of 
God. Accordingly, we might say that they depend upon God's mind for their 
existence in the sense that ideas (mental objects) cannot exist without a mind, 
however, this does not mean that he is somehow causually responsible for 
their existence. It is true that God is cognitively identical with the ideas in his 
mind eternally and necessarily inasmuch as he is essentially omnscient, but it 
is equally true that the objects of his cognition are logically distinct from his 
cognition. This leads us think that God's having these ideas in his mind is 
simply a brute fact about him. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for thinking that the ontological 
and modal status enjoyed by abstract objects is retained on this picture 
inasmuch as they are identified with the ideas in the mind of a being, God, who 
is necessary and Ultimate. Also, since God is essentially what he is and has 
these ideas in his mind by his very nature, his concepts are essentially as they 
are, that is, they have their intrinsic properties and relations necessarily. 
7.1 Divine Conceptualism Characterised 
Crucial to the divine conceptualist view, as seen, is the view that the 
reference of necessary truths is the ontology of abstract objects as conceived 
as ideas in the mind of God. The ontology of abstract objects thus turns out to be 
the divine mental ontology, and therefore what is responsible for the 
ontological and modal properties of necessary truths is the nature of divine 
concepts. Accordingly, propositions are to be identified with the divine 
thoughts which are the outcome God's self-thinking. However, since God 
eternally and necessarily thinks himself, propositions too exist eternally and 
necessarily. 
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However, one should distinguish the question of the necessary existence 
of propositions from that of their alethic modal properties. Thus, for example, 
it is one thing to think that the proposition that 
(3)2+2=4, 
as an abstract object (a divine thought) exists necessarily but still another to 
think that such a proposition is necessarily true. Thus, it might be said that 
even though every proposition has the property of existing necessarily, not 
every proposition is necessarily true as there is a prima facie distinction 
between necessary and contingent propositions. Thus, for example, while a 
proposition such as (3) has the property of being true necessarily, a 
contingent proposition such as 
(4) Plato is the teacher of Aristotle 
has the property of being true accidentally or contingently. Let us first 
consider the ontological issues: exactly in which sense do propositions exist? 
Granted that propositions are the outcome of God's eternally and 
necessarily thinking his ideas, we might think that all propositions, as divine 
thoughts, depend on God's thinking for their existence. Therefore, 
(5) Propositions exist if and only if they are thought (entertained) by God. 
Indeed (5) can also be backed up by the general conviction that 
propositions are to be conceived as possible objects of beliefs in that they exist 
if and only if they are either believed or disbelieved by a person or mind. 1 
Thus, as Plantings writes, it might "seem just crazy to suppose that 
propositions could exist quite independent of minds or persons or judging 
beings. "2 
1 See Pollock (1984), pp. 7-8. 
2 (1982), pp. 67-68. 
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However, Frege objects to the identification of propositions with certain 
mental dispositions on the grounds that if propositions were the mental 
contents of some mind, it would be difficult or impossible for more than one 
person to grasp same the propositional content; propositions could hardly 
have been, as an objective fact, the subject of an intersubjective 
communication. 3 
Divine conceptualism is invulnerable to this objection. From the fact 
that propositions are identical with God's thoughts it does not follow that they 
cannot be the subject of intersubjective communication; on the contrary, it 
can rightly be argued that since propositions thus conceived are objective in 
the sense that they exist independently of other contingent minds, it is more 
intuitive to think that such an objective domain of understanding, the divine 
mind, should be the source of our perceiving propositions than a mind- 
independent realm of propositions. This should be more evident when we 
consider how the epistemological difficulties facing a realist view of abstract 
objects conceived of as existing independent of God, may be avoided on the 
divine conceptualist account where our grasp of abstract objects and therefore 
propositions is understood to be a result of some kind of divine action on us. 
Thus, given that propositions are divine thoughts, one might say, to grasp a 
proposition is to have a divine thought communicated to one. 
There is, however, another Fregean4 objection to the identification of 
propositions with certain mental contents. That is, if we are to think of 
propositions as somehow the objects of thought of some mind then there is the 
risk of falling into the trap of psychologism. Given that what propositions 
express, the content of propositions, is objective, then their truth and falsity 
does not change from person to person; people's beliefs concerning 
3 See Frege (1956), pp. 27-29. 
4 See ibid., passim 
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propositions are clearly subjective, therefore, the same proposition could be 
held true by one person but held to be false by the other. 
It seems to me that Frege's worries are well-justified. True, it is a fact 
that we are easily mistaken about the truth-value of propositions, we hold 
many true as well as false beliefs, but that does not affect the truth value of 
propositions; thus for example, that Tom believes that p does not make pa true 
proposition or vice-versa. However, since the divine conceptualist thinks that 
such a person cannot but be a necessary mind, God, who is omniscient, she can 
satisfactorily argue that divine conceptualism is invulnerable to Frege's 
objection. Since the divine conceptualist identifies propositions with God's 
thoughts, there is no reason for thinking that God might have false beliefs. 
Indeed, if God is by definition omniscient it is not just unlikely that he holds 
false beliefs, but impossible; hence there is every reason to suppose that his 
beliefs are objective in the strictest sense. 
In fact, such a divine conceptualist picture also sheds light upon the 
divine self-knowledge. Thus, since God is essentially omniscient he is 
necessarily self-aware; that is, he has complete self-knowledge. God believes of 
himself that he exists necessarily, he is omnipotent and omniscient etc. Let us 
call God's knowledge of himself "Divine knowledge de se". Although every 
subject (self) S (other than the divine self) has certain beliefs or knowledge 
of herself to some extent and Ss beliefs of herself might be incorrigible for S, 
this, nevertheless, does not mean S is infallible in this respect. There might be 
a lot of false beliefs which S ascribes to herself. Then, it is hard to see how S's 
self-knowledge can be complete. However, since God is omniscient and 
therefore infallible in this respect, he cannot possibly ascribe false beliefs to 
himself; his beliefs of himself are, so to speak, de re (facts) of himself. 5 
Therefore, only God has complete knowledge of himself. 
5 For a general account of de se propositional attitudes, see D. Lewis (1979), pp. 133-159. 
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However, not all propositions and therefore not all divine thoughts are 
necessarily true. The reference for the claims of necessary truths, it has been 
argued, is the ontology of abstract objects conceived as ideas (concepts) in the 
mind of God. Now, if what makes a divine thought necessarily true itself is a 
mental state of affairs about divine concepts then we might characterize 
necessary truths such as 
(3)2+2-4 
as divine conceptual truths where, since God is eternally and necessarily 
engaged in thinking his concepts, his thinking of (3) is cognitively identical 
with facts about the concepts involved in (3). 6 That is, since God thinks that 
2+24 eternally and necessarily, it cannot be the case that he thinks that 
2+24 without at the same time recognizing that 2+2=4 is the case, that is, 
that it is true. 
In other words, the truth and necessity of (3), as a necessary divine 
thought, is the function of divine concepts where "the number 2, the number 
4, the relation of addition, and that of equality are all divine concepts"7. But 
how about contingent truths such as 
(4) Plato is the teacher of Aristotle? 
Is (4) a conceptual truth? It is hard to answer this question in the affirmative, 
because it is evident that none of the terms involved in such a proposition 
seems to make it true. Nothing about the individual essence of Plato seems to 
make him a teacher let alone making him the teacher of Aristotle. 
However, given that all propositions (necessary or contingent), as 
abstract objects, exist necessarily, we might say, even though contingent 
6 Despite the clear resemblance between this view and the identity theory of truth which 
identifies facts with true thoughts, the divine conceptualist thinks that there is a logical 
distinction between a divine thought and what makes it necessarily true. 
7 Morris and Menzel op. cit, pp. 355-356. 
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propositions such as (4) are not true in terms of divine concepts, they depend 
upon the divine mind for their existence. 
Thus, we might say that God's thinking of propositions comes in 
different grades of divine propositional attitudes such as believing, 
entertaining, conceiving8; thus even though God necessarily thinks 
(entertains) all propositions, he does not believe them all. Given that 
propositions come in different modal grades with respect to their truth-values, 
the divine conceptualist can articulate this phenomenon in relation to divine 
propositional attitudes. Let us start with the case of contingent propositions. A 
proposition such as 
(4) Plato is the teacher of Aristotle, 
is true in only some possible worlds. In other words, one might say, (4) is true 
if and only if the state of affairs corresponding to (4) obtains; that is to say, it 
is true only if there is an actual world in which Plato as a matter of fact is the 
teacher of Aristotle. But clearly that Plato taught Aristotle is purely a matter of 
contingency; it could have been the case that Plato never taught Aristotle, and 
as a result, there are possible worlds in which (4) is indeed false. But given 
that God does not have false beliefs, one might say 
(6) For any contingent truth p, p is a contingent divine thought such that God 
believes that p if and only if God wills to actualise/create at least one possible 
world w, in which the state of affairs designated by p obtains, and that there is 
some possible worlds w in which the state of affairs designated by p fails to 
obtain. 
Thus, although the truth of contingent propositions depends upon 
divine choice to create an actual world in which the corresponding states of 
8 For a detailed account of such a different gradation of divine thoughts and propositional 
attitudes, see Loux (1986), pp. 500- 511. 
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affairs obtain, necessary truths are true independently of such a divine act. 
` 
Since necessary truths remain true, so to speak, on all divine interpretations, 
therefore, God necessarily believes them. Necessary truths thus seem to have a 
special status in the divine intellect. To mark this difference one might say, 
(7) For any necessary, truth p, p is a necessary divine thought such that God 
strongly believes that p. 10 
But is it correct to characterise God having strong beliefs and 
presumably weak beliefs? It does not seem so, for we might rightly think that 
such different gradations of belief states have rather anthropomorphic 
connotations; perhaps we hold strong and weak beliefs because we are not in 
an epistemically perfect condition to see whether our beliefs are justified and 
therefore true. But this cannot be true of God, hence, it seems to be more 
accurate to follow Plantingaii in saying that it is a part of divine nature to 
believe necesssary truths, therefore we might rephrase (7) as 
(7*) For any necessary truth p, p is a necessary divine thought such that it is a 
part of God's nature to believe that p. 
In a word, propositions as abstract objects enjoy the status of necessary 
existence simply because of the fact that God eternally and necessarily thinks 
(entertains) them; and some propositions enjoy the status of being necessarily 
true simply because of being divine conceptual truths. 
Thus, there was no time when God did not entertain the thought that 
Plato is the teacher of Aristotle or did not believe that 2+2=4, even though 
9 Thus, as Peikoff notes, in " ... the dualism of the Divine Intellect and the Divine Will the 
former gives rise to necessary truths, the latter, to the contingent truths. " (1984, p. 31). 
See also Morris and Menzel op. cit., p. 355. 
10 Such a description of necessary truth in terms of "strong divine beliefs" is introduced 
in Loux, op. cat, p. 510. 
11 (1980), p. 145. 
213 
there was a time when neither Plato nor Aristotle existed or 2+2=4 was not 
exemplified. It is therefore inconsistent with the nature of God to fail to 
entertain that Plato is the teacher of Aristotle or to believe that 2+2=4, even 
though he could have believed the former otherwise given that he could have 
created another possible world in which the state of affairs of Plato's being the 
teacher of Aristotle does not obtain; but clearly he could not have believed 
otherwise in the case of the latter. For the equality relation (which happened 
to be expressed in the conventional notation "=") obtaining between "2 + 2" and 
"4" is a necessary relation while the (tutorship) relation taking place between 
Plato and Aristotle is a contingent one. 
So, it is correct to say that even though all abstract objects exist in the 
divine mind, not all of them are actualised/ exemplified. This seems to shed 
light on the divine conceptualist conception of unactualised possibilia, that is, 
possible worlds, possible state of affairs, possible individuals etc., as there are 
unexemplified properties such as, the property of being a "winged horse" 
which has an intermediate position between what actually exists and what is 
simply non-existent which one cannot even think of. 
Following the modal actualist account of the unactualised but possible 
objects, 12 namely that they are merely abstract objects, the defender of 
"divine conceptualism" could extend his basic view to the domain of 
unexemplified objects by maintaining that like the rest of abstract objects, 
they are necessary beings and therefore are ideas in the mind of God. 13 Indeed 
that the ontological basis of possible but unexemplified objects is grounded in 
God's mind leads us to the threshold of the traditional theory of "exemplarism", 
according to which all abstract objects or the ideas (properties, exemplars, or 
individual essences) of all possible beings exist eternally in God's mind; and 
12 See Plantinga (1976), p. 272. 
13 Cf. Rescher (1973), pp. 166-181. 
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among these eternally existing exemplars in the divine mind God chooses what 
he wishes to create/ exemplify. 14 
Consequently, divine conceptualism, by grounding abstract objects in 
the mind of God in terms of divine ideas, takes God to be the source of all 
modalities, necessities and possibilities. In so doing, the divine conceptualist 
thinks that abstract objects and necessary truths can be essentially as they 
are, and thus be objective in the strictist sense by reference to the ideas in the 
mind of God. Divine conceptualism can therefore be characterised as 
"conceptual realism" of a special kind. Thus divine conceptualism both 
presupposes and rejects a realism in that it acknowledges the existence of 
abstract objects independently of the contingent instances exemplifying them, 
but also denies that abstract objects exist independently of God's mind. 
Therefore, divine conceptualism does not affirm a nominalistic ontology 
according to which there are only substances, therefore there are no such 
things as abstract objects. However, it is correct, in a sense, to think that 
divine conceptualism too favours the view that in fact only substances exist 
but this does not entail that its ontology is nominalistic; for, as seen, on the 
divine conceptualist view, abstract objects exist and indeed exist necessarily. 
What needs to be seen, therefore, is that the ontological domain of 
abstract objects is by its nature different from that of substances in that while 
the former is entirely mental, the latter is non-mental. While abstract objects 
are mind-dependent, substances exist mind-independently. 15 In so doing, 
14 However, although the traditional theory of "exemplarism", as pointed out, has a great 
explanatory force and rather interesting implications on some theistic problems, it has 
been argued that it involves some other important difficulties such as the difficulty of 
making sense of possible but unactualised objects, or the problem of identifying objects 
across possible worlds, etc. However, this is a matter of a separate debate. For such a 
discussion, see J. S. Ross (1986), pp. 315-314; and L Zagzebski (1989), pp. 119-144. 
15 However, there is a sense in which we might think that the existence of the Forms of 
contingent substances as ideas in the mind of God is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the existence of contingent substances such as trees, cats and human beings. 
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divine conceptualism has the advantage of eliminating the troublesome 
ontology of the abstract in metaphysics: the mental and physical ontology are 
sufficient to explain whatever exists. 
7.2 Divine Conceptualism, God and His Nature 
So far I have tried to offer a general discussion of certain modal and 
ontological issues with the view to clarifying the ground and nature of 
abstract objects as well as necessary and contingent propositions in reference 
to the divine mind; thus, the main argument has been that since abstract 
objects together with their properties and relations are grounded in the mind 
of God in terms of his ideas, God is the source of all necessities and possibilities. 
However, God himself has certain properties some of which are essential to 
him such as being omniscient, and being omnipotent, whereas some are 
accidental to him such as the property of being the creator of the universe. 
Therefore, there are propositions which are contingently true and also 
necessarily true of God such as the proposition that 
(8) God is the creator of the universe; 
and that, 
(9) God exists. 
Now, the question is, how are we to consider these properties and 
propositions? Can we extend the basic argument of divine conceptualism to 
this domain? Given the basic conceptualist intuition that abstract objects are 
ideas in the mind of God and also that properties and propositions about God 
himself too are abstract objects, it must follow that the propositions (8) and (9), 
as abstract objects, too depend upon God's mind for their existence. To start 
with (8), as a contingent proposition, it depends upon the divine mind for its 
existence because it needs to be thought by God in order to exist. But also it is a 
contingent proposition in that God could have refrained from creating the 
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universe; there are possible worlds in which (8) is false. In the divine 
conceptualist terms, (8) is a contingent divine thought, therefore, given (8), 
God believes it only if he as matter fact actualises/ creates the universe; 
therefore its truth depends upon his choice whether to create the universe or 
not. 
As for (9), it also depends upon divine thinking for its existence, but the 
difference is that, unlike (8), it seems to be a necessary proposition. But given 
that the truth of (9) is necessary, unlike (8), its truth does not depend upon a 
divine choice; that is to say, God does not have any alternative to believe 
otherwise; in simple terms, he cannot believe that he does not exist. So, (9) is a 
necessary divine thought and following the account of necessary divine 
thoughts given in (7); (9) is equivalent to 
(10) It is a part of divine nature to believe that (9). 
However, what seems to be puzzling about (9) seems to be its truth 
rather than its existence. To be sure, God's existence, therefore (9), is radically 
different from the rest of the necessary propositions. There does not seem to be 
a particular barrier why 
(4)2+2=4 
should not be necessarily true in reference to the interconnected divine 
concepts, but one can hardly say the same thing for (9); it seems impossible 
that (9) is true in reference to the concepts involved in (9). In other words, 
God's actual existence cannot be grounded in his mind. As Russell puts it, "who 
would dare... to say that God's existence depends upon his understanding? " 16, By 
the same token, the necessity involved in the existence of God cannot in turn 
be explained in reference to de dicto modality which is embedded in the nature 
of the divine mind. Even if we suppose that it is a part of the concept of "God" 
that he exists necessarily, and that God has such a concept eternally and 
necessarily in his mind, and thus that (9) eternally and necessarily true, this 
16 (1937), p. 179. 
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cannot explain the necessary existence of God in actual terms. God's actual 
existence cannot be the result of the conceptual necessity involved in (9). 
Such an account is therefore unquestionably circular and mistaken. 
However, the divine conceptualist need not be commited to such a 
clearly absurd view. What the divine conceptualist is committed to is that (9), 
as an abstract object, is mind-dependent, therefore, he would argue that God is 
responsible for the existence of (9) purely on the propositional level, not for 
the actual state of affairs designated by (9), that is, God's (de re) existence. On 
the contrary, the divine conceptualist takes the existence of God to be the 
ontologically most fundamental reality of all; the first condition (i. e., the first 
actual state of affairs) which obtains necessarily, and the proposition 
descriptive of this actual condition, that is, "God exists" to be the first truth of 
all. Therefore, the proposition "God exists" can be true only if the state of 
affairs designated by such a proposition, as a matter of fact, obtains; that is, 
only if there is a God. This is true and the divine conceptualist grants the fact 
that although (9) depends on the divine mind for its existence not for its truth, 
and therefore the necessity involved in the actual existence of God is 
ontological, not propositional. 
Indeed, the divine conceptualist thinks that God is the unique necessary 
substance whose essence and existence is inseparable whereas other 
substances such as human beings, cats and stones are created, contingent 
substances which exist only in the actual worlds in which God creates them. 
That is why, the essence of these substances (each of which is a necessary 
being) is distinct from their existence (which is a matter of contingency). 
However, on the divine conceptualist account, the necessity of divine existence 
cannot be considered in the same boat as, for instance, the necessity of a 
proposition such as (3); the necessity of a proposition is to be understood in 
reference to the nature of God's concepts; whereas the necessity of divine 
existence itself is to be understood in the sense that he is the ultimate being 
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upon whom everything else depend for its existence. This fact was clearly 
underlined by Leibniz: "... without him [God] there would be nothing real in 
the possibilities -not only nothing existent, but also nothing possible. " 
17 
Without God's existence, on this view, neither can anything else exist nor be 
possible; his existence, ontologically, is the most fundamental fact. 
But what about divine properties, notably, those pertaining to God's own 
nature such as omniscience, omnipotence? Given the above account that God's 
existence in a sense precedes everything else, then, obviously God cannot exist 
without exemplifying those properties which are essential to his nature. If so, 
how are we to say that divine essential properties depend upon the divine mind 
without facing the seemingly inevitable charge of circularity? 
Here, it might be said that once again the circularity results from a 
confusion between properties as abstract objects and their actual instances. 
When the divine conceptualist maintains that abstract objects depend upon 
God's mind, he does not mean that their actual instances too depend upon God's 
mind. Thus, for example, even though the conceptualist thinks that properties 
such as green as abstract objects depend upon the divine mind, by this, he does 
not mean that the actual, exemplified, (concrete) greenness of actual 
substances such as the actual property-instance of the tree in our garden too 
depend upon the divine mind. For the exemplified (actual) property-instances 
depend on the divine creation, i. e., upon the divine will, rather than the divine 
intellect. Similarly, when the divine conceptualist says that the divine 
properties are abstract objects, therefore, that they are grounded in God's 
mind, by this he does not mean that the actual instances of these properties 
which God exemplifies depend upon God's mind. 18 
17 (1973), p. 185. 




Nevertheless, the divine essential properties seem to posit a special case 
in that while the non-divine properties, the properties of contingent 
substances, precede their exemplifications, this does not hold in the case of 
divine essential properties. On the contrary, God's exemplifying his properties 
seems to be at least logically prior to, so to speak, his thinking of his properties 
as abstract objects. But this does not seem to be a great trouble for the divine 
conceptualist argument that abstract objects are grounded in the divine mind 
save that in the case of God, the necessary substance, the exemplification of his 
properties somehow (logically) precedes their existence as concepts in his 
mind. 
It is now time to consider a number of objections to divine 
conceptualism. The first one was originally raised by Russell in his criticism 
of Leibniz: 
God's existence is deduced from the Law of Contradiction, to which it is 
therefore subsequent. Hence we cannot, without vicious circle, maintain that 
this law is only due to God's knowledge of it. Again without the law of ... 
contradiction, as Leibniz truly says [.... ], there would be no difference between 
truth and falsehood. Therefore, without this law, it could not be true, rather 
than false, that God exists. Hence, though God's existence may depend upon the 
law of contradiction, this law cannot in turn depend upon God's existence. 19 
Russell's objection, in essence, maintains that the Law of Contradiction 
would still have held even if God did not exist; 20 therefore, one might say, the 
existence of such a principle as an eternal (mind-independent) essence 
survives even if God did not exist; hence its existence is ontologically more 
fundamental than God's. This obviously contradicts the divine conceptualist 
thesis that the Law of Contradiction, as a necessary truth, depends upon God's 
mind. 
19Ibid., p. 180. 
20 See Wolterstorff (1970), pp. 292-293. 
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In defence of Leibniz, Adams21, taking for granted that the crucial 
starting-point in Leibniz's argument is the impossibility of divine non- 
existence, has argued that "we can intelligibly speculate about the ontological 
status of the Principle of Contradiction only from a standpoint in which the 
truth rather than the falsity of that principle is the default value"22. Thus 
Adams maintains that the vicious circularity would be side-stepped if we think 
that "the proposition 'God exists' depends for its truth on the truth of the 
Principle of Contradiction, while the Principle of Contradiction depends on the 
existence of God, not for its truth, but for its reality, 23. 
Adams is certainly right that one's starting-point must be the 
impossibility of divine non-existence, but how are we to understand the claim 
that the law of contradiction depends upon on the existence of God for its 
existence, not for its truth? What is the truth and the reality of the Law of 
Contradiction? Can we really separate the reality of such a principle from its 
truth? Yes, along the divine conceptualist line depicted above, we might think 
that since propositions by their very nature are mind-dependent, the 
proposition that God exists too, as an abstract object, depends upon God's mind 
for its existence, not for its truth as it is pretty ridiculous to say that the divine 
existence depends upon the divine mind; but it remains difficult to see how this 
account can be applied to the case of the law of contradiction, which says that 
p cannot be true together with not-p. That is to say, that it is necessarily true 
that (p&ýp) is false. 
Perhaps the only intelligible way of making a distinction between the 
reality and truth of such a law is to say that it is one thing to say that the 
proposition that . (p&. -p) exists as an abstract object, but another thing to say 
that - (p &. -p) is true, or indeed necessarily true. Again, it makes sense to say 
21 See (1994), pp. 184-186. 
22 Ibid., p. 186. 
23 Ibid., p. 186. 
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that the reality and the (necessary) truth of -(p & -p) is something different 
from the reality and truth of its instances such as the proposition that 
it is 
false that this table is rectangular and non-rectangular at the same time, or 
that God e sts and God does not eist , but I 
do not see how any of these can 
help us to understand Adams' distinction between the reality and truth of the 
principle in question as such so that one might reasonably claim that it 
depends upon God for its reality, but not its truth. 
However, it seems to me that there is another way of facing the 
Russellian objection. What the principle of contradiction says is that (p & . -p) 
cannot be true, therefore, the necessity here involved is de dicta, it is to do 
with necessity of the propositions. Now given the divine conceptualist account, 
it must follow that it is necessarily true that -(p &-p) is a necessary divine 
thought; that is to say, it is necessarily true because it is a reflection of the 
divine concepts that -(p &-p) should be true. But if the law of contradiction is 
to be restricted to the domain of propositions, then one cannot, with Russell, 
maintain that God's existence is subsequent to the principle in question; 
rather, it must be said, the propositions about God and presumably about his 
nature are subsequent to the law of contradiction. 
Of course, that it is necessarily false that God exists and God does not 
exist, is subsequent to L -(P &rp), but what reasons might one have for the 
contention that God's own existence is subsequent to L-p&.. p)7 However, the 
real target of the objection, one might think, is that God's existence itself 
exemplifies, therefore, it is an instance of the law of contradiction. But I do not 
see how such an objection can go through, for there is, in the actual reality 
including God's existence, as Wittgenstein pointed out in Tractatus, nothing 
which corresponds to the negative fact such as '_'24. However, the divine 
conceptualist thinks that '"'' corresponds to a reality but such a reality is 
24 (1922), § 4.0621. 
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mental. Therefore it seems to me that the law of contradiction finds its real 
force and expression in the domain of propositions, that is, of thoughts. 
But if we are to restrict our discussion to the domain of propositions 
alone, once again, God's existence is not subsequent to the law of contradiction 
whereas the existence of propositions about God, as the divine conceptualist 
already acknowledged, are subsequent to both the existence of God and of the 
principle in question. However, the divine conceptualist would also think that 
since the necessity and truth involved in our understanding of the law of 
contradiction is to do with propositions, therefore, there are good reasons for 
thinking that it depends upon God's mind for its existence as well as the 
necessity of its truth which, I think, cannot be separated from each other in 
the present context. 
The second objection to divine conceptualism goes as follows: God exists 
if and only if it is possible that God exists; that is, God cannot said to be a 
necessary being unless his existence is possible. But then the realm of 
possibilities is ontologically more fundamental than God's existence and 
therefore it cannot be said that possibilities depend upon God for their 
existence. To put it otherwise, to say that God (necessarily) exists is to say that 
he exists in every possible world, this, however, seems to locate God within the 
domain of possibilities which exists independently of God, therefore, such a 
domain would be ontologically more fundamental than God. 25 This, to be sure, 
is unacceptable from the divine conceptualist viewpoint, according to which 
God's mind is the seat of all possibilities. 
Such an objection, it seems to me, is mistaken in that "possibly" cannot 
be predicated of a being whose existence is a matter of de re necessity. That is 
to say, since in God essence cannot be detached from existence, it simply does 
not make sense to say that possibly God exists somehow precedes necessarily 
God exists. Such a terminology, therefore, is applicable only to the beings in 
25 This objection is raised and discussed in Leftow, (1990b), pp. 208ff. 
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which one can draw a distinction between essence and existence; and that is to 
say, it can be applied only to contingent beings. Thus, for example, it can 
rightly be said that it is possible that there are human beings precedes the 
actual existence of human beings, for the essence of no human being involves 
his existence. 
Then, since God has the property of existence essentially; his existence 
is purely actual, no possibility precedes his actual existence. So, we have to 
think that for any being x, if x' s existence is possible, then, in the first place, 
x itself cannot make his existence actual. Hence, x's essence needs to be 
caused/ actualised by an actual being. This is another way of saying that the 
actually existing beings other than God are caused by God to exist; therefore, 
they are all created. But this cannot be true of God as his essence involves his 
existence; that is to say, he is uncaused, unactualised and therefore, uncreated. 
Consequently, if God's essence involves his existence, it must follow that he is 
purely actual and if so, possibility statements do not apply to him. 26 
On the other hand, since the divine conceptualist thinks that (de dicto) 
necessities and possibilities are grounded in the mind of God, he can rightly 
argue that it is the divine mind which delimits what can be true about possible 
worlds and not vice-versa. Indeed, it might be said27 that possible worlds are 
the maximal sets of divine thoughts. 
7.3 Conclusion 
The basic objective of our investigation has been to provide a 
satisfactory explanation to the problem of necessity in order to see what is the 
ground and nature of necessity/ necessary truths and also of our knowledge of 
them. In so doing, we have seen that none of the non-realist theories such as 
26 Also see Leftow, ibid., pp. 210-211. 
27 See (1986), p. 504. 
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naturalism, conventionalism of different kinds, and various conceptualist 
theories in terms of the human-mind-dependency can really do justice to our 
intuitions about necessary truths. 
We saw in Chapter 1 that necessary truths cannot be naturalized on the 
grounds of an extensionalist ontology where they are considered to reflect 
either highly probable inductive truths or truths which are somehow more 
central to one's holistic web of beliefs. Thus I argued that there are certain 
necessary truths such as the law of contradiction which are indispensable for 
our thinking such that there are no conceivable circumstances in which they 
might be revised and therefore I concluded that necessary truths reflect the 
intrinsic properties and relations of intensional (abstract) objects, not those of 
extensional (physical) objects. Likewise, we saw in Chapter 2 that necessary 
truths cannot be explained by reference to a linguistic ontology, therefore 
they are not analytic if by this it is meant that their truth and necessity can be 
established solely by virtue of the meanings of the words involved where 
meanings are rooted in our contingent linguistic conventions. Since meanings 
cannot be identified with certain linguistic entities, necessary truths cannot 
be taken to characterize the properties and relations of certain linguistic 
entities; the intensional ontology in question cannot therefore be identified 
with a linguistic ontology. Therefore I argued that necessary truths cannot be 
rooted in our contingent linguistic conventions but are the essence of every 
possible linguistic convention; that is one cannot establish a linguistic 
convention without already presupposing certain necessary truths. 
The problems of a conventionalist theory of necessary truths are not 
avoided by either the Wittgensteinian radical or anthropological 
conventionalism. In Chapter 3, it has been argued that one cannot show that 
the actual set of necessary truths is the rules of our language-game as it is 
hard to conceive how a radically different language-game could have possibly 
accommodated, say, the negation of the law of contradiction. Equally, to think 
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that necessary truths are constituted by the human forms of life is 
far from 
being convincing unless it is shown how radically different forms of life are 
conceivable. Otherwise, the anthropological conventionalist claim that there 
can be alternative forms of life even though they are inconceivable by us 
seems to face the charge of inconsistency. And this, I argued, shows that the 
content (meaning) of a property (intensional objects in general) cannot be an 
outcome of our social or anthropological agreement. 
By the same token, we saw in Chapter 4 that neither the quasi-realist 
account that necessary truths are answerable to our actual imaginations nor 
the Cautious Man's attitude of holding back in ascribing necessity to necessary 
truths is tenable. Furthermore, the contention that necessary truths cannot be 
identified with the mental properties of human beings is fortified by the 
untenability of the anti-realist (intuitionistic) view that necessary truths are 
grounded in our recognitional capacities. Thus I argued that there are at least 
two reasons for thinking that necessary truths do not owe their existence to 
the mental properties of human beings: (i) necessary truths cannot be 
exhausted by the finite intellectual capacities of space-time bounded creatures, 
viz., they outrun our epistemic capacities and (ii) although it is conceivable 
that human beings could have failed to exist it is not thus conceiveable that 
there were no necessary truths. 
Thus, considering that necessary truths cannot be explained by 
reference to certain contingent facts we saw that there are good reasons for 
eliminating these theories in favour of realism which, in explaining 
necessary truths, makes reference to an ontology of abstract objects which 
exist necessarily and have their properties. and relations essentially. Such a 
realist view, however, is not exempt from difficulties. A well-known problem is 
epistemological: how are we to explain our knowledge of abstract objects 
which are causally inert? Another question is metaphysical: what is the 
ground of the interconnectedness of abstract objects? 
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I have argued in Chapter 4 that the problems facing realism can 
somehow be overcome along a line of thought put forward by Plato and 
Plotinus. Thus, to provide an explanation for the interconnectedness of 
abstract objects, we saw how Plato and Plotinus postulate further metaphysical 
principles. In particular, considering the role of nous in the metaphysics of 
Plato and Plotinus, we have seen that there are good reasons for postulating a 
universal mind as an eternal cognizer of the Forms and also for thinking that 
the Forms have to be somehow internal to it. 
Yet, considering that nous is ontologically secondary to the Form of the 
Good or the One, and thus ontologically derivative (somehow caused or created 
by the archg) I have argued that there are good reasons for supposing that it 
cannot retain the ontological and modal status of abstract objects and 
necessary truths. Nonetheless, I argued the problems facing such a view can 
be reasonably overcome if we combine our considerations about an eternal 
mind, nous, with the theistic concept of God under the label of "Divine 
Conceptualism". 
I have also argued that divine conceptualism is preferable to both 
Plato's and Plotinus' accounts because of its simplicity, it explains the ground 
of abstract objects and necessary truths in reference to one being, viz., God 
rather than two beings, that is, the arche and nous. Indeed, by grounding 
abstract objects in God who is eternal, necessary and omniscient, the divine 
conceptualist not only retains the ontological status of abstract objects and 
necessary truths but also offers an answer to the notorious epistemological 
problem of abstract objects. Accordingly, I argued in tentative fashion that 
abstract objects are best conceived as ideas in the mind of God and necessary 
truths are best conceived as the divine conceptual truths whose necessity and 
truth are answerable to the nature of the interwoven divine concepts. 
However, we. saw that God's relation to necessary truths might call a 
Euthyphro-type dilemma into question: are necessary truths necessary 
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because God wishes them so of his free choice or are they necessary anyway 
such that even he cannot or could not have made them otherwise? In this 
connection, in Chapter 5, having examined the Cartesian doctrine of the 
creation of eternal truths or "Universal Possibilism" according to which, since 
God is responsible for the existence of necessary truths via his creation he 
could have made them otherwise, I argued that such an account leads us to 
certain consequences which are in patent contradiction with our 
philosophical as well as theological intuitions. Thus we saw, for example, if God 
is creatively responsible for necessary truths he could have made it true that it 
Is the case that God has created necessary truths and that they have not been 
created, which can hardly be intelligible. The problems facing such a view 
cannot be resolved by "limited Possibilism" if we assume that necessary truths 
are necessarily necessary. likewise, we saw that such a doctrine cannot be 
vindicated by the contention that God's power to have made necessary truths 
otherwise is inconceivable to the human mind inasmuch as such a possibility 
is not supposed to be conceivable. Indeed, this also seems to make the Cartesian 
doctrine somehow inconsistent and unintelligible. These considerations, it 
seems to me, reinforce our realistic intuition that necessary truths could not 
have been created as they reflect the properties and relations of abstract 
objects which have been identified with ideas in. the mind of God. 
On the other hand, in Chapter 6, having examined Theistic Activism 
which advocates the view that God eternally and necessarily creates abstract 
objects and necessary truths in terms of his intellective activity, I argued that 
even if this might avoid the problems of the Cartesian voluntarism it, 
nevertheless, has its own problems. Thus, assuming that anything created has 
a beginning in time, the concept of creation remains contradictory when 
predicated of abstract objects and necessary truths, which cannot be said to 
have any beginning whatsoever. The idea of necessary creation also 
contradicts the traditional conception of God's being a free creator. And also, 
'I-, 
228 
given that God himself has certain essential properties, this obliges the 
theistic activist to think in a unacceptably circular way that God creates his 
nature. God cannot create his nature without exemplifying his nature, that is 
God cannot create his nature unless he already has it. Thus, if abstract objects 
and necessary truths are the products of, so to speak, divine self-functioning, 
then it becomes difficult to understand the very ground and nature of such a 
functioning without God having his nature (which necessitates the 
exemplification of his essential properties) in the first place. In this 
connection, I argued that even though divine intellective activity is necessary 
for the existence of necessary truths it is not sufficient to explain the very 
facts about God's concepts which make them necessarily true. Therefore, I 
conclude, even though one can agree with the theistic activist on the 
identification of abstract objects and necessary truths with God's necessary 
concepts and thoughts, one should reject that this can properly be explained 
by reference to the traditional theistic doctrine of creation. 
Having rejected the idea that abstract objects and necessary truths can 
be created at all, we are left with divine conceptualism. Since abstract objects 
and necessary truths are uncreated we should think that God has these ideas in 
his mind because of his very nature. However, we have seen that even though 
divine conceptualism, by rejecting the idea of creation, avoids the problems 
facing the Cartesian voluntarism and the theistic activism, it has its own 
problems. Thus, for example, even though one might say the proposition that 
"God exists" depends upon the divine mind for its existence, it is hard to see 
how it might depend upon the divine mind for its necessity and truth. 
Therefore, I have argued that since the necessity and truth of such a 
proposition cannot be answered by reference to the nature of the divine 
concepts involved, the divine conceptualist has to consider this as an exception 
to his general account of necessary truths. Nevertheless, we have seen that the 
divine conceptualist can to some extent square with this difficulty by saying 
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that the necessity and truth of this proposition is to be ontological rather than 
propositional. Another difficulty with divine conceptualism is the question of 
divine essential properties and the divine conceptualist has to acknowledge 
that they are somehow logically prior to their conceptualisation by the divine 
mind and there should have a special category in the theory proposed. 
To be sure, no metaphysical theory should be expected to be free from 
all difficulties, and, as Oliver rightly observes, "one cannot hope to defend a 
metaphysical theory by constructing knock-down arguments against each of 
its competitors". 28 Presumably, therefore, one should somehow look for a 
powerful explanation in constructing a metaphysical theory. In this 
connection, to be sure, divine conceptualism underwrites a few assumptions as 
correct and also has its own defects. All in all, however, divine conceptualism 
remains the most advantageous account we have examined. 
Thus, first of all, it has a simple answer to the Dummettian two-fold 
problem of necessity: the source of necessity is God, and we recognise 
necessary truths because of divine action on us in this respect. As an 
explanatory hypothesis, the fidelity of divine conceptualism to Ockham's razor 
should have been evident inasmuch as the phenomenon of abstract objects and 
necessary truths is explained in reference to only one being, God. The 
simplicity or the ontological economy of divine conceptualism is also evident 
as it eliminates the abstract ontology in metaphysics. 29 
Secondly, taking the abstract ontology to be the divine mental ontology, 
divine conceptualism explains how so-called abstract objects such as 
properties and propositions can be causally effective as they are conceived as 
the concepts and thoughts of God who is a causal power. And thirdly30, divine 
28 (1996), p. S. 
29 For the role of simplicity and ontological economy in constructing a metaphysical 
theory, see ibid, pp. 1-9. 
30 Cf. Morris and Menzel (1986), p. 361. 
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conceptualism accommodates the plausible conceptualist intuition that abstract 
objects and necessary truths are mind-dependent as well as the realistic 
intuition that they are independent of human (contingent) minds. 
Divine conceptualism also seems to have some interesting implications 
for the theory of meaning and understanding. Given that, on the divine 
conceptualist view, properties are divine concepts and that the truth 
conditions of a property F can be obtained by grasping the objective sense 
(intension) of F, it would follow that in grasping the sense of a property one 
grasps the content of a divine concept. And thus the very phenomenon of 
understanding, the grasping of an objective sense, or a relation among ideas 
can, in turn, be seen as a matter of "divine illumination". 
Consider that 'meanings' are grounded in the divine mind, still another 
implication of the divine conceptualism can be found for religious language 
and philosophical theology. Thus even though, on the divine conceptualist 
theory, the human mind is limited in grasping all propositional contents 
(divine concepts and thoughts), nevertheless there is a considerable overlap 
between the human and divine mind. Such an overlap, it might be argued, can 
provide sufficient ground for the (semi) -objectivity of the divine and human 
dialogue and can also underline the theocentric nature of man. 
And finally, given that divine conceptualism, as a theistic hypothesis, 
provides a powerful explanation for the phenomenon of abstract objects and 
necessary truths, it seems to me that one might also consider it as an inductive 
argument for the existence of God. 31 
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